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InFocus Corporation (NASDAQ:INFS) has released its results for the fourth quarter and full year ended December 31 and they are, frankly, nothing short of horrific. As always, Greenbackd’s concern is primarily for the state of the balance sheet and the liquidation value of the company. Here, the news is bad:

Balance Sheet

Total cash and restricted cash as of December 31, 2008 were $33.4 million, a decrease of $36.9 million from the end of the third quarter. The reduction in cash was primarily driven by changes in working capital, the cash loss from operations and settlement on foreign exchange hedges. Inventories at the end of the fourth quarter were $38.5 million, an increase of $8.1 million compared to the third quarter of 2008.

We generally don’t pay too much mind to earnings. We welcome it when earnings fall off a cliff and drag stock along for the ride because it creates opportunities for investors like us who are focused on the balance sheet. We do, however, take issue with a management burning through more than half of a company’s cash in quarter, especially when that cash is set alight in the “settlement on foreign exchange hedges.” An investor cannot have any confidence in a management that, confronted with cash losses from operations, not only neglects to fix operating cash flow but finds a new way to lose money. Remember INFS’s adoption of a poison pill “to help ensure … our Board of Directors is able to conduct its review of strategic alternatives without the threat of coercive takeover or control tactics that do not offer shareholders a fair premium”? Surely that argument is at an end now. Management has failed. It’s time for Nery Capital Partners to bayonet the wounded and put INFS’s stockholders out of their misery.

When we started coverage in December last year, INFS had a market capitalization of $25.6M. We estimated its liquidating value to be more than 80% higher at $46.7M or $1.15 per share. With Nery Capital Partners and Miller pushing the company to enhance its stock price, we believed INFS to be an attractive opportunity. That seems to have been a mistake. We don’t have a full 10Q / 10K to review, so we’ve adjusted our earlier model based on the information in the press release attached to the 8K (described above). Based on that incomplete information, we estimate that INFS’s liquidation value could now be as low as $8M or $0.20 per share. Given that INFS closed yesterday at $0.37, our reason for holding the stock is gone. Accordingly, we have to close out the position. We opened it at $0.63, so our INFS position is down 41.3% on an absolute basis. The S&P 500 Index closed at 873.59 on December 12, 2008 and closed yesterday at 833.74. That’s a return of -4.6% for the index and means we’re off 36.7% on a relative basis. In all, a bitterly disappointing outcome.

If you have the stomach for it, you can read a summary of the whole sorry tale below. Looking back, it seems that there were a number of portentous steps taken by management that should have tipped us off:

After we opened our position on December 12 last year, INFS announced that it would “restructure.” We wrote that management “believes it will achieve profitable operations with an 18% gross margin target and operating expenses in the range of $10-11 million per quarter.” We noted that projections about future profitability often don’t turn out as projected, saying:

They are made by managements deaf to what the market is telling them about the company. As a result, we are much more interested in the company’s plans to unlock the value in the assets. On that front, the news is mixed.

INFS has previously announced that it had retained an investment banking firm to provide “advisory services.” The new announcement says that these advisory services include “advice concerning unsolicited offers from outside sources expressing interest in purchasing the Company.” This is a positive development. The bad news is that the company has suspended the stock repurchase plan, which is slightly disappointing. We say “slightly disappointing” because a buy back of 4 million shares over a three year period does not have a meaningful effect on the per share value, so cutting it makes almost no difference. It does show, however, that management is ignoring obvious value-enhancing opportunities for stockholders.

There was a brief glimpse of light when we read a report that a group of “high-powered executives,” including INFS’s co-founder Steve Hix, wanted to buy the company if they could get financing. The executives planned to save INFS from the “New York sharks” who wanted to liquidate the company for a quick profit. Said one of the group:

We’ve got some whispers that there’s a guy in New York looking at buying 50 percent of this company, and he’ll liquidate it. We are scared. We don’t want that to happen to this company. We’ve been working for nine months on a way to save it.

Nery Capital, presumably one of the “New York Sharks,” then upped its stake to 12.2% of INFS’s outstanding stock. It seemed we might be in a competitive bid situation, which would have been very good news for stockholders as it often presages a fully valued offer for the company.

Unfortunately, the news then took a decided turn for the worse when INFS’s management adopted a poison pill, which it euphemistically described as a “Shareholder Rights Plan.” We wrote that calling such an abomination a “Shareholder Rights Plan” was pretty galling when its effect was to take rights away from shareholders and deliver them to management. We were also unhappy with the suggestion that the board were the ones to determine what was “in the best interest of [INFS] and its shareholders” and how much of a premium was “fair” given the level at which the stock languished (when we wrote that, the stock “languished” at $0.78, more than 100% higher than the level at which it languishes today).

Tuesday’s results announcement is just the final nail in the coffin. We care little for the tumble in earnings. We do care that the company has burnt through more than half its cash in a single quarter in pursuit of “foreign exchange hedges.” We’ve lost what little confidence we had in management’s ability to put shareholders first. That wouldn’t ordinarily cause us to exit a position. The accelerating destruction of value is, however, too much, and we’ve closed out the position.

[Full Disclosure:  We have a holding in INFS. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

Biotechnology Value Fund (BVF) yesterday called for the management of Avigen Inc (Nasdaq: AVGN) to “address certain fundamental questions BVF believes need to be answered in order for stockholders to effectively evaluate [AVGN]’s future strategic direction.”

We’ve been following AVGN (see archived posts here) because it’s a net cash stock (i.e. it’s trading at less than the value of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and specialist biotechnology activist fund BVF has been pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholders. MediciNova Inc (NASDAQ:MNOV) has made an offer for AVGN that we think represents a clever way for AVGN’s stockholders to receive cash equivalent to that which they would receive in a liquidation (less $7M to be paid to MNOV) with the possibility for “an extraordinary, uncapped return” if MNOV is successful post-merger. We estimate AVGN’s cash at around $1.22 per share (BVF estimates $1.20 per share), which is a little less than 20% higher than AVGN’s $1.04 close yesterday.

