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Dr. Roderick Wong has withdrawn his slate of director nominees for election at Facet Biotech Corporation’s (NASDAQ:FACT) 2009 annual meeting of stockholders. Wong’s withdrawal means that our investment thesis is gone, and we’re closing the position.

We opened the position at $9.13 and closed it at $8.96, which means we’re down 1.86% on an absolute basis. The S&P500 Index closed at 850.08 on the day we opened the position and closed yesterday at 919.53, which means we’re off 10% on a relative basis.

Post mortem

FACT was a new category of investment for us: special situations (see our post archive here). It was an activist play with a catalyst in the form of Dr. Roderick Wong’s nomination for the annual meeting of an alternative slate of directors, including well-known activist investor Robert. L. Chapman. The dissident slate called for a cash dividend of up to $15 per share and demanded the sale of the other non-cash assets, estimating they may be worth an additional $8 to $16 per share, which represented a substantial upside at FACT’s $9.13 closing price (equivalent to a market capitalization of $216.8M) at the time we opened the position. We estimated the liquidation value to be anywhere from nil to $259M or ~$10.85 per share and the net cash value from nil to $228M or $10.54 per share, so it wasn’t a typical liquidation play for us. The company was burning through its cash at a rapid rate, so the main risk to the investment was that the status quo was maintained. Although Wong et al held only 0.5% of FACT’s outstanding stock, we thought the presence of Bob Chapman and other noted activist and deep value investors on the register (Baupost Group holds ~18%) indicated a good chance of success for the dissidents.

The position started falling apart when Chapman and Broenniman withdrew their consents:

In March 2009, Facet Biotech Corporation (the “Company”) received a notice of intention to nominate five candidates for election to the Company’s five-person Board of Directors at the Company’s 2009 Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the “Annual Meeting”). Sent by Roderick Wong, the notice stated the intent to nominate Philip R. Broenniman, Robert L. Chapman, Jr., David Gale, Bradd Gold and Roderick Wong, for election to the Company’s Board of Directors. On April 30, 2009, Philip R. Broenniman and Robert L. Chapman, Jr. each separately notified the Company in writing that they were withdrawing their consent to being named as nominees for election to the Company’s Board of Directors at the Annual Meeting.

And the death knell was Wong withdrawing the entire slate:

RODERICK WONG WITHDRAWS DIRECTOR NOMINATIONS

Redwood City, Calif., May 4, 2009 — Facet Biotech Corporation (Nasdaq: FACT) and Roderick Wong, M.D., today jointly announced that based on productive discussions between Facet and Dr. Wong, Dr. Wong has withdrawn his slate of director nominees for election at Facet’s 2009 annual meeting of stockholders and will not present, recommend or move for the election of any of the nominees he had submitted for election.

Faheem Hasnain, president and chief executive officer of Facet, said, “We thank Dr. Wong for raising important concerns held by some of Facet’s stockholders and advocating for these stockholders. Our Board values his insights regarding the future of the company and we look forward to an ongoing constructive dialogue with Dr. Wong.”

Dr. Wong said “I am pleased to have brought this situation to an amicable conclusion. Our discussions have focused on issues that are critical to Facet’s success and I appreciate the time and attention that the company has devoted to our discussions.”

Wong gives no indication in the press release what, if any, concessions were made by FACT to bring the situation to an “amicable conclusion.” There were no reasons given for Chapman and Broenniman’s withdrawl either. It could be that, without Chapman and Broenniman, Wong felt he didn’t have the support to roll the board and so sought a face-saving resolution with the company. We don’t know, but we welcome speculation in the comments.

[Full Disclosure:  We do not have a holding in FACT. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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Soapstone Networks Inc (NASDAQ:SOAP) has filed its 10Q for the quarter ended March 31, 2009.

We been following SOAP (see our post archive here) because it is trading well below its net cash value with an activist investor, Mithras Capital, disclosing an 8.7% holding in October last year. The stock is up 48.0% from $2.50 when we initiated our position to close yesterday at $3.70, giving SOAP a market capitalization of $52.0M. We last estimated the company’s net cash value to be $86.1M or $5.59 per share. Following our review of the Q1 10Q, we’ve adjusted our valuation down 6% to $80.3M or $5.21 per share as a result of $6.7M of cash burned.

