Archive for October, 2009

Forward Industries Inc (NASDAQ:FORD) has fired its investment and engaged another. It looks like FORD is intent on spending the cash on its balance sheet, which is a shame. Rather than make an acquisition, they should focus on the work on their desk and pay a big dividend. There’s a half chance that the bank could suggest a sale of the company, but that seems unlikely. I can’t believe there are no activists out there willing to take on this company. It’s 40% off its 52-week high. It’s net cash. There are no big holders. Management’s not doing a bad job, but an acquisition is a ridiculous idea. This is an instance of a management trying to plow a dollar back into the business and turn it into fifty cents. I could use that dollar more profitably. Then again, I’d probably just spend it on pennywhistles and moonpies.

We started following FORD (see our post archive here) because it was trading at a discount to its net cash and liquidation values, although there was no obvious catalyst. Management appeared to be considering a “strategic transaction” of some kind, which might have included an “acquisition or some other combination.” Trinad Management had an activist position in the stock, but had been selling at the time we opened the position and only one stockholder owned more than 5% of the stock. The stock is up 36.8% since we opened the position to close yesterday at $1.97, giving the company a market capitalization of $13.4M. Following our review of the most recent 10Q, we’ve estimate the liquidation value to $19.5M or $2.47 per share.

Here’s a link to the announcement (it’s just a marketing announcement by the bank so I’m not going to repost it).

FORD is trading at a substantial discount to its liquidation and net cash values. The risk to this position is management spraying the cash away on an acquisition. A far better use of the company’s cash is a buyback, special dividend or return of capital. Another concern is Trinad Management exiting its activist position in the stock. Those concerns aside, I’m going to maintain the position because it still looks cheap at a discount to net cash.

[Full Disclosure:  We have a holding in FORD. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]


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Following my Simoleon Sense interview with Miguel Barbosa, I’ve had a few requests for a post on Tom Evans. Here it is, hacked together like Frankenstein’s monster from all the public information I could track down:

Thomas Mellon Evans was a one of the first modern corporate raiders, taking Graham’s net current asset analysis and using it to wreak havoc on the gray flannel suits of the 40s and 50s. He’s not particularly well-known today, but he waged numerous takeover battles using tactics that are forerunners of those employed by many of the takeover artists of the 1980s and the activists of the 1990s and 2000s. Proxy battles? Check. Greenmail? Check. Liquidations? Check.

Born September 8, 1920 in Pittsburgh, and orphaned at the age of 11, Evans grew up poor. Despite his famous middle name (his grandmother’s first cousin was Andrew Mellon), he began his financial career at the bottom. After graduating from Yale University in 1931 in the teeth of the Great Depression, he landed a $100-a-month clerk’s job at Gulf Oil.

While his friends headed out in the evening, Evans would stay home reading balance sheets and looking for promising companies: those he could he could buy for less than the assets were worth in liquidation. Evans found such companies by calculating their “net quick assets,” the long forgotten name for “net current assets.” His friends teased him about his obsession and gave him a nickname: “Net Quick” Evans. From the 1944 Time Magazine article, Young Tom Evans:

With only some fatherly advice from Gulf’s Board Chairman, W. L. Mellon, Tom Evans made his way alone. For six years he saved money, like an Alger hero; and played the stockmarket, unlike an Alger hero. Thus he collected $10,000. He wanted to find and buy a family-owned business that had gone to pot. In the down-at-the-heels H. K. Porter Co., in Pittsburgh’s slummy Lawrenceville section, he found it. Once a No. 1 builder of industrial locomotives, Porter Co. was down to 40 workers.

Tom Evans bought up Porter bonds at 10 to 15 cents on the dollar, reorganized the company under 77B, and became president at 28.

From then on, Evan was the chief terror of the sleepy boardrooms of the era, much like Icahn would be 30 years later. As a connoisseur of deep value on the balance sheet, one has to admire his methods (From the New York Times obituary, Thomas Evans, 86, a Takeover Expert, Dies):

‘He was never really an operator; he was a financial guy — a balance sheet buyer,” one of his sons, Robert Sheldon Evans, told Forbes magazine in 1995. ”He would buy something for less than book value and figure the worst that could happen was he would liquidate it and come out O.K. What he didn’t want to do was lose money on the deal. If he knew his downside was covered, then he figured the upside would probably take care of itself.

”It was a very shrewd policy in the 50’s and 60’s, when there were highly inefficient markets: buying undervalued assets, running them for cash and selling off pieces. The 80’s leveraged buyout guys were just taking a lot of his deals to their logical extension.”