The full text of BVF’s press release is reproduced below:

Biotechnology Value Fund, L.P. Requests Avigen Board to Provide Critical Information to Stockholders

Tuesday February 10, 2009, 1:04 pm EST

Raises Questions to be Addressed by Board and Management on Avigen’s February 11, 2009 Conference Call

SAN FRANCISCO, Feb. 10 /PRNewswire/ — Biotechnology Value Fund, L.P. (“BVF”), today called for the management of Avigen, Inc. (Nasdaq: AVGN – News) to address certain fundamental questions BVF believes need to be answered in order for stockholders to effectively evaluate Avigen’s future strategic direction. Avigen announced in its January 14, 2009 press release that it will hold a conference call on Wednesday, February 11, 2009 (time to be announced) to, among other things, “provide an update on the progress of the strategic review.” To make that update more effective, BVF raises the following questions and challenges the Board and management to finally address these fundamental issues:

1. Why has Avigen failed to call the special meeting of stockholders that would permit stockholders to have a say in Avigen’s future? BVF delivered its request for a special meeting to the Board over a month ago. To date, the Board has failed to call the requested special meeting. This meeting would provide stockholders with the ability to exercise their fundamental right to vote on Avigen’s strategic direction. If stockholders agree with BVF, they can vote to remove existing directors and elect BVF’s nominees. If the Board does not act prior to Wednesday, March 11, 2009 to set a meeting date, BVF can unilaterally set the date of the special meeting and would anticipate setting a meeting date for early April.

2. Why has Avigen not offered downside protection to stockholders? BVF has repeatedly called on Avigen to commit to protecting stockholder value by offering all stockholders a fixed amount of cash under any resulting scenario. Management has continually resisted this suggestion, leading us to believe that Avigen intends to gamble that money. MediciNova has proposed a transaction that offers critical downside protection to stockholders. So why hasn’t Avigen done so directly?

3. Why does Avigen not consider the MediciNova proposed merger to be a compelling outcome for stockholders? BVF does not understand why Avigen appears to be resisting the MediciNova transaction. Economically, based on publicly available information, we believe this proposed transaction to be in the best interest of all stockholders. In a worst case scenario, stockholders would receive approximately Avigen’s liquidation value. In a best-case scenario, stockholders would own 45% of the combined company.

4. Is management requiring downside protection for Avigen stockholders as a condition to all potential “strategic alternatives?” If this is the case, Avigen should state so explicitly so stockholders can stop worrying about losing the bulk of their investment. If not, please explain how any alternative without downside protection could be more attractive to stockholders. Most biotech companies in Avigen’s shoes have managed to destroy the majority of stockholder value through by pursuing their favorite merger. How can Avigen justify standing in the way of the downside protection being offered by MediciNova?

5. What is the estimated net liquidation value of Avigen? In response to our tender offer, management claimed that Avigen is currently worth more than our offer of $1 per share, without support of any kind. We call on management to publicly provide their estimate of Avigen’s liquidation value, together with a detailed analysis. Management should also disclose how much cash was burned by Avigen since its last public filing on September 30, 2008 and how much cash net of debt and obligations will be available on March 31, 2009.

6. What are Avigen’s total “golden parachute” obligations and how much time did Avigen’s CEO spend in Utah versus California during the critical months of December and January? In a shameless example of acting in their own self-interest, in October 2008 management increased its “golden parachute” payments in order to “to attract and retain key executive talent.” At the time, we estimated these payouts to total at least $3 million, an incredible 16.5% of Avigen’s entire market value at the time of adoption. BVF believes this is particularly egregious given the current economic environment. What is the current value of these obligations and how many employees stand to receive these payouts?

7. What is Avigen’s relationship with its financial advisers and how are they being compensated? In January 2009, the Board of Directors announced that it had retained not one but two financial advisers, RBC Capital Markets and Pacific Growth Equities LLC. Why did the Board find it necessary to engage two financial advisers? Will these advisors be paid in the same currency as stockholders or will they, like management, take cash and leave stockholders with paper?

Mark N. Lampert, the General Partner of BVF stated, “Since management announced the failure of AV650 in October of last year, we have found their reluctance to address certain issues, which we believe are integral for stockholders’ assessment of Avigen’s current prospects and future direction, to be incredibly frustrating. We are hopeful management will not hide behind vague generalities, and will provide specific answers to these important questions.

Mr. Lampert continued, “We hope the Board and management will address our questions and concerns and provide stockholders with the disclosure necessary to properly evaluate and determine the best strategic direction for Avigen. We call on each Board member, consistent with his fiduciary duties, to act in the best interests of all stockholders. If we determine this Board has acted inconsistently with its fiduciary duties, we will not hesitate to take any and all actions within our rights as stockholders, including commencing litigation and/or seeking an injunction, in order to protect our investment in Avigen. We look forward to the Board’s and management’s response.”

[Full Disclosure: We have a holding in AVGN. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only.]

Biotechnology Value Fund (BVF) responded on Friday to Avigen, Inc.’s (NASDAQ:AVGN) announcement that its board is “considering ‘strategic alternatives,'” announcing that it is “gravely concerned” that AVGN’s announcement is “silent on downside protection for all stockholders.”