The value proposition updated

The company’s balance sheet value is almost wholly cash, which it continues to burn (the “Book Value” column shows the assets as they are carried in the financial statements, and the “Liquidating Value” column shows our estimate of the value of the assets in a liquidation):

soap-summary-2009-3-311

Balance sheet adjustments

We need to make the following adjustments to the balance sheet estimates above:

  • Cash burn: The company used $6.7M in cash in the first quarter. They expect cash burn to continue to be between $6M and $6.5M per quarter.
  • Off-balance sheet arrangements and contractual obligations: SOAP does not have any off-balance-sheet arrangements and its contractual obligations, which consist entirely of operating leases, are $3.9M. These operating lease payments are the minimum rent expense for SOAP’s facilities, including its head office.

Conclusion

We continue to believe that SOAP is a very good opportunity. The company’s ongoing business is small in comparison to its net cash position, so it shouldn’t dissipate its cash any time soon. It has no off-balance sheet arrangements, little in the way of ongoing contractual obligations and no material litigation, so the cash position seems reasonably certain. The company’s engagement of an investment bank to explore strategic alternatives is a promising step in the right direction. We continue to be concerned by the continued issuance of options at a huge discount to liquidation value. The sooner Mithras Capital gets control of this situation the better.

[Full Disclosure:  We have a holding in SOAP. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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Vanda Pharmaceuticals Inc. (NASDAQ:VNDA) has reported its results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2009.

We’ve been following VNDA (see our post archive here) because it’s trading below its net cash value and Tang Capital Partners (TCP) has called for the company to “cease operations immediately, liquidate [VNDA]’s assets and distribute all remaining capital to the Stockholders.” TCP has now filed a preliminary proxy statement for the 2009 Annual Meeting urging stockholders to support TCP’s slate of two director nominees, Kevin C. Tang and Andrew D. Levin, M.D., Ph.D. The stock is up 29.5% since we initiated the position to close yesterday at $1.01, giving the company a market capitalization of $24.3M. We initially estimated the net cash value to be around $42.6M or $1.60 per share. We’ve now reduced our estimate of the net cash value to $38.6M or $1.45 per share. The company continues to hemorrhage cash, so the investment turns on TCP’s ability to get control of the board at the Annual Meeting and staunch the bleeding. If TCP cannot get onto the board quickly, the company will continue to burn cash and the investment will be a dud. VNDA has a staggered board, which makes TCP’s task difficult.

The value proposition updated

In the first quarter of 2009 VNDA burned through $3.8M in cash, which reduces our estimate of the net cash value from $42.6M to $38.6M or $1.45 per share (the remaining difference is due to the slight increase in shares on issue). Set out below is our summary balance sheet  (the “Book Value” column shows the assets as they are carried in the financial statements, and the “Liquidating Value” column shows our estimate of the value of the assets in a liquidation):

vnda-summary-2009-12-31

Conclusion

VNDA continues to be an interesting play. While the stock is up nearly 30% since we initiated the position, it is still trading at a 45% discount to our estimate of its $1.45 per share net cash value. That value is of course deteriorating rapidly, and the challenge for investors is to determine which of two outcomes is more likely: If TCP can get on the board quickly, stop the cash burn and liquidate the company, we’re likely to see a good return. If TCP cannot get onto the board quickly or at all, the company will continue to burn cash and the investment will be a dud. VNDA has a staggered board, so this will make TCP’s task difficult. We’re inclined to maintain our position and see how this plays out.

[Full Disclosure:  We do not have a holding in VNDA. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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In Now a baker’s dozen in North Dakota, footnoted.org’s Michelle Leder tracks the small, but growing number of companies whose shareholders are requesting via the annual proxy process that their companies relocate to North Dakota:

Last week, 11 companies, including Exxon Mobil (EOM), Southwest (LUV), and Amgen (AMGN), were on the list. But since Friday, two more companies have been targeted, which makes it a baker’s dozen. Over the past two days, shareholder activist John Chevedden, who has introduced proposals at Southwest and two others, added Continental Airlines (CAL) and Staples (SPLS) to his list.

The rush is on because the corporations law in North Dakota is intended to be much friendlier to shareholders. Shareholders in North Dakota can expect the following (from the 2007 press release announcing the bill):

· Majority voting in election of directors. In an uncontested election of directors, shareholders have the right to vote “yes” or “no” on each candidate, and only those candidates receiving a majority of “yes” votes are elected.

· Advisory shareholder votes on compensation reports. The compensation committee of the board of directors must report to the shareholders at each annual meeting of shareholders and the shareholders have an advisory vote on whether they accept the report of the committee.

· Proxy access. The corporation must include in its proxy statement nominees proposed by 5% shareholders who have held their shares for at least two years.