The book The White Sharks of Wall Street: Thomas Mellon Evans and the Original Corporate Raiders by Diana B. Henriques is an excellent biography on Evans. More than that, it describes many of the battles for corporate control in the 40s, 50s and 60s. In contradistinction to the takeover battles of the 80s, the dogfights in the 40s, 50s, and 60s were largely proxy fights, and in as much, should be familiar to today’s “activist investors.” James B. Stewart’s Let’s make a deal, his review of Henriques’ book, does it justice:

There are surely few phenomena more remarkable in American business than the periodic ability of cash-poor but swashbuckling newcomers, using little or none of their own money, to seize control of some of the country’s most valuable corporations. In its most recent, frenzied incarnation, dot-com entrepreneurs have exchanged stock in companies with few tangible assets and even fewer profits for control of established, profitable companies. Fifteen years ago, the currency was junk bonds rather than inflated stock. And before that, it was bank loans using a target’s assets as collateral.

Wall Street greets each wave of takeovers as the dawning of a new era. But the proposition that nothing has fundamentally changed is convincingly set forth in ”The White Sharks of Wall Street,” an engaging and thorough history of early corporate takeovers by Diana B. Henriques, a financial reporter for The New York Times. Her central character is Thomas Mellon Evans, who surfaces in what seems like nearly every trendsetting corporate battle from 1945 until his retirement in 1984, and whose tactics remain essential to practitioners of corporate warfare. Junk bonds? Greenmail? Scorched earth? Evans had been there long before investment bankers coined a catchy vocabulary to describe the maneuvers of people like T. Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn and Saul Steinberg.

Though Evans seems to have escaped the widespread public resentment and envy the others generated, and Henriques’s portrait is carefully nonjudgmental, it is difficult for a reader to work up much sympathy for him. He was ruthless, bad-tempered, usually indifferent to workers and communities. He repeatedly displayed what appears to be a criminal disregard for the antitrust laws (though he was never prosecuted). He divorced two wives (the second later committed suicide), and both times a replacement was conspicuously at hand long before any legal proceedings had begun. He betrayed two of his own sons in his quest for corporate dominance and wealth.

Yet as a deal maker Evans displayed a natural audacity and genius. In 1935, 24 years old and lacking any money to speak of, he decided he wanted to gain control of Pittsburgh’s struggling H. K. Porter Company, a manufacturer of steam locomotives. Inspired by a Fortune magazine account of Floyd Odlum, who became rich by using borrowed securities as collateral for loans to buy undervalued stock, Evans borrowed shares from a Mellon mentor, took out a loan and invested in Gulf Oil stock, then a Mellon enterprise. When Gulf’s stock rose handsomely as the nation emerged from the Depression, Evans used his profits to buy Porter bonds, then selling for a small fraction of their face value. When Porter finally had to declare bankruptcy and was reorganized, Evans, as the largest creditor, traded his bonds for equity and became the largest shareholder. Porter, essentially acquired for junk bonds, would be Evans’s vehicle for most of his life.

I highly recommend The White Sharks of Wall Street: Thomas Mellon Evans and the Original Corporate Raiders by Diana B. Henriques for fans of deep value and activist investment.

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We’ve just completed an interview with Miguel Barbosa of the wonderful Simoleon Sense. Go there now, and get trapped in an endless loop as you are recirculated back here and so on.

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Yesterday was the record date for the first dividend in the liquidation of Leadis Technology Inc (NASDAQ:LDIS). The dividend is likely to be approximately $0.93 per share. The board estimates that “if we are able to dispose of substantially all of our non-cash assets, the aggregate amount of all liquidating distributions that will be paid to stockholders will be in the range of approximately $0.93 to $1.20 per share of Leadis common stock.” After the initial $0.93 dividend, the remaining dividends will be in the range of nil to $0.27 ($1.20 less $0.93). LDIS closed yesterday at $0.99. If the stub starts trading tomorrow at $0.06 ($0.99 less $0.93), it becomes an interesting security offering the potential for some substantial upside.

The definitive proxy filings have the detail:

How much can stockholders expect to receive if the Plan of Dissolution is approved at the special meeting?

At this time, we cannot predict with certainty the amount of any liquidating distributions to our stockholders. However, based on information currently available to us, assuming, among other things, no unanticipated actual or contingent liabilities, we estimate that over time stockholders will receive one or more distributions that in the aggregate range from approximately $0.93 to $1.20 per share. This range of estimated distributions represents our estimate of the amount to be distributed to stockholders during the liquidation, but does not represent the minimum or maximum distribution amount. Actual distributions could be higher or lower.