The full text of BVF’s announcement is reproduced below:

BVF WARNS STOCKHOLDERS: AVIGEN CONTINUES TO REMAIN SILENT ON DOWNSIDE PROTECTION

AVIGEN’S LATEST MOVES REINFORCE TROUBLING PATTERN OF DISMISSING ALTERNATIVES WHICH PROTECT STOCKHOLDER VALUE

BVF URGES AVIGEN BOARD TO CALL SPECIAL MEETING SO STOCKHOLDERS CAN VOTE FOR DIRECTORS COMMITTED TO MAXIMIZING VALUE AND MINIMIZING RISK AND WASTE

NEW YORK, February 6, 2009 – BVF Acquisition LLC (the “Purchaser”), an affiliate of Biotechnology Value Fund L.P. (“BVF”), announced today that it is gravely concerned that today’s announcement by the Board of Directors of Avigen, Inc. (NASDAQ:AVGN) that it is considering “strategic alternatives” is silent on downside protection for all stockholders.

Speaking on behalf of BVF, Mark Lampert, BVF’s General Partner, stated, “As the largest stockholder in Avigen, holding 8,819,600, or approximately 29.63% of Avigen’s outstanding shares, we are worried that this Board is embarking on a path that will use the companies cash and valuable assets in a misguided transaction which offers no downside protection to stockholders — a key feature of the proposed merger with MediciNova . The landscape is littered with numerous parallels in which cash shells like Avigen have entered into transactions promoted as value-creating, but which ultimately left investors holding nearly worthless stock. Our nominees are committed to closing the downside-protected merger with MediciNova. We are disappointed that the current Board seems to be more interested in entrenching itself by means of implementing golden parachutes and a poison pill, actions that we believe are detrimental to the creation of value at Avigen. We reiterate our call to the Avigen Board to institute downside protection for all stockholders.”

Separately, BVF is notifying the SEC of significant and blatant inaccuracies in Avigen’s 14D-9 filing. BVF will hold Avigen responsible for any harm caused to BVF by these inaccuracies.

“We believe Avigen’s board and management has a long history of failure and waste and do not believe this Board should be making any decisions about Avigen’s future. Any decision by this Board for the direction of Avigen should be subject to a vote of stockholders,” Mr. Lampert said. “We note that Avigen’s directors and officers own an aggregate of 48,233 shares of Avigen stock, as opposed to BVF’s over 8.8 million shares. BVF shares the interests of all stockholders in the direction of the Company, and has never requested any benefit in which all stockholders would not fully participate. Our tender offer provides other stockholders with a liquidity option. We welcome any stockholders who do not wish to tender to continue as holders alongside BVF.”

BVF continues to urge the Avigen Board to stop stalling and to promptly call a special meeting of stockholders to enable the true owners of the company, the stockholders, to determine the fate of their investment. BVF submitted a request on January 9, 2009 for Avigen to call special meeting. Today, nearly one month later, the Company has taken no action in this regard. At the special meeting, stockholders will be asked to replace the existing Board with directors who would be dedicated to maximizing value and minimizing risk and waste on behalf of all Avigen stockholders. BVF believes that stockholders who are concerned about the continuing destruction of value at Avigen – whether or not they intend to tender their shares – should urge the Board to call a meeting as soon as possible.

On January 23, 2009, BVF commenced a tender offer at $1.00 per share, which represented a premium of 35% over the closing stock price of $0.74 on January 8, 2009, the day before BVF announced its desire to replace Avigen’s incumbent Board of Directors. Subsequent to the commencement of BVF’s tender, Avigen’s stock price has increased to above the tender price. The offer, which is not subject to any financing condition, was and is intended to give certain stockholders, who desire near-term liquidity, an alternative to the proposed merger with MediciNova. Each stockholder should make their own decision on whether or not to tender.

The tender offer is conditioned upon, among other things, the BVF nominees being elected or appointed to the Avigen Board of Directors so that they would constitute a majority of the Board. If placed on the Board, the BVF nominees would, subject to their fiduciary duties, pursue merger negotiations with MediciNova, Inc. or other actions that would be designed to enhance value and minimize risk for all Avigen stockholders.

MacKenzie Partners, Inc. is the Information Agent for the tender offer and any questions or requests for the Offer to Purchase and related materials with respect to the tender offer or the special meeting may be directed to MacKenzie Partners, Inc.

[Full Disclosure: We have a holding in AVGN. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only.]

The board of Avigen Inc (NASDAQ: AVGN) has responded to Biotechnology Value Fund’s (BVF) cash tender offer to purchase the outstanding common stock of AVGN, writing that the offer is “inadequate and not in the best interests of stockholders.”

We’ve been following AVGN (see archived posts here) because it’s a net cash stock (i.e. it’s trading at less than the value of its cash after deducting all liabilities) and specialist biotechnology activist fund BVF has been pushing it to liquidate and return its cash to shareholders. MediciNova Inc (NASDAQ:MNOV) has made an offer for AVGN that we think represents a clever way for AVGN’s stockholders to receive cash equivalent to that which they would receive in a liquidation (less $7M to be paid to MNOV) with the possibility for “an extraordinary, uncapped return” if MNOV is successful post-merger. We estimate AVGN’s cash at around $1.22 per share (BVF estimates $1.20 per share), which is a little less than 20% higher than AVGN’s $1.04 close yesterday.

The letter to AVGN stockholders is reproduced below:

Dear Avigen Stockholder:

Your Board of Directors has determined that the unsolicited conditional offer (“Offer”) by BVF Acquisition LLC (“BVF”) to acquire your shares is inadequate and not in the best interests of stockholders. The Board strongly urges you not to tender any shares into BVF’s Offer, and to withdraw any previously tendered shares. We believe we can create more value for your investment than the $1.00 per share that has been offered by BVF.

To that end, we are pleased to report good progress in our process of considering strategic alternatives to maximize stockholder value. In the last few weeks, Avigen has received multiple proposals that place significant value on its cash position, intellectual property portfolio, AV411 product development program, and public listing on the NASDAQ Global Market. We expect to receive additional proposals in the weeks ahead and are optimistic about achieving our objective of creating significant value for all stockholders.