· Reimbursement for successful proxy contests. The corporation must reimburse shareholders who conduct a proxy contest to the extent the shareholders are successful. Thus, if a shareholder conducts a proxy contest to place three directors on a corporation’s board and two of the candidates are elected, the shareholder will be entitled to reimbursement of two-thirds of the cost of the proxy contest.

· Separation of roles of Chair and CEO. The board of directors must have a chair who is not an executive officer of the corporation.

As we’ve discussed previously, Carl Icahn is a supporter of North Dakota’s initiative, and has even proposed a federal law that allows shareholders to vote by simple majority to migrate a company from its state of incorporation to more shareholder-friendly states, including North Dakota. At present, that power is vested in boards, which means that even if the proposal passes, the boards must embrace the proposal before it is binding on the company. Leder thinks this means it’s unlikely that the companies will up stakes for North Dakota, but it’s interesting to watch.

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Autobytel Inc’s (NASDAQ:ABTL) board has responded to Trilogy, Inc’s $0.35 per share tender offer, calling it “grossly inadequate” and “unequivocally” recommending that stockholders reject it.

We started following ABTL (see our post archive here) because it was trading at a substantial discount to its liquidation and net cash values and Trilogy had filed a 13D notice disclosing a 7.4% holding. Trilogy has now launched a tender offer for ABTL at $0.35 per share, which is at our estimate of ABTL’s $15.4M or $0.34 per share net cash value, but at a substantial discount to our estimate of ABTL’s $24.3M or $0.54 per share liquidation value. When Trilogy launched its offer, we wrote that we believed that $0.35 per share was only the opening salvo and a higher price was possible if the board terminated the rights plan poison pill. The stock closed yesterday at $0.515, which is a huge 47% premium to Trilogy’s offer price and suggests the market is also anticipating a higher offer. The stock is up 19.8% since we started following it in December.

Here’s the letter from ABTL:

April 27, 2009

Dear Stockholder:

On Monday, April 20, 2009, I received a letter from Trilogy Enterprises, Inc. (“Trilogy”) indicating that Trilogy had launched a tender offer for all of Autobytel Inc.’s (our “Company”) outstanding shares of common stock at $0.35 per share.

Our Board of Directors (our “Board”), in consultation with its legal and financial advisors, has evaluated Trilogy’s offer and has found Trilogy’s $0.35 offer price to be grossly inadequate and unequivocally recommends to stockholders that they reject Trilogy’s offer and not tender their shares to Trilogy.

Our Board also believes that the combination of actions taken by our Company as described below will result in our stockholders achieving significantly more value than the offer made by Trilogy. In reaching its decision to recommend that stockholders reject the Trilogy offer and not tender their shares to Trilogy, our Board considered many factors, including:

• Our Company’s strong balance sheet and current cash and receivables position, noting, in particular, that our Company’s cash position alone is substantially in excess of Trilogy’s offer.

• The initial reaction of the securities trading markets to Trilogy’s offer appears to support our Board’s decision that the offer price is inadequate.

• The recent thorough evaluation of strategic alternatives conducted by our Board, including the possible sale of our Company, which concluded that selling our Company in today’s environment was not in the best interest of maximizing value.

• The indications of interest received and offers from potential buyers for our Company as a result of the sale process.

• Inquiries made to our Company’s financial advisor by other interested parties in response to Trilogy’s offer.

• The reasons for the Board’s decision to terminate the sale process, including:

• The value of our Company’s websites; and

• The value of our Company’s intellectual property, particularly its patents, which resulted in a $20 million settlement with the Dealix Corporation in 2006 and most recently settlements with Edmunds.com, Internet Brands, InsWeb and Lead Point that will provide our Company with valuable content, images, shopping and interactive tools and data for our websites.

• Other strategic alternatives being evaluated by our Board and management team.

• The belief that Trilogy is being opportunist in exploiting a recent extreme price decline in our common stock and use of confidential information about our Company obtained by Trilogy under a non-disclosure agreement.

Based upon the above, our Board recommends that you reject Trilogy’s offer and not tender your shares of common stock for purchase by Trilogy.

In addition, we encourage you to read the enclosed Schedule 14D-9, which provides further details with regard to our Board’s recommendation and discusses the factors that our Board carefully considered and evaluated in making its decision to reject Trilogy’s offer.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact our information agent, MacKenzie Partners, Inc., at the following numbers: Toll-Free 1-800-322-2885 or at 1-212-929-5500 (collect) or by email at autobytel@mackenziepartners.com.