This estimated range is based upon, among other things, the fact that as of August 31, 2009, we had approximately $28.6 million in cash, cash equivalents, restricted cash equivalents and short-term and non-current investments. In addition, subsequent to August 31, 2009, we received approximately $3.2 million in connection with the sale of certain assets to IXYS Corporation. We expect to use cash of approximately $2.3 million to satisfy liabilities on our unaudited balance sheet after August 31, 2009. In addition to converting our remaining non-cash assets to cash and satisfying the liabilities currently on our balance sheet, we have used and anticipate using cash for a number of items, including but not limited to: satisfying capital leases and other contractual commitments. In addition to the satisfaction of our liabilities, we have used and anticipate continuing to use cash in the next several months for a number of items, including, but not limited to, the following:

• ongoing operating expenses;

• expenses incurred in connection with extending our directors’ and officers’ insurance coverage;

• expenses incurred in connection with the liquidation and dissolution process;

• severance and related costs;

• resolution of pending and potential claims, assessments and obligations; and

• professional, legal, consulting and accounting fees.

We are unable at this time to predict the ultimate amount of our liabilities because the settlement of our existing liabilities could cost more than we anticipate and we may incur additional liabilities arising out of contingent claims that have not been quantified, are not yet reflected as liabilities on our balance sheet and have not been included in the estimated range of potential distributions, such as liabilities relating to claims that have not been resolved and claims or lawsuits that could be brought against us in the future. If any payments are made with respect to the foregoing, the estimated range of distributions to stockholders will be negatively impacted and less than estimated. If the ultimate amount of our liabilities is greater than what we anticipate, the distribution to our stockholders may be substantially lower than anticipated. Therefore, we are unable at this time to predict the precise nature, amount and timing of any distributions due in part to our inability to predict the ultimate amount of our liabilities. Accordingly, you will not know the exact amount of any liquidating distributions you may receive as a result of the Plan of Dissolution when you vote on the proposal to approve the Plan of Dissolution. You may receive substantially less than the low end of the current estimate.

For some further background, see Shake&Bake’s take on LDIS.

Hat tip Joseph.

[Full Disclosure:  We have a holding in LDIS. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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Digirad Corporation (NASDAQ:DRAD) has filed its 10Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2009.

We started following DRAD (see our post archive here) because it was an undervalued asset play with a plan to sell assets and buy back its stock. The stock is up more than 167% since we started following it to close yesterday at $2.35, giving the company a market capitalization of $36.1M. We last estimated the liquidation value to be around $32.5M or $1.73 per share. We’ve now increased our valuation to $32.9M or $1.77 per share following another very good quarter for DRAD. Year-to-date, DRAD has generated over $3.4M in cash from operations. DRAD has also started buying back stock under its previously announced $2M stock repurchase plan.

The value proposition updated

DRAD has continued its good year, generating $3.4M in operating cash flow year-to-date. Our updated estimate for the company’s liquidation value is set out below (the “Book Value” column shows the assets as they are carried in the financial statements, and the “Liquidating Value” column shows our estimate of the value of the assets in a liquidation):

DRAD Summary 2009 9 30Off-balance sheet arrangements and contractual obligations: The company hasn’t disclosed any off-balance sheet arrangements in its most recent 10Q.

The catalyst

DRAD’s board has announced a stock buyback program:

The Company also announced that its board of directors has authorized a stock buyback program to repurchase up to an aggregate of $2 million of its issued and outstanding common shares. Digirad had approximately 19 million shares outstanding as of December 31, 2008. At current valuations, this repurchase plan would authorize the buyback of approximately 2.1 million shares, or approximately 11 percent of the company’s outstanding shares.

Chairman of the Digirad Board of Directors R. King Nelson said, “The board believes the Company’s direction and goals towards generating positive cash flow and earnings coupled with an undervalued stock price present a unique investment opportunity. We are confident this will provide a solid return to our shareholders.”