Reasons for the Board’s Recommendation to Reject the BVF Offer

The Board cited the following reasons for recommending that stockholders reject BVF’s Offer:

* The Offer price is inadequate and substantially undervalues Avigen. The Board believes the Offer price substantially undervalues Avigen’s business, including its cash position, AV411 development program, intellectual property, license with Genzyme, experienced management team and public listing.

* We believe we can structure a transaction that will allow you to receive value for many or all of the company’s assets. The Board believes that the current global economic crisis provides significant strategic opportunities to companies such as Avigen that have a strong cash position and public listing. In addition to pursuing a potential strategic relationship with MediciNova, Inc., we have recently received other written proposals which appear competitive to the MediciNova proposal. These proposals place significant value on many or all of Avigen’s assets, and we believe we will receive additional proposals in the weeks ahead.

* The Avigen stock price has recently traded as high as $1.06 per share, and closed February 5, 2009 at a price of $1.00 per Share.

* The BVF Offer transfers to BVF any future increases in the price of your Avigen stock. Under the terms of BVF’s Offer, if you tender your shares, and the Offer is consummated, you would not receive more than $1.00 per share. The Board does not believe that BVF would make this Offer unless it expected the stock price to increase.

In fact, BVF states in its Offer that “[t]he Purchaser is making this Offer because BVF believes that the purchase of Shares at the purchase price pursuant to the Offer represents an attractive investment for the Purchaser.” If you tender your shares to BVF and the Offer is consummated, BVF will benefit from any gains in Avigen’s stock price, not you.

* The BVF Offer is not a firm commitment to you and is unlikely to close by the Expiration Time. The Offer has conditions that make it unlikely to close on February 23, 2009 as stated in the Offer, and carries significant uncertainty that the Offer will be consummated at all.

Avigen’s Board is committed to listening to its stockholders and working with them to achieve the maximum value of the company’s assets. The Board has met and interacted with BVF a number of times, received and evaluated its proposals, and tried to draw on its ideas in a collaborative manner. These efforts to work with BVF are described in detail in Avigen’s Schedule 14D-9, which accompanies this letter and has been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

The Board also has worked diligently to engage in discussions with MediciNova, Inc., which in December 2008 proposed acquiring Avigen. Since making that unsolicited proposal, however, MediciNova has been slow to advance discussions, as more fully described in Avigen’s Schedule 14D-9 filing.

Our Pledge to Stockholders

Avigen’s Board and management took decisive action since the announcement of our AV650 trial results on October 21, 2008, and acted swiftly to preserve cash. We believe the value of Avigen’s remaining assets is significant and the potential for a strategic transaction is worthy of consideration. Whatever the outcome, we intend to apply the same financial judgment used in the past to decisions going forward.

In the meantime, Avigen intends to provide its stockholders with regular updates and to continue to work with all its stockholders in a thoughtful, collaborative and respectful manner.
Respectfully,

Signed for the Board of Directors:

/s/ Zola Horovitz, Ph.D.
Zola Horovitz, Ph.D. as Chairman of the Board

/s/ Kenneth G. Chahine, Ph.D., J.D.
Kenneth G. Chahine, Ph.D., J.D. as Chief Executive Officer

The relevant portion of AVGN’s Schedule 14D-9 filing follows:

Although BVF had previously been a significant stockholder of Avigen, BVF’s filings with the SEC show that BVF had sold almost all of its Shares prior to October 21, 2008. Specifically, in the two months prior to October 21, BVF sold more than 640,000 Shares, at prices ranging from $3.95 to $4.60 per Share.

On October 21, 2008, Avigen announced that the top-line data from its AV650 trial for the treatment of spasticity in patients with multiple sclerosis did not meet its primary endpoint. As a result of this announcement, Avigen’s stock price dropped by more than 80% and, on the same day, BVF purchased more than 8,100,000 Shares in the open market at an average price of approximately $0.58 per Share.

Avigen held a conference call announcing the data from the AV650 trial. On the call, Avigen stated that the management and Board were pleased with the trial design and execution, but unfortunately the results were unequivocal. As a result, the AV650 program would be immediately terminated and no additional investment in the program was planned.

On October 22, 2008, Avigen’s representatives met with BVF’s representatives. At the meeting, BVF’s representatives expressed admiration for the team’s past performance in creating stockholder value. BVF proposed that Avigen, given its expertise and cash balance, look for attractive companies to merge with or acquire. BVF expressed its belief that such a strategy could lead to a significant return on its recent investment.

Avigen’s Chairman, Dr. Zola Horovitz, invited Mark Lampert, President of BVF, to present his views to the Board at the upcoming Board meeting on October 30, 2008. Mr. Lampert presented at the meeting and again expressed his admiration of the Board and management on taking swift and decisive action to terminate the AV650 program. However, instead of pursuing strategic alternatives, Mr. Lampert recommended to the Board that Avigen immediately liquidate. Following Mr. Lampert’s participation, the Board approved management’s recommendation to significantly reduce head count and to monetize both the AV513 and AV411 assets through either a partnership or sale transaction, and authorized management to initiate a process to identify potential strategic opportunities that could maximize stockholder value and result in returns that exceeded Avigen’s liquidation value.

On the next day, and without waiting for any response from the Board, BVF filed an amendment to its Schedule 13D expressing the same view Mr. Lampert had expressed at the Board meeting and threatening to bring a proposal for liquidation directly to a vote of the stockholders.

On November 3, 2008, Avigen announced a significant restructuring aimed at preserving cash and reassessing strategic opportunities, including staff reductions of over 70 percent of Avigen’s total workforce, as approved by the Board on October 30.