On Behalf of the Board of Directors,

Jeffrey H. Coats
President and Chief Executive Officer

At $0.515, ABTL has a market capitalization of $23.3M, which is approaching our estimate of its $0.54 per share liquidation value. We’re planning to maintain the position as we believe a higher bid is on the cards and Trilogy will know that it is unlikely to get sufficient acceptances at a discount to ABTL’s liquidation value.

[Full Disclosure:  We do not have a holding in ABTL. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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We’re getting on the Twitter train. Catch us here: http://twitter.com/Greenbackd

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Empirical Finance Research Blog has a review of a new paper, Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, which finds that the “market reacts favorably to hedge fund activism, as the abnormal return upon announcement of potential activism is in the range of seven percent, with no return reversal during the subsequent year.” Further, the paper “provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of informed shareholder monitoring.”

The authors seek to address the questions posed by “critics and regulators” about the benefits of hedge fund activism to shareholders and the claim that hedge fund activists “destroy value by distracting managers from long-term projects.” Specifically, the paper seeks to answer the following questions:

  • Which firms do activists target and how do those targets respond?
  • How does the market react to the announcement of activism?
  • Do activists succeed in implementing their objectives?
  • Are activists short-term in focus?

We’ve set out below brief answers to the questions posed in the paper:

Which firms do activists target and how do those targets respond?

Hedge fund activists tend to target companies that are typically “value” firms, with low market value relative to book value, although they are profitable with sound operating cash flows and return on assets. Payout at these companies before intervention is lower than that of a matched sample. Target companies also have more takeover defenses and pay their CEOs more than comparable companies. Relatively few targeted companies are large-cap firms, which is not surprising given the relatively high cost of amassing a meaningful stake in such a target. Targets exhibit significantly higher institutional ownership and trading liquidity. These characteristics make it easier for activists to acquire a significant stake quickly.

How does the market react to the announcement of activism?

We find that the market reacts favorably to activism, consistent with the view that it creates value. The filing of a Schedule 13D revealing an activist fund’s investment in a target firm results in large positive average abnormal returns, in the range of 7 to 8 percent, during the (-20,+20) announcement window. The increase in both price and abnormal trading volume of target shares begins one to ten days prior to filing. We find that the positive returns at announcement are not reversed over time, as there is no evidence of a negative abnormal drift during the one-year period subsequent to the announcement. We also document that the positive abnormal returns are only marginally lower for hedge funds that disclosed substantial ownership positions (through quarterly Form 13F filings) before they file a Schedule 13D, which is consistent with the view that the abnormal returns are due to new information about activism, not merely that about stock picking. Moreover, target prices decline upon the exit of a hedge fund only after it has been unsuccessful, which indicates that the information reflected in the positive announcement returns conveys the market’s expectation for the success of activism.

Activism that targets the sale of the company or changes in business strategy, such as refocusing and spinning-off non-core assets, is associated with the largest positive abnormal partial effects of 8.54 percent and 5.95 percent, respectively (the latter figure is lower than the overall sample average because most events target multiple issues). This evidence suggests that hedge funds are able to create value when they see large allocative inefficiencies. In contrast, we find that the market response to capital-structure related activism – including debt restructuring, recapitalization, dividends, and share repurchases – is positive, yet insignificant. We find a similar lack of statistically meaningful reaction for governance-related activism-including attempts to rescind take-over defenses, to oust CEOs, to enhance board independence, and to curtail CEO compensation. Hedge funds with a track record of successful activism generate higher returns, as do hedge funds that initiate activism with hostile tactics.

Do activists succeed in implementing their objectives?

The positive market reaction is also consistent with ex-post evidence of overall improved performance at target firms. On average, from the year before announcement to the year after, total payout increases by 0.3-0.5 percentage points (as a percentage of the market value of equity, relative to an all-sample mean of 2.2 percentage points), and book value leverage increases by 1.3-1.4 percentage points (relative to an all-sample mean of 33.5 percentage points). Both changes are consistent with a reduction of agency problems associated with free cash flow and subject managers to increased market discipline.

We also find improvement in return on assets and operating profit margins, but this takes longer to happen. The post-event year sees little change compared to the year prior to intervention. However, EBITDA/Assets (EBITDA/Sales) at target firms increase by 0.9-1.5 (4.7-5.8) percentage points by two years after intervention. Analyst expectations also suggest improved prospects at target firms after hedge fund intervention. During the months before Schedule 13D filings, analysts downgrade (future) targets more than they upgrade them whereas after intervention is announced analysts maintain neutral ratings. Given that successful activism often leads to attrition through sale of the target company, ex post performance analysis based on surviving firms may underestimate the positive effect of activism.