According to the most recent 10Q, the company has now started to buy its own stock, albeit a relatively small amount:

On February 4, 2009, our Board of Directors approved a stock repurchase program whereby we may, from time to time, purchase up to $2.0 million worth of our common stock in the open market, in privately negotiated transactions or otherwise, at prices that we deem appropriate. The plan has no expiration date. Details of purchases made during the nine months ended September 30, 2009 are as follows (Edited to fit this space.):

DRAD Buy Back Detail 2009 09 30


DRAD is now trading at a reasonable 24% premium to its $32.9M or $1.77 per share in liquidation value. It’s off about 20% from its peak, and looks likely to continue to drop. We’re generally sellers of secondary securities trading at a premium to liquidation value, but DRAD seems to have the started generating cash. We’d like to see where it can go. We can see no other reason to cease holding DRAD in the Greenbackd Portfolio and so we’re going to maintain the position for now.

[Full Disclosure:  We do not have a holding in DRAD. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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The FT Alphaville blog has a post, The US stock market is overvalued by 40%, based on a recent research report, The US Stock Market: Value and Nonsense About It, from Andrew Smithers of London-based research house Smithers & Co.

According to the FT Alphaville blog, Smithers says there are only two ‘valid’ ways to value the market. One is by using a cyclically adjusted PE ratio and the other by using the Q ratio, which compares the market capitalisation of companies with their net worth, adjusted to current prices. Both techniques yield the same answer: the stockmarket is overvalued by around 40%.

Smithers explains:

As the valid measures of the US market show that it is currently around 40% overvalued, some ingenuity is needed to claim otherwise. The EPS for the past 12 months on the S&P 500 is $7.51 so, with the index at 1071, it is selling at a trailing PE of 142. This is far higher than it has ever been before, as the previous end month record is a PE of 47. But current multiples are no guide to value; when depressed, or elevated, they need to be adjusted to their cyclical norm.

This is how the cyclically adjusted PE (”CAPE”) is calculated and when its current value is compared with long-term average, using the geometric means of EPS and cyclically adjusted PEs,6 it shows that the market is 37.7% overpriced using 10 years of earnings’ data and 45% if 20 years are used. This method is therefore of no use to those who sell shares, or have made faulty claims about value in the past. The following are among the most common approaches to circumventing the problem this presents. Some produce relatively small distortions, but these can amount to a substantial degree of misinformation when combined.

Go to the The FT Alphaville blog post, The US stock market is overvalued by 40%.

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In a new paper Value vs Glamour: A Global Phenomenon (via SSRN)  The Brandes Institute updates the landmark 1994 study by Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny investigating the performance of value stocks relative to that of glamour securities in the United States over a 26-year period. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny found that value stocks tended to outperform glamour stocks by wide margins, but their earlier research did not include the glamour-driven markets of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The paper asks, “What effect might this period have on their conclusions?” To answer that question, The Brandes Institute updated the research through to June 2008, examining the comparative performance of value and glamour over a 40-year period, and extending the scope of the initial study to include non-U.S. markets, to determine whether the value premium is evident worldwide.

The research focuses on our favorite indicator, price-to-book value, but also includes price-to-cash flow, price-to-earnings, sales growth over the preceding five years and combinations of the foregoing. Here is The Brandes Institute’s discussion on price-to-book:

Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny on price-to-book

The Brandes Institute  hewed closely to Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s methods, described on page 3 of the paper:

First, the sample of companies as of April 30, 1968 was divided into deciles based on one of the criteria above. Second, the aggregate performance of each decile was tracked for each of the next five years on each April 30. Finally, the first and second steps were repeated for each April 30 from 1969 to 1989.

We start with the price-to-book criterion as an example. First, all stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX as of April 30, 1968 were sorted into deciles based on their price-to-book ratios on that date. Stocks with the highers P/B ratios were grouped in decile 1. For each consecutive decile, P/B ratios decreased; this cuilminated in stocks with the lowest P/B values forming decile 10.

In essence, this process created 10 separate portfolios, each with an inception date of April 30, 1968. The lower deciles, which consisted of higher-P/B stocks, represented glamour portfolios. In contrast, the higher deciles – those filled with lower-P/B stocks – represented value portfolios.

From there, annual performance of deciles 1 through 10 was tracked over the subsequent five years. Additionally, new 10-decile sets were constructed based on the combined NYSE/AMEX sample as of April 30, 1969, and every subsequent April 30 through 1989. For each of these new sets, decile-by-decile performance was recorded for the five yeras after the inception date. After completing this process, the researchers had created 22 sets of P/B deciles, and tracked five years of decile-by-decile performance for each one. Next, [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny] averaged the performance data across these 22 decile-sets to compare value and glamour.