Dr. Kenneth Chahine, Avigen’s CEO, continued to have an open dialogue with Mr. Lampert through phone conversations and emails. Dr. Chahine tried to reassure BVF that Avigen was going to conduct an orderly and efficient process and that Avigen was being fiscally prudent. Mr. Lampert expressed his opinion that Avigen should grant BVF a “put option” (an option to sell its Shares back to Avigen at a set price in the future) to guarantee the minimum “worst case outcome” for BVF. Dr. Chahine expressed that such a put option could potentially weaken Avigen’s negotiating position in its efforts to monetize AV411 or a sale of Avigen. Dr. Chahine explained his concerns by using the analogy of someone trying to sell their house for full value when the buyers know the house is scheduled to go into foreclosure at a fraction of the price in the future.

On November 21, 2008, Avigen entered into the Rights Agreement described in more detail in Item 8 below, in order to discourage a hostile takeover by a third party at a price that would prevent stockholders from obtaining fair value for their Shares.

During the next two weeks Avigen continued discussions with strategic advisors and began negotiating engagement letters with Pacific Growth Equities (“Pacific Growth”) and RBC Capital Markets (“RBC”).

On December 4, 2008, Dr. Chahine, along with one of the strategic advisors, spoke with Mr. Lampert. Dr. Chahine stated that he had spoken with counsel, strategic advisors, and several Board members regarding BVF’s demand for a put option. Dr. Chahine conveyed that numerous legal and business concerns had been raised and cautioned that a put option might have unintended consequences that would disadvantage all stockholders, including BVF. Nevertheless, Dr. Chahine stated that he remained open-minded and invited Mr. Lampert to provide Avigen’s strategic advisors at Pacific Growth support and rationale for BVF’s proposal for presentation and consideration by the Board at a meeting to be held on December 9.

On December 8, 2008, Dr. Horovitz received a letter from MediciNova, Inc. (“MediciNova”), proposing an acquisition of Avigen by MediciNova and setting forth very general terms for the proposed acquisition. Dr. Horovitz promptly contacted MediciNova’s Chairman and expressed that Avigen was in the process of retaining strategic advisors to consider proposals such as this early in the new year. This timing was necessary to permit Avigen’s management to focus on the ongoing restructuring efforts and to complete the negotiation of the sale of AV513 to Baxter Healthcare, and to formally retain strategic advisors.

On December 9, 2008, the Board met. While not formally engaged, strategic advisors from Pacific Growth and RBC gave presentations outlining their expertise and the review process. The Board discussed the MediciNova proposal and Dr. Horovitz stated that he had contacted MediciNova’s Chairman and had proposed a timeline for discussion. BVF did not provide any supporting material to strategic advisors on the mechanism or rationale for a put option.

On December 11, 2008, BVF published an open letter to the Board. In the letter BVF accused management and the Board of general mismanagement and reiterated BVF’s demand that the Board “guaranty” an outcome for stockholders.

On December 18, 2008, Avigen announced the sale of its AV513 product candidate for $7,000,000 ($0.23 per Share) to Baxter Healthcare.

On December 22, 2008, Drs. Horovitz and Chahine issued a letter to stockholders underscoring the Board’s and management’s commitment to act in the best interests of Avigen’s stockholders and emphasizing the swift and decisive actions already taken to preserve cash since the AV650 announcement. The letter to stockholders also reminded stockholders of the significant value of Avigen’s remaining assets, and of the Board’s and management’s commitment to pursue possible strategic transactions that would be in the best interests of all of Avigen’s stockholders. The letter concluded with a pledge to stockholders that Avigen would continue to use the same fiscally prudent approach that had allowed it to preserve cash.

On that same day, Dr. Horovitz received a second (and modified) proposal from MediciNova. In the letter, MediciNova proposed terms substantially similar to those contained in MediciNova’s December 8 letter, modified to reflect the $7,000,000 received from the sale of AV513.

The Board subsequently reviewed the proposal from MediciNova and concluded that the MediciNova proposal, as revised, should be carefully considered and that due diligence should commence early in the new year following the engagement of strategic advisors. Dr. Horovitz again contacted MediciNova’s Chairman and communicated the Board’s conclusion.

On December 29, 2008, BVF filed an amended Schedule 13D advocating that Avigen should “consummate the Proposed Merger expeditiously.” It was the Board’s view that BVF’s publicly-stated support for the MediciNova proposal weakened Avigen’s negotiating position, making it more difficult for Avigen to negotiate a better transaction with MediciNova on behalf of all of Avigen’s stockholders.

On January 9, 2009, BVF delivered a notice to Avigen, demanding that Avigen call a special meeting of stockholders to, among other things, remove the current members of Avigen’s Board, without cause, and for the proposed election of BVF’s slate of director nominees (the “BVF Nominees”).

On January 14, 2009, Avigen announced that it had engaged RBC to oversee the review of merger and acquisition opportunities for Avigen and had engaged Pacific Growth primarily to assist in monetizing Avigen’s AV411 assets.

On the very next day, BVF publicly announced its intention to make a tender offer to purchase all of the outstanding Shares of Avigen. In its offering documents filed subsequently, BVF incorrectly stated that Avigen had rejected the MediciNova proposal and expressed BVF’s view that, if elected to the Board of Avigen, the BVF Nominees would pursue the MediciNova proposal.

On January 19, 2009, Avigen sent a confidentiality agreement to MediciNova’s Chairman of the Board, in order to initiate the due diligence process and negotiations regarding a possible transaction between Avigen and MediciNova. The Board proposed in the confidentiality agreement that both Avigen and MediciNova share information with each other in order to permit the Board and, if a transaction is agreed upon, Avigen stockholders, to understand key aspects of MediciNova’s business, including anticipated expenses, development plans, and commercialization strategy in order to properly evaluate the proposal and determine whether it is appropriate to recommend or, if recommended, approve.