Are activists short-term in focus?

Hedge fund activists are not short-term in focus, as some critics have claimed. The median holding period for completed deals is about one year, calculated as running from the date a hedge fund files a Schedule 13D to the date when the fund no longer holds a significant stake in a target company. The calculation substantially understates the actual median holding period, because it necessarily excludes events where no exit information is available by March 2007. Analysis of portfolio turnover rates of the funds in our sample suggests holding periods of closer to twenty months.

Empirical Finance Research has some tips for implementing the “hedge fund activist alpha strategy” based on their experience watching real-world activists work their magic:

1. Focus on small companies

2. Watch for activists who are entering companies at the same time mutual funds are dumping (watch for 13-G’s filed concurrently with 13Ds). This way you can buy at cheap prices while the mutual funds are putting pressure on the stock. Eventually, the selling pressure is gone AND you have an activist there to make sure the ship is sailing straight ahead.

3. Call the company in question and assess how ‘open’ they are. Sometimes even the best activist campaign can’t beat an overly entrenched and crooked management.

4. Call the activist and get a feel for what they want to do with the company. In my experience, activist investors are usually class-act capitalists and may give you hints as to the direction they want to take a company.

5. Do your own due diligence and determine where the ‘hidden’ value is located. If you have an assessment of exactly what the activist is after, you may be able to determine how successful they will be in their attempts to unlock this value. Here is a quick example. If you determine the activist wants to unlock value when there is a discrepancy between the value of an asset on the books and the value of an asset in the real-world (i.e. a real estate holding), but you determine that selling the asset would be a nightmare (maybe you live down the street from the property) and/or involves abusive tax treatment that not many people understand, you may shy away from following the activist.

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Autobytel Inc (NASDAQ:ABTL) has received a tender offer from Trilogy, Inc. at $0.35 per share. ABTL’s board is reviewing the offer and will advise its acceptence or rejection of the offer “on or before April 24, 2009.”

We started following ABTL (see our post archive here) because it was trading at a discount to its liquidation and net cash value and Trilogy, Inc. had been creeping up the register. Trilogy held 7.4% of ABTL’s outstanding stock prior to launching the tender offer. ABTL closed yesterday at $0.39, which is an 11% premium to Trilogy’s offer price, but still at a substantial discount to our estimate of ABTL’s liquidation value. We estimate that value to be around 38% higher still at $24.3M or $0.54 per share and ABTL’s net cash value to be around $15.4M or $0.34 per share.

Here’s Trilogy’s press release:

TRILOGY ENTERPRISES ANNOUNCES CASH TENDER OFFER FOR AUTOBYTEL AT $0.35 NET PER SHARE

AUSTIN, Texas, April 20, 2009 – Trilogy Enterprises, Inc. (“Trilogy”), a provider of technology powered business services to the automotive industry, today announced that its wholly-owned subsidiary, Infield Acquisition, Inc., has commenced a tender offer to acquire all of the outstanding shares of common stock of Autobytel Inc. (Nasdaq: ABTL) for $0.35 net per share in cash.

The offer represents a 32% premium over the trailing 30-day average closing price of Autobytel’s common stock.

“We are pleased to offer a significant premium to Autobytel’s shareholders, ” stated Sean Fallon, Senior Vice President of Trilogy. “The automotive industry is experiencing an unprecedented decline and we believe that Autobytel must take steps now to ensure its shareholders receive the highest value. Given the significant risks of this business and the Company’s history of operating losses, we believe the premium offered is very attractive.”

“As Autobytel’s second largest stockholder and the beneficial owner of approximately 7.4% of Autobytel’s outstanding common stock, we have studied this business carefully. We have concluded that Autobytel’s ability to execute a turnaround and realize significant value for its stockholders is subject to significant and unacceptable risk. We believe that a high-premium, all-cash tender offer is the most effective way to maximize value for all stockholders. As a result, we have determined it is necessary to take the offer directly to our fellow stockholders in order to deliver significant value to them as expeditiously as possible,” added Mr. Fallon.

“We are confident our fellow stockholders will find that this compelling offer reflects a superior value for their shares, both in light of Autobytel’s current and recent trading history, as well as any realistic near or long term assessment of Autobytel’s prospects. We are committed to completing this offer and remain willing to work cooperatively with Autobytel,” concluded Mr. Fallon.