As the chart below indicates, [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny] found that performance for glamour stocks was outpaced by performance for their value counterparts. For instance, 5-year returns for decile 1 – those stocks with the highest P/B ratios – averaged an annualized 9.3%, while returns for the low-P/B decile 10 averaged 19.8%. These annualized figures are equivalent to cumulative rates of return of 56.0% and 146.2%, respectively.

Value Glamour 1

[Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny] repeated this analysis for deciles based on price-to-cash flow, price-to-earnings, and sales growth. The trio found that, for each of these value/glamour criteria, value stocks outperformed glamour stocks by wide margins. Additionally, value bested glamour in experiments with groups sorted by select pairings of P/B, P/CF, P/E, and sales growth.

The Brandes Institute update

The Brandes Institute sought to extend and update Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s findings. They replicated the results of the Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny study to validate their methodology. When they were satisfied that there was sufficient parity between their results and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s findings “to validate our methodology as a functional approximation of the [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny] framework,” they adjusted the sample in three ways: First, they included stocks listed on the NASDAQ domiciled in the US. Second, they excluded the smalles 50% of all companies in the sample. Finally, they divided the remaining companies into small capitalization (70% of the group by number) and large capitalization (30% of the group by number):

To expand upon [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s] findings we begin with our adjusted sample, which now includes data through 2008. Specifically, we added decile-sets formed on April 30, 1990 through April 30, 2003 and incorporated their performance into our analysis. This increased our sample size from 22 sets of deciles to 36. In addition, the end of the period covered by our performance calculations extended from April 30, 1994 to April 30, 2008.

Exhibit 3 compares average annualized performance for U.S. stocks from the 1968 to 2008 period for deciles based on price-to-book. Returns for deciles across the spectrum changed only slightly in the extended time frame from our replicated [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s] results. Most notably, the overall pattern of substantial value stock outperformance persisted. During the 1968 to 2008 period, performance for decile 1 glamour stocks averaged an annualized 6.9% vs. an average of 16.2% for the value stocks in decile 10. Respective cumulative performance equaled 39.6% and 111.9%.

Value Glamour 2

Set out below is the comparison of large cap and small cap performance:

Value Glamour 3The paper concludes that the value premium persists for the world’s developed markets in aggregate, and on an individual coutry basis. We believe it is more compelling evidence for value based investment, and, in particular, asset based value investment.

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Disgruntled VaxGen Inc (OTC:VXGN) shareholders have initiated a class action against the board of VXGN over possible breaches of fiduciary duty in the sale to OXGN. The board certainly deserves the suit because of the appalling deal struck with OXGN. Priced at a discount to VXGN’s net cash and liquidation values, and payment in the watered scrip of a speculative biotech play, it’s a real dud for VXGN shareholders (see our more detailed take on the terms of the VXGN / OXGN deal). A successful outcome in any litigation may be a Pyrrhic victory for participating VXGN shareholders. As we understand it, VXGN’s board is indemnified out of VXGN’s assets and so as any damages award will return to VXGN plaintiffs VXGN’s assets less legal fees and the break fee. Perhaps someone more knowledgable can illuminate the situation for us in the comments. It’s also possible that the merger will not survive the shareholder vote. As reader bellamyj notes, in November 2007 VXGN announced another disastrous merger with Raven Biotechnologies. Over the next few days VXGN stock fell almost 50% and the merger was terminated the day before the special meeting, apparently due to shareholder opposition. Perhaps that will happen again. If it does, OXGN will still tear out ~$2.5M from VXGN, but it may be a better outcome than the deal on the table.

About our VXGN position

We’ve been following VXGN (see our post archive here) because it is trading at a substantial discount to its net cash position, has ended its cash-burning product development activities and is “seeking to maximize the value of its remaining assets through a strategic transaction or series of strategic transactions.” Management has said that, if the company is unable to identify and complete an alternate strategic transaction, it proposes to liquidate. One concern of ours has been a lawsuit against VXGN by its landlords, in which they sought $22.4M. That lawsuit was dismissed in May, so the path for VXGN to liquidate has now hopefully cleared. The board has, however, been dragging its feet on the liquidation. Given their relatively high compensation and almost non-existent shareholding, it’s not hard to see why.