In the days following, Avigen’s strategic advisors at RBC met with representatives of BVF to engage in further discussions.

On January 20, 2009, RBC presented various financial analyses and an overview and update of the process of evaluating Avigen’s strategic alternatives to the Board. On that date, Avigen received multiple proposals from companies to engage in strategic transactions that, on their face, appeared competitive with the MediciNova proposal. Avigen contacted these companies and initiated discussions to assess these potential strategic transactions.

Avigen’s strategic advisors at RBC sent an email to MediciNova’s Chairman on January 22, 2009, stating that efforts to reach MediciNova’s CEO and CFO were unsuccessful and urging him to review and return the confidentiality agreement so that due diligence could commence as soon as possible. The Chairman responded that he would remind the MediciNova management. RBC subsequently received a communication from MediciNova’s CFO promising that they would review the draft and return it with any comments.

In spite of Avigen’s continuing efforts to assess potential strategic transactions and the Board’s and management’s efforts to engage Mr. Lampert in productive discussions, on January 23, 2009, the Purchaser filed a Schedule TO with the SEC, formally initiating the Offer.

At Board meetings held on January 26 and 29, 2009, at each of which the Board assessed the Offer, RBC presented various financial analyses and an overview and update regarding the process of evaluating Avigen’s strategic alternatives.

One week after MediciNova’s prior communication, on January 29, 2009, strategic advisors at RBC once again contacted MediciNova’s Chairman reiterating that efforts to reach MediciNova’s CEO and CFO were unsuccessful and urging him to review and return the confidentiality agreement so that diligence could commence as soon as possible. The Chairman responded that he would remind the management again.

On January 30, 2009, RBC received a revised version of the confidentiality agreement from MediciNova with suggested changes. The draft was reviewed by Avigen’s counsel and on February 3, 2009, promptly returned to MediciNova. RBC proposed that MediciNova’s counsel call Avigen’s counsel to expedite the process and resolve any issues so that the due diligence process could be initiated as soon as possible.

As of the date of this statement, MediciNova’s counsel had not yet contacted Avigen’s counsel.

AVGN’s other proxy documents can be found here.

[Full Disclosure: We have a holding in AVGN. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only.]

The Official Activist Investing Blog has published its list of activist investments for January (the investments with links are to our latest update at the time of this post):

Ticker Company Activist Investor
ABVA Alliance Bankshares Corp John Edgemond
AMLN Amylin Pharmaceuticals Carl Icahn; Eastbourne Capital
AVGN Avigen Inc. Biotechnology Value Fund
BIOD Biodel Inc Moab Partners
BKS Barnes & Noble, Inc Yucaipa Companies
CHUX O’Charley’s Inc Crescendo Partners
CITZ CFS Bancorp Financial Edge Fund
CLCT Collectors Universe Shamrock Activist Fund
CNBC Center Bancorp Lawrence Seidman
CPWM Cost Plus Inc Stephens Investment Holdings
CRGN CuraGen Corp DellaCamera Capital
CTO Consolidated Tomoka Land Co Wintergreen Advisers
CWLZ Cowlitz Bancorporation Crescent Capital
DFZ R.G. Barry Corporation Mill Road Capital
DITC Ditech Networks Lamassu Holdings
EDCI EDCI Holdings Chapman Capital
ENZN Enzon Pharmaceuticals DellaCamera Capital; Carl Icahn
EPL Energy Partners Wexford Capital
FNHM.OB FNBH Bancorp Andrew Parker
FSBI Fidelity Bancorp Finacial Edge Fund
FSCI Fisher Communications Gamco Investors
FSFG First Savings Financial Group Joseph Stilwell
GET Gaylord Entertainment TRT Holdings
ICGN ICAgen Inc Xmark Opportunity Partners
INFS InFocus Corp Nery Capital Partners
ISH International Shipholding Corporation Liberty Shipping Group
JTX Jackson Hewitt Tax Service Shamrock Activist Value Fund
KANA Kana Software Inc KVO Capital Management
KFS Kingsway Financial Sevices Joseph Stillwell
KONA Kona Grill Mill Road Capital
LAQ The Latin America Equity Fund City of London Investment Management
MGAM Multimedia Games Inc Dolphin Limited Partnership
MIPI Molecular Insight Pharmaceuticals David Barlow
NDD Neuberger Berman Dividend Advantage Western Investment
NTII Neurobiological Technologies Highland Capital Management
NTMD Nitromed Inc Deerfield Capital Management
OFIX Orthofix Ramius Capital
PIF Insured Municipal Income Fund Inc Bulldog Investors
PPCO PenWest Pharmaceuticals Perceptive Advisors;

Tang Capital Partner

PRSC Providence Service Corp 73114 Investments
PRXI Premier Exhibitions, Inc Sellers Capital
QDHC Quadramed Corp BlueLine Capital
RDC Rowan Companies Steel Partners
SLTC Selectica Inc Trilogy
SONS Sonus Networks Legatum Limited
SSE Southern Connecticut Bancorp Lawrence Seidman
SUAI Specialty Underwriters Alliance Hallmark Financial Services
SUG Southern Union Co Sandell Asset Management
SUMT SumTotal Systems Discovery Capital
SUTM.PK Sun Times Media Group Davidson Kempner Partners
TEC Teton Energy Corp First New York Securities
TESS Tessco Technologies Discovery Equity Partners
TIER Tier Technologies Inc Parthenon Capital
TMI TM Entertainment & Media Bulldog Investors
TRGL Toreador Resources Nanes Delorme Partners
TRMA Trico Marine Services Kistefos AS
TUTR Plato Learning Stephen Becker
TWMC TransWorld Entertainment Riley Investment Management
VLCY.PK Voyager Learning Company FoxHill Opportunity
WFMI Whole Foods Market Inc Yucaipa Companies
WMPN.OB William Penn Bancorp Joseph Stilwell
WOC Wilshire Enterprises Bulldog Investors
WRLS Telular Corp Simcoe Partners
YSI U-Store-It Trust Todd Amsdell
ZEP Zep Inc. Gamco

Carl Icahn contributed an article to the Wall Street Journal on President Obama’s plan to limit executive pay to $500,000 a year plus restricted stock for institutions that receive government funding. Icahn argues that while the response is “understandable,” the salary cap fails to address the root cause of the problem:

The real problem is that many corporate managements operate with impunity — with little oversight by, or accountability to, shareholders. Instead of operating as aggressive watchdogs over management and corporate assets, many boards act more like lapdogs.