The tender offer is scheduled to expire at 12:01 A.M., New York City time, on Tuesday, May 19, 2009, unless extended. The tender offer documents, including the Offer to Purchase and related Letter of Transmittal, will be filed today with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”). Autobytel’s stockholders may obtain copies of the tender offer documents when they become available at http://www.sec.gov. Free copies of such documents can also be obtained when they become available by calling Morrow & Co., LLC, toll-free at (800) 662-5200.

The tender offer was detailed in a letter dated April 20, 2009 from Trilogy to ABTL’s President and Chief Executive Officer, Jeffrey H. Coats, and ABTL’s Board of Directors. The full text of the letter is set forth below:

April 20, 2009
Autobytel Inc.
18872 MacArthur Boulevard, Suite 200
Irvine, California 92612-1400
Attention: Mr. Jeffrey H. Coats, President and Chief Executive Officer

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Trilogy Enterprises, Inc. (“Trilogy”), through its affiliates, owns approximately 7.4% of Autobytel Inc.’s (“Autobytel” or the “Company”) stock and is Autobytel’s second largest stockholder. We have successfully created and delivered innovative solutions to the automotive industry for more than a decade.

We believe Autobytel is facing a crucial period in its corporate existence. The automotive market is undergoing a crisis so severe that it is difficult to adequately describe. Strong companies may find a way forward. Weak companies will undoubtedly fail.

Unfortunately, Autobytel has historically struggled to create an independently viable business. For example:

• In 2006, Autobytel incurred operating losses of $40MM on $85MM in revenue;

• In 2007, Autobytel incurred operating losses of $35MM (not including litigation settlement costs) on $84MM in revenue; and

• In 2008, Autobytel incurred operating losses of $36MM (before impairment charges and litigation settlement costs) on $71MM in revenue, which declined by 15% from the prior year.

Autobytel has itself acknowledged that the market is “extremely challenging” and it expects the U.S. automotive industry to decline more than 20% in 2009. Given the market outlook, what should stockholders reasonably expect from a company that has not proven itself viable historically?

We recognize that Autobytel has taken steps to address this crisis. However, we do not believe the steps taken are adequate to address the severity of the situation. Autobytel facing another corporate reorganization during potentially the worst market in history seems highly unlikely to prevail. The current plan appears akin to “let’s give this one last shot”. Unfortunately, shareholder cash and value is at stake.

Given Autobytel’s business prospects and the significant historical and recent operating losses, the Board should take steps now to preserve as much shareholder value as possible. We believe the only means to accomplish this is the immediate sale of the business.

We are aware that Autobytel had engaged a financial advisor to evaluate the possible sale of the Company. Autobytel announced that its advisor conducted an extensive process which resulted in Autobytel concluding that shareholder value could not be maximized in the current environment. We assume this means no buyer desired to pay a price required by the Board.

Today, our wholly-owned subsidiary has commenced a tender offer that provides stockholders with an opportunity to sell shares at $0.35 per share in cash. We believe this price is likely lower than the share price the Board aspired to obtain during the recent sale process. However, we believe it is a full and fair value for the Company and offers both an attractive premium for stockholders, as well as immediate liquidity for a stock that is thinly traded.

We hereby request that the Board support the proposed tender offer, and in doing so, consider the following:

• The offer represents a 32% premium on the stock’s trailing 30 day closing price;

• The offer provides immediate liquidity for all stockholders;

• The trading volume reported for April is less than 65,000 shares per day, on over 45 million shares outstanding;

• The Company is a sub-scale public company and may not be able to continue to bear the costs and obligations of a public company;

• The Company cannot withstand another shift in strategy during what may be the worst market in history;

• The Company may not be able to continue to bear the costs of its management team, including the lucrative packages offered to its recent hires;

• The Company recently issued executive stock options at $0.35 per share, which the Company must believe is fair value;

• The Company had $32MM in cash in September and only $27MM in December;

• The Company continues to burn cash and is likely to do so for the foreseeable future. It is reasonable to believe that the Company may run out of cash by the end of 2010;

• Without at least breakeven results, stockholder value will only continue to deteriorate until no stockholder value remains;

• Any acquiror must take on the Company’s cash burn and fund the Company in a highly uncertain environment; and

• Any acquirer may have to invest significant additional funds into the Company to make it operationally efficient and competitive.

It is time to stop the erosion in stockholder value. Looking at where Autobytel’s stock price traded a year ago is not indicative of the true value of the Company, but it should serve as a reminder of the value that was destroyed. Autobytel’s management should realistically evaluate the prospects for its business. A candid assessment of that situation should lead management to conclude that an all cash offer at a significant premium to all Company stockholders is in the best interests of the stockholders.