There are two competing alternate proxy slates seeking nomination to the board of VXGN, Value Investors for Change and the VaxGen Full Value Committee. Value Investors for Change, led by Spencer Capital, filed preliminary proxy documents in August to remove the board. In the proxy documents, Value Investors for Change call out VXGN’s board on its “track record of failure and exorbitant cash compensation”:

VaxGen does not have any operations, other than preparing public reports. The Company has three employees, including the part-time principal executive officer and director, and four non-employee directors. Since the Company’s failed merger with Raven Biotechnologies, Inc. in March 2008, the Board has publicly disclosed that it would either pursue a strategic transaction or a series of strategic transactions or dissolve the Company. The Company has done neither. In the meantime, members of the Board have treated themselves to exorbitant cash compensation. Until July 2009, two non-employee members of the Board were paid over $300,000 per year in compensation. The principal executive officer will likely receive over $400,000 in cash compensation this year.

The VaxGen Full Value Committee comprising BA Value Investors’ Steven N. Bronson and ROI Capital Management’s Mark T. Boyer and Mitchell J. Soboleski, intends to replace the current board with directors who will focus on the following objectives:

1. Returning capital to [VXGN]’s shareholders, including an immediate distribution of $10,000,000 in cash;

2. Terminating [VXGN]’s lease with its landlord, Oyster Point Tech Center, LLC, and settling with the landlord the obligations of [VXGN] on the remaining lease payments;

3. Exploring ways to monetize [VXGN] as a “public shell,” including the utilization of [VXGN]’s Substantial Net Operating Losses; and

4. Protecting for the benefit of shareholders royalty payments receivable from the sale of [VXGN]’s intellectual property.

BA Value Investors had previously disclosed an activist holding and, in a June 12 letter to the board, called on VXGN to “act promptly to reduce the size of the board to three directors; reduce director compensation; change to a smaller audit firm; terminate the lease of its facilities; otherwise cut costs; make an immediate $10 million distribution to shareholders; make a subsequent distribution of substantially all the remaining cash after settling the lease termination; distribute any royalty income to shareholders; and explore ways to monetize the public company value of the Issuer and use of its net operating losses.”

VXGN is up 25.0% since we initiated the position. At its $0.60 close yesterday, it has a market capitalization of $22.5M. We last estimated the company’s liquidation value to be around $25.4M or $0.77 per share. VXGN has other potentially valuable assets, including a “state-of-the-art biopharmaceutical manufacturing facility with a 1,000-liter bioreactor that can be used to make cell culture or microbial biologic products” and rights to specified percentages of future net sales relating to its anthrax vaccine product candidate and related technology. The authors of a letter sent to the board on July 14 of this year adjudge VXGN’s liquidation value to be significantly higher at $2.12 per share:

Excluding the lease obligations, the net financial assets alone of $37.2 million equate to $1.12 per share. The EBS royalties (assuming a 6% royalty rate and a $500 million contract as contemplated by NIH/HHS and EBS) of $30 million and milestones of $6 million total $36 million of potential additional future value (based clearly on assumptions, none of which are assured), or $1.09 per share. Adding $1.12 and $1.09 equals $2.21 per share.

Here’s the press release announcing the litigation:

Levi & Korsinsky, LLP Investigates Possible Breach of Fiduciary Duty by the Board of VaxGen, Inc. – VXGN.OB

Levi & Korsinsky is investigating the Board of Directors of VaxGen, Inc. (“VaxGen” or the “Company”) (OTC BB: VXGN) for possible breaches of fiduciary duty and other violations of state law in connection with their attempt to sell the Company to Oxigene Inc. (“Oxigene”) (NasdaqGM: OXGN). Under the terms of the transaction, VaxGen shareholders will receive 0.4719 Oxigene shares for every VaxGen share they own which, based on the $1.42 per share closing price of Oxigene stock on October 14, 2009, the day prior to the announcement, is valued at approximately $0.67. In addition, Oxigene is to place approximately 8.5 million common shares in escrow to be released to VaxGen shareholders contingent upon the occurrence of certain events over the two-year period following the closing.

The investigation concerns whether the VaxGen Board of Directors breached their fiduciary duties to VaxGen shareholders given that (i) the Company has approximately $1.07 per share in cash with no debt; (ii) the Company has a book value of approximately $0.99 a share; (iii) at least one analyst has set a $2.00 price target for VaxGen stock; and (iv) and the Board agreed to a non-solicitation provision and a termination fee up to $1,425,000 that will all but ensure that no superior offers will ever be forthcoming.

If you own common stock in VaxGen and wish to obtain additional information, please contact us at the number listed below or visit http://www.zlk.com/vxgn1.html.

Levi & Korsinsky has expertise in prosecuting investor securities litigation and extensive experience in actions involving financial fraud and represents investors throughout the nation, concentrating its practice in securities and shareholder litigation.