Despite the fact that managements, albeit with some exceptions, have done an extremely poor job, they are often lavishly rewarded regardless of their performance.

Icahn goes on to explain that the problem is that boards and managements are entrenched by state laws and court decisions that “insulate them from shareholder accountability and allow them to maintain their salary-and-perk-laden sinecures.” He proposes a federal law that allows shareholders to vote by simple majority to migrate the company from its state of incorporation to more shareholder-friendly states. This power is currently vested in boards and management:

This move would not be a panacea for all our economic problems. But it would be a step forward, eliminating the stranglehold managements have on shareholder assets. Shouldn’t the owners of companies have these rights?

Now some might ask: If this policy proposal is right, why haven’t the big institutional shareholders that control the bulk of corporate stock and voting rights in this country risen up and demanded the changes already?

This is because many institutions have a vested interest in supporting their managements. It is the management that decides where to allocate their company’s pension plans and 401(k) funds. And while there are institutions that do care about shareholder rights, unfortunately there are others that are loath to vote against the very managements that give them valuable mandates to manage billions of dollars.

This is an obvious and insidious conflict of interest that skews voting towards management. It is a problem that has existed for years and should be addressed with new legislation that benefits both stockholders and employees, the beneficiaries of retirement plans.

I am not arguing for a wholesale repudiation of corporate law in this country. But it is in our national interest to restore rights to equity holders who have seen their portfolios crushed at the hands of managements run amok.

It’s vintage Icahn to suggest such a simple yet effective, market-based solution.

CNBC has an interview with Ricardo Salinas, the Mexican billionaire who took a position in Circuit City Stores Inc (OTC:CCTYQ) after it fell into bankruptcy and lost $41 million. In the interview with Michelle Caruso-Cabrera, Salinas explains why he made his bet on CCTYQ and how it went wrong. Although Salinas’ CCTYQ investment wasn’t a Grahamian net net, his explanation does capture some of the pitfalls of investing based on asset values:

Mr. Salinas made the majority of his $41 million investment in Circuit City after the troubled chain filed for bankruptcy protection in November. He amassed a 28 percent stake in the company and then began trying to work out a deal with Circuit City’s suppliers in an effort to take the chain private.

But Mr. Salinas backed out of the deal just before the company decided to liquidate, according to a recent account in The Richmond Times-Dispatch.

“It was much more complicated than he expected it to be,” an unidentified source told the newspaper. Pricing on some inventory “was just too high” and the support from banks and vendors “just wasn’t there,” the Times-Dispatch quoted the source as saying.

In his CNBC interview, Mr. Salinas expressed regret about not capturing Circuit City at a bargain-basement price and losing his investment, but acknowledged that it was for the best.

“I don’t care how rich you are, it must hurt to lose $41 million,” Ms. Caruso-Cabrera said to Mr. Salinas on location in Mexico.

“You know – when you’re talking about investments and businesses- it doesn’t pay to be afraid,” Mr. Salinas said, according to a transcript of the interview, which will be broadcast Wednesday night on CNBC. “It doesn’t pay, because fear is not a good counselor. Fear makes you do stupid things. So, of course it hurts.”

Mr. Salinas said he is moving on from his experience but is still looking at buying American assets.

“Well, we’re looking at a couple of mining companies that have been really pounded by the declining commodities,” he said in the interview. “And we think that, you know, mining is a great business. So we might go into a new tack there.”

(Via The New York Times Dealbook)

MathStar Inc (OTC:MATH) has taken the first steps to liquidation, announcing that it is preparing to sell its Field Programmable Object Array (FPOA) technology and intellectual property.

We started following MATH in December last year when it was trading at $0.68 because it was a net cash stock with a substantial stockholder lobbying management to liquidate. The stock is up 29.4% to $0.88 yesterday, giving it a market capitalization of $8.1M. We estimate MATH’s liquidation value still to be around 80% higher at $14.8M or $1.57 per share. That value is predominantly cash and short term investments and doesn’t take into account any further value that the sale of the FPOA technology and intellectual property may yield. Two activist investors, Mr. Salvatore Muoio of S. Muoio & Co. and Mr. Zachary McAdoo of The Zanett Group, have been urging MATH’s board to consider liquidation rather than a merger. MATH’s board seems to agree, twice rejecting unsolicited merger proposals, suspending the company’s operations and exploring “strategic alternatives, which could include merger, acquisition, increasing operations in another structure or liquidation.”

The company’s announcement of the sale of the technology and intellectual property is as follows:

COLORADO SPRINGS, Colorado – January 26, 2009 – Core Capital’s Electronics and Semiconductor Group (ESG), an investment banking firm with an electronics and semiconductor focus, announces that its client, MathStar, Inc. (OTC: MATH), has prepared its technology for purchase. MathStar, a fabless semiconductor company specializing in high-performance programmable logic, is finalizing its Field Programmable Object Array (FPOA) technology and intellectual property package for sale. Arrangements have been prepared to assist prospective buyers to evaluate the opportunity, including a webinar, a private “data room” web portal, and access to key creators of the technology.