We are pleased to make this proposal to our fellow stockholders. We believe they will find it to be attractive in light of both the Company’s trading history, and a realistic assessment of the Company’s prospects. We are committed to completing this offer and hopeful that we will be able to work cooperatively with the Company in doing so.
We look forward to your timely response.

Sincerely,
Trilogy Enterprises, Inc.

Trilogy’s offer is a little disappointing given that it is pitched at ABTL’s net cash value and at a large discount to its liquidation value. The discount is a direct result of the poison pill adopted by ABTL in 2004. From the most recent 10K:

Preferred Shares Purchase Rights Plan

In July 2004, the Board of Directors approved the adoption of a stockholder rights plan under which all stockholders of record as of August 10, 2004 received rights to purchase shares of Series A Junior Participating Preferred Stock. The rights were distributed as a non-taxable dividend and will expire July 30, 2014.

The rights will be exercisable only if a person or group acquires 15% or more of the common stock of the Company or announces a tender offer for 15% or more of the common stock. If a person or group acquires 15% or more of the common stock, all rightholders, except the acquirer, will be entitled to acquire at the then exercise price of a right that number of shares of the Company’s common stock which at the time will have a market value of two times the exercise price of the right. Under certain circumstances, all rightholders, other than the acquirer, will be entitled to receive at the then exercise price of a right that number of shares of common stock of the acquiring company which at the time will have a market value of two times the exercise price of the right. The initial exercise price of a right is $65.00.

The Board of Directors may terminate the rights plan at any time or redeem the rights prior to the time a person or group acquires more than 15% of the Company’s common stock.

In January 2009, the stockholder rights plan was amended to allow Coghill Capital Management LLC and certain of its affiliates (collectively “Coghill”) to hold up to 8,118,410 shares without becoming an acquiring person under the stockholders rights, subject to various conditions set forth in the amendment, including Coghill’s execution of and compliance with a standstill agreement.

We believe this is the opening salvo in Trilogy’s tender offer, and a higher price is possible if the board terminates the rights plan. We’ll watch the developments with interest.

[Full Disclosure:  We do not have a holding in ABTL. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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Business Week has an article, Fighting takeovers by playing the debt card, describing Amylin Pharmaceuticals Inc.’s (NASDAQ:AMLN) attempts to fend off Carl Icahn through the use of a “Poison Put.” A poison put is a change-of-control debt covenant the effect of which is to require the borrower to pay back an outstanding loan if investors buy a sufficiently large stake in the company or elect a slate of directors. In this case, AMLN says it would be forced to pay back a $125M loan if Icahn’s slate gets control of its board, which could in turn cause it to default on up to $900M in debt. That makes AMLN an unpalatable activist target.

Business Week says the covenant is the “choice du jour” for an increasing number of companies seeking to avoid the attention of activists and raiders:

Many companies have such change of control covenants in their bond or loan agreements, among them J.C. Penney (JCP), Kroger (KR), Ingersoll-Rand (IR), and Dell (DELL). That’s not to say they would use them to ward off an Icahn. Nor is it clear how many companies are using these covenants to do so. But shareholder activists have little doubt that they have become a takeover defense. “[These change of control provisions] are designed to deter a proxy fight,” says Chris Young, director of mergers and acquisitions research for the shareholder advisory firm RiskMetrics Group (RMG).

Change in control provisions are nothing new. In fact they are a standard condition in most loan agreements:

Change of control provisions first began appearing in 1980 when corporate raiders started taking over companies and loading them up with debt. Concerned that these companies would be unable to pay back their loans, lenders insisted on covenants requiring them to repay their original lenders. These provisions became fashionable again during the private equity boom of recent years. Now, with credit tight, they have become a potent deterrent to corporate raiders leery of being forced to repay a company’s debt and then refinance the loans at higher rates.

What is new, however, is companies actively seeking the inclusion of such a covenant as a device to fend off a suitor, as Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. (USA) (NYSE:LGF) and Exelon Corporation (NYSE:EXC) seemed to do recently:

When JPMorgan Chase (JPM) extended Lions Gate’s revolving line of credit last year, the terms included a provision that triggers instant repayment if an investor buys more than 20% of the company’s stock. Since then Icahn has acquired 14% of Lions Gate. In late March, Lions Gate “strongly urged” investors-while taking no formal position-to scrutinize an offer by Icahn to buy $316 million in debt. (He could convert it into stock and boost his ownership stake.) In the same letter, Lions Gate, without mentioning Icahn, said it could be forced to repay both its bank debt and notes.