Hat tip JM.

[Full Disclosure:  We have a holding in VXGN. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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Rolfe Winkler of Reuters blog Contingent Capital has a great summary of David Einhorn’s talk to the Value Investing Congress. Despite what we say in the title, Einhorn is hardly fickle (we just couldn’t resist). If anything, he’s stubborn to a fault, so it is interesting that he’s changed his mind so dramatically about the influence of macro events on his traditional bottom-up investment style. In his speech (.pdf via Winkler’s blog), he sets out the rationale behind the change, what he perceives the current macro risks to be, and what he’s doing in response. Apologies in advance for the huge blocks of text. We believe that this is the most important factor influencing the market and the economy, and will be for the next 5-10 years. Ignore it at your peril.

Speaking of his change in attitude to secular macro trends, Einhorn said:

I want to revisit [Greenlight’s 2005 position in MDC Holdings, a homerbuilder] because the loss was not bad luck; it was bad analysis. I down played the importance of what was then an ongoing housing bubble. On the very same day, at the very same conference, a more experienced and wiser investor, Stanley Druckenmiller, explained in gory detail the big picture problem the country faced from a growing housing bubble fueled by a growing debt bubble. At the time, I wondered whether even if he were correct, would it be possible to convert such big picture macro-thinking into successful portfolio management? I thought this was particularly tricky since getting both the timing of big macro changes as well as the market’s recognition of them correct has proven at best a difficult proposition. Smart investors had been complaining about the housing bubble since at least 2001. I ignored Stan, rationalizing that even if he were right, there was no way to know when he would be right. This was an expensive error.

The lesson that I have learned is that it isn’t reasonable to be agnostic about the big picture. For years I had believed that I didn’t need to take a view on the market or the economy because I considered myself to be a “bottom up” investor. Having my eyes open to the big picture doesn’t mean abandoning stock picking, but it does mean managing the longshort exposure ratio more actively, worrying about what may be brewing in certain industries, and when appropriate, buying some just-in-case insurance for foreseeable macro risks even if they are hard to time.

What, according to Einhorn, is the secular macro trend most influencing the market and economy? The inflationary policies of the current administration:

Presently, Ben Bernanke and Tim Geithner have become the quintessential short-term decision makers. They explicitly “do whatever it takes” to “solve one problem at a time” and deal with the unintended consequences later. It is too soon for history to evaluate their work, because there hasn’t been time for the unintended consequences of the “do whatever it takes” decision-making to materialize.

Rather than deal with these simple problems with simple, obvious solutions, the official reform plans are complicated, convoluted and designed to only have the veneer of reform while mostly serving the special interests. The complications serve to reduce transparency, preventing the public at large from really seeing the overwhelming influence of the banks in shaping the new regulation.

In dealing with the continued weak economy, our leaders are so determined not to repeat the perceived mistakes of the 1930s that they are risking policies with possibly far worse consequences designed by the same people at the Fed who ran policy with the short term view that asset bubbles don’t matter because the fallout can be managed after they pop. That view created a disaster that required unprecedented intervention for which our leaders congratulated themselves for doing whatever it took to solve. With a sense of mission accomplished, the G-20 proclaimed “it worked.”

We are now being told that the most important thing is to not remove the fiscal and monetary support too soon. Christine Romer, a top advisor to the President, argues that we made a great mistake by withdrawing stimulus in 1937.

An alternative lesson from the double dip the economy took in 1938 is that the GDP created by massive fiscal stimulus is artificial. So whenever it is eventually removed, there will be significant economic fall out. Our choice may be either to maintain large annual deficits until our creditors refuse to finance them or tolerate another leg down in our economy by accepting some measure of fiscal discipline.

Over the last couple of years we have adopted a policy of private profits and socialized risks. We are transferring many private obligations onto the national ledger. Although our leaders ought to make some serious choices, they appear too trapped in short-termism and special interests to make them. Taking no action is an action.

In the nearer-term the deficit on a cash basis is about $1.6 trillion or 11% of GDP. President Obama forecasts $1.4 trillion next year, and with an optimistic economic outlook, $9 trillion over the next decade. The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research recently published a study that indicated that “by all relevant debt indicators, the U.S. fiscal scenario will soon approximate the economic scenario for countries on the verge of a sovereign debt default.”

Further, the Federal Open Market Committee members may not recognize inflation when they see it, as looking at inflation solely through the prices of goods and services, while ignoring asset inflation, can lead to a repeat of the last policy error of holding rates too low for too long.