MathStar began its sales efforts in early October 2008, when it signed with the Core Capital Electronics and Semiconductor Group to complete a strategic sale of MathStar’s technology and intellectual property.

[Disclosure: We do not presently have a holding in MATH. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only.]

Our posts on ValueVision Media Inc. (NASDAQ:VVTV) attract more attention than any other posts on this site, though we exited the position last year. We initially liked VVTV because it looked like a cheap net net with other potentially valuable assets. That was a mistake. VVTV has huge contractual obligations relative to its current assets.* Those contractual obligations are the difference between VVTV being a cheap net net and having no value in liquidation. Let us repeat that: VVTV has no value in liquidation. VVTV’s stockholders face an absolute loss of capital if VVTV fails. In other words, VVTV’s downside is 100%. We exited on that basis. Really, we should never have opened the position.

VVTV’s best chance to salvage some value for its stockholders lay in the auction process it was conducting. The auction process seems to have been reasonably extensive (the financial advisor contacted 137 parties and executed confidentiality agreements with 39 of them). It was also unsuccessful:

ShopNBC (Nasdaq: VVTV), the premium lifestyle brand in electronic retailing, today announced that the Special Committee of independent members of its Board of Directors has concluded its comprehensive review of strategic alternatives commenced on September 10, 2008, with the assistance of its independent financial advisor, Piper Jaffray & Co.

The Special Committee and Piper Jaffray broadly solicited expressions of interest in a purchase of or strategic relationship with the company and also evaluated several other strategic alternatives, including a distribution to shareholders through a sale of assets and liquidation of the company. While a number of parties engaged in the process and conducted due diligence, the Special Committee did not receive any final bids from any of the parties involved. In addition, the Special Committee concluded that a liquidation of the company would not likely result in any distribution to the company’s shareholders. Therefore, at the recommendation of the Special Committee, the full Board of Directors determined to continue and subsequently to conclude the strategic alternatives review process. As outlined in the accompanying press release, the company plans to continue its implementation of new corporate strategies designed to grow its EBITDA levels, increase revenues and decrease expenses.

Since September 10, 2008, Piper Jaffray contacted a total of 137 parties and executed confidentiality agreements with 39 of them. Initial indications of interest were received from 13 parties and, based on the credibility of their financing plans, four parties were invited to the second round of the sale process, which included in-depth discussions and meetings with management. Of the four, two were strategic parties and two were financial sponsors. Additionally, each of the four parties had access to an extensive electronic data room and the opportunity to conduct a thorough due diligence process.
The company encountered a number of external and internal issues that adversely affected the process, including current market conditions and economic circumstances, difficult retail and credit environments, the company’s recent operating performance and cost structure, uncertainty surrounding the status of the possible redemption of the Series A Redeemable Convertible Preferred Stock held by GE, and the early stage of the company’s cable and satellite distribution negotiations.
The Special Committee stated that after the conclusion of this extensive process, no final bids were received. “Over the last few months, we thoroughly explored a wide range of strategic alternatives and held extensive discussions with a number of interested parties,” commented George Vandeman, Chairman of the Special Committee and member of ShopNBC’s Board of Directors. “While we hoped to find a viable transaction through these discussions, no final bids were received. As a result, the Special Committee concluded and recommended to the Board that the best option at this time is to continue to operate the company as an independent entity.”

Notwithstanding the formal termination of the strategic alternatives process, the Special Committee and Board remain committed to maximizing shareholder value and will pursue any reasonable alternatives that present themselves.

The failure of the company to sell was obviously disappointing for those holding on for the conclusion of the auction process: the stock crashed from $0.52 to $0.28 on the day of the announcement and now trades at $0.26. There are now no other positive catalysts for the company in the near term. Those holding on for a turnaround in this particular situation might wish to consider two points:

  1. A position in VVTV carries the risk of a 100% loss of capital. From the press release: “The Special Committee concluded that a liquidation of the company would not likely result in any distribution to the company’s shareholders.”
  2. Of the four parties invited to the second round of the sale process, which included in-depth discussions and meetings with management, access to an extensive electronic data room and the opportunity to conduct a thorough due diligence process, none submitted a final bid.

*The obvious question is how we missed the contractual obligations. The answer’s not a particularly good one, but here it is: It was a rookie blunder. When we started applying Graham’s formula, we were applying it too narrowly and we missed anything that wasn’t carried in the financial statements, including VVTV’s huge contractual obligations. We figured it out after several commenters pointed it out first. We now make sure to at least consider whether a prospect’s contractual obligations, off-balance sheet arrangements or litigation could have a material effect on the asset value.

[Full Disclosure:  We do not have a holding in VVTV. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

Pershing Square Capital Management hosted its Annual Investor Dinner in late January (Dealbreaker has a copy of the presentation (.pdf).) We’ve previously written about Pershing Square in relation to its position in Borders Group Inc (NYSE:BGP). It was not one of our better calls.

Pershing Square’s investment strategy makes for interesting reading:

We seek simple, predictable, free-cash-flow-generative businesses that trade at a large discount to intrinsic value

  • Mid-and large-cap companies
  • Typically not controlled
  • Minimal capital markets dependency
  • Typically low financial leverage and modest economic sensitivity
  • Often hidden value in asset base
  • Catalyst for value creation which we can often effectuate

At the right price, we may waive one or more of the above criteria
Our selection process is designed to help avoid permanent loss of capital while generating attractive long-term returns.

Pershing Square’s investment strategy is more Buffett than Graham (or more Fisher than Graham), but note that they do seek value that may be hidden in assets. Pershing Square’s returns have been extraordinary, as this slide attests:

pershing-square-cumulative-net-returns1

Although not all Pershing Square’s positions were winners:

pershing-square-2008-winners-and-losers

(via Dealbreaker)