In another case, the giant electric utility Exelon (EXC) wants to buy rival NRG Energy (NRG) for $5 billion and is waging a proxy battle to elect nine members to NRG’s board. In a letter to shareholders, NRG warned that such an outcome would trigger “an acceleration” of its $8 billion of debt. Exelon General Counsel William A. Von Hoene Jr. counters that NRG is “using the debt issue as a threat” to scare off NRG’s shareholders from considering its bid.

AMLN shareholders aren’t taking it lying down. The San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund, an AMLN investor, has sued the company for agreeing to the poison put about the time takeover speculation began in 2007. For its part, AMLN says it has since tried unsuccessfully to get bondholders to waive a provision blocking outsiders from taking over the board and has asked its bankers for a similar waiver. Steven M. Davidoff, The Deal Professor, has a superb analysis of the issues in his NYTimes.com DealBook column, Icahn, Amylin and the New Nuances of Activist Investing. Says Davidoff:

The pension fund’s claim is mainly that these poison put provisions are void. In support of this claim, the plaintiff appears to be arguing that the provision violates the Unocal standard in Delaware, which requires that director action in response to a threat to the corporation not be coercive vis-à-vis stockholders.

In addition, the plaintiff claims that the poison put provisions violate Section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law which requires that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation be run by the board. Here, the plaintiff claims that the poison put provisions hinder the board’s exercise of its fiduciary duties to ensure a free and fair election, since the directors cannot approve all nominees for election.

The more problematic issue is with the language in the credit agreement for the term loan. … [If] in a two-year period the board changes control due to a proxy contest, the provision is triggered. The actions of Mr. Icahn and Eastbourne, if successful, would do the trick.

So, we are left with the issue of whether this provision violates Unocal. The answer is likely no. Delaware has broadly interpreted the doctrine, and here there is an opening for a change of control to occur – it will just take two years. This conceivably could be only two proxy contests, and therefore I suspect will likely not be found coercive. After all if Delaware tolerates staggered boards, why wouldn’t it tolerate a provision which has a similar effect?

Shareholder activist Nell Minow says companies shouldn’t use the poison put if their object is to disenfranchise stockholders:

These are shareholder rights that can’t be negotiated away by someone else.

We agree. Unfortunately, as Davidoff points out, lenders do have legitimate reasons for asking for such a provisions: they want to know who they are dealing with. This means that lenders will keep proposing poison puts and boards will “avoid resisting” them because they deter shareholder activism.

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Chromcraft Revington (AMEX:CRC) has filed its 10K for the period ended December 31, 2008.

We initiated the position in CRC in December last year (see the post archive here) because it was trading at a substantial discount to its liquidation value and a substantial stockholder had called for its sale or orderly liquidation. Aldebaran Capital, LLC, a 7.7% stockholder, sent a letter to the company on October 29 last year arguing that if CRC is unable to “promptly stabilize its business and rationalize its cost structure” it should be sold or liquidated. Neither of those two events has occurred and the company now appears to be trading at a premium to its value in liquidation. We initially estimated the company’s liquidation value at around $15M. We’ve now reduced our valuation to $2.8M or $0.35 per share. The problem we identified when we opened the position persists: The company is in a liquidity crisis and risks entering bankruptcy. For these reasons, we’re exiting.

We opened the CRC position at $0.46 and it closed yesterday at $0.48, which means we’re up 4.8% on an absolute basis. The S&P500 Index was at 909.7 when we opened the position and closed yesterday at 832.39, which means we’re up 12.8% on a relative basis.

The value proposition updated

The company appears to have some value on its balance sheet, but much of that value is illusory for the reasons we’ll outline below (the “Book Value” column shows the assets as they are carried in the financial statements, and the “Liquidating Value” column shows our estimate of the value of the assets in a liquidation):

crc-summary-2008-12-31The $7.2M in liquidation value above doesn’t take into account CRC’s non-cancelable operating leases for office space, showroom facilities and transportation and other equipment. The future minimum lease payments under these leases for the years ending December 31, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 are $1.9M, $1.1M, $0.8M, $0.6M, and $0, respectively, or $4.4M in total. Deducting the $4.4M from the $7.2M in balance sheet value leaves just $2.8M or $0.35 per share.

A slightly disappointing outcome, but we’re happy to take a small gain given the reduction in value.

[Full Disclosure:  We do not have a holding in CRC. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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