At the same time, the Treasury has dramatically shortened the duration of the government debt. As a result, higher rates become a fiscal issue, not just a monetary one. The Fed could reach the point where it perceives doing whatever it takes requires it to become the buyer of Treasuries of first and last resort.

I believe there is a real possibility that the collapse of any of the major currencies could have a similar domino effect on re-assessing the credit risk of the other fiat currencies run by countries with structural deficits and large, unfunded commitments to aging populations.

I believe that the conventional view that government bonds should be “risk free” and tied to nominal GDP is at risk of changing. Periodically, high quality corporate bonds have traded at lower yields than sovereign debt. That could happen again.

His response has been to buy physical gold “as insurance against sovereign default(s).”

Now, the question for us as investors is how to manage some of these possible risks. Four years ago I spoke at this conference and said that I favored my Grandma Cookie’s investment style of investing in stocks like Nike, IBM, McDonalds and Walgreens over my Grandpa Ben’s style of buying gold bullion and gold stocks. He feared the economic ruin of our country through a paper money and deficit driven hyper inflation. I explained how Grandma Cookie had been right for the last thirty years and would probably be right for the next thirty as well. I subscribed to Warren Buffett’s old criticism that gold just sits there with no yield and viewed gold’s long-term value as difficult to assess.

However, the recent crisis has changed my view. The question can be flipped: how does one know what the dollar is worth given that dollars can be created out of thin air or dropped from helicopters? Just because something hasn’t happened, doesn’t mean it won’t. Yes, we should continue to buy stocks in great companies, but there is room for Grandpa Ben’s view as well.

I have seen many people debate whether gold is a bet on inflation or deflation. As I see it, it is neither. Gold does well when monetary and fiscal policies are poor and does poorly when they appear sensible. Gold did very well during the Great Depression when FDR debased the currency. It did well again in the money printing 1970s, but collapsed in response to Paul Volcker’s austerity. It ultimately made a bottom around 2001 when the excitement about our future budget surpluses peaked.

Prospectively, gold should do fine unless our leaders implement much greater fiscal and monetary restraint than appears likely. Of course, gold should do very well if there is a sovereign debt default or currency crisis.

A few weeks ago, the Office of Inspector General called out the Treasury Department for misrepresenting the position of the banks last fall. The Treasury’s response was an unapologetic expression that amounted to saying that at that point “doing whatever it takes” meant pulling a Colonel Jessup: “YOU CAN’T HANDLE THE TRUTH!” At least we know what we are dealing with.

When I watch Chairman Bernanke, Secretary Geithner and Mr. Summers on TV, read speeches written by the Fed Governors, observe the “stimulus” black hole, and think about our short-termism and lack of fiscal discipline and political will, my instinct is to want to short the dollar. But then I look at the other major currencies. The Euro, the Yen, and the British Pound might be worse. So, I conclude that picking one these currencies is like choosing my favorite dental procedure. And I decide holding gold is better than holding cash, especially now, where both earn no yield.

For years, the discussion has been that our deficit spending will pass the costs onto “our grandchildren.” I believe that this is no longer the case and that the consequences will be seen during the lifetime of the leaders who have pursued short-term popularity over our solvency. The recent economic crisis and our response has brought forward the eventual reconciliation into a window that is near enough that it makes sense for investors to buy some insurance to protect themselves from a possible systemic event. To slightly modify Alexis de Tocqueville: Events can move from the impossible to the inevitable without ever stopping at the probable.

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The old Wall Street saw, variously attributed to Warren Buffett or Humphrey B. Neill, author of the Art of Contrary Thinking, goes, “Never confuse genius with a bull market.” With that in mind, we present to you the performance of the Wilshire 5000 Equal Weight Index, which is one of the broadest measures of the stock market.

For the month of September the Wilshire 5000 Equal Weight Index was up 15.8% and for the last quarter to September 30 it was up 36.0%.  You can see for yourself at the Wilshire Index Calculator (it’s a little clunky – you’ll need to select “Wilshire 5000 Equal Weight” in the “Broad/Style” box and set the date to September 30 2009). Year to date the index is up a whopping 83.02%. From March through September, the average stock is up 113.1%. If we take the Wilshire 4500 Equal Weight Index, which excludes the top 500 stocks by market capitalization of the 5000 Equal Weight Index, the return is +120% from March to September 2009. Sobering.

Hat tip Bo.

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