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Charlie Rose has a fantastic interview with Wilbur Ross, who played Willy Tanner (the dad) on Alf before becoming an investor in distressed businesses, most notably in the coal, steel and auto parts industries. This profile describes Ross’s start thus:

In 2001, when LTV, a bankrupt steel company based in Cleveland, decided to liquidate, Ross was the only bidder. Ross suspected that President Bush, a free trader, would soon enact steel tariffs on foreign steel, the better to appeal to prospective voters in midwestern swing states. So in February 2002, Ross organized International Steel Group and agreed to buy LTV’s remnants for $325 million. A few weeks later, Bush slapped a 30 percent tariff on many types of imported steel—a huge gift. “I had read the International Trade Commission report, and it seemed like it was going to happen,” said Ross. “We talked to everyone in Washington.” (Ross is on the board of News Communications, which publishes The Hill in Washington, D.C.)

With the furnaces rekindled, LTV’s employees returned to the job, but under new work rules and with 401(k)s instead of pensions. A year later, Ross performed the same drill on busted behemoth Bethlehem Steel. Meanwhile, between the tariffs, China’s suddenly insatiable demand for steel, and the U.S. automakers’ zero-percent financing push, American steel was suddenly red hot. The price per ton of rolled steel soared, and in a career-making turnaround, Ross took ISG public in December 2003.

After pulling off a quick turnaround in the twentieth century’s iconic business—steel—Ross set about doing the same with the troubled iconic industry of the nineteenth century. In October 2003, he outdueled Warren Buffett for control of Burlington Industries, a large textile company that failed in late 2001. In March 2004, he snapped up Cone Mills, which, like Burlington, was based in Greensboro, North Carolina, and bankrupt. As with the steel companies, the PBGC took over some of the pensions, the unions made concessions, and thousands of laid-off workers were recalled. Most important, debt was slashed. Today, International Textile Group has just about $50 million in debt, less than the two companies were paying in interest a few years ago.

In the Charlie Rose interview Ross discusses his analysis of LTV, which is basically a classic Graham net current asset value analysis:

Ross: We’re in the business not so much of being contrarians deliberately, but rather we like to take perceived risk instead of actual risk. And what I mean by that is that you get paid for taking a risk that people think is risky, you particularly don’t get paid for taking actual risk. So what we had done we analysed the bid we made, we paid the money partly for fixed assets, we basically spent $90 million for assets on which LTV had spent $2.5 billion in the prior 5 years, and our assessment of the values was that if worst came to worst we could knock it down and sell it to the Chinese. Then we also bought accounts receivable and inventory for 50c on the dollar. So between those combination of things, we frankly felt we had no risk.

Charlie Rose: And then next year you bought Bethlehem.

Ross: Yes, but before that even, what happened, out came BusinessWeek asking, “Is Wilbur Ross crazy?”

The joke was, right when everybody was saying, “This is too risky. It’ll never work,” the big debate in our shop was, “Should we just liquidate it and take the profit or should we try to start it up?” That’s how sure we were that we weren’t actually taking a risk, but I wanted to start it up because if you liquidate it you make some money, but you wouldn’t change the whole industry and you wouldn’t make a large sum as we turned out to do.

Watch the interview.

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The WSJ has a more full profile of Li Lu (subscription required), the Chinese-born hedge-fund manager in line to become a successor to Warren Buffett at Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

Mr. Li, 44 years old, has emerged as a leading candidate to run a chunk of Berkshire’s $100 billion portfolio, stemming from a close friendship with Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s 86-year-old vice chairman. In an interview, Mr. Munger revealed that Mr. Li was likely to become one of the top Berkshire investment officials. “In my mind, it’s a foregone conclusion,” Mr. Munger said.

The profile discusses Li Lu’s investment in BYD:

The Chinese-American investor already has made money for Berkshire: He introduced Mr. Munger to BYD Co., a Chinese battery and auto maker, and Berkshire invested. Since 2008, Berkshire’s BYD stake has surged more than six-fold, generating profit of about $1.2 billion, Mr. Buffett says. Mr. Li’s hedge funds have garnered an annualized compound return of 26.4% since 1998, compared to 2.25% for the Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index during the same period.

Mr. Li’s big hit began in 2002 when he first invested in BYD, then a fledgling Chinese battery company. Its founder came from humble beginnings and started the company in 1995 with $300,000 of borrowed money.

Mr. Li made an initial investment in BYD soon after its initial public offering on the Hong Kong stock exchange. (BYD trades in the U.S. on the Pink Sheets and was recently quoted at $6.90 a share.)

When he opened the fund, he loaded up again on BYD shares, eventually investing a significant share of the $150 million fund with Mr. Munger in BYD, which already was growing quickly and had bought a bankrupt Chinese automaker. “He bought a little early and more later when the stock fell, which is his nature,” Mr. Munger says.

In 2008, Mr. Munger persuaded Mr. Sokol to investigate BYD for Berkshire as well. Mr. Sokol went to China and when he returned, he and Mr. Munger convinced Mr. Buffett to load up on BYD. In September, Berkshire invested $230 million in BYD for a 10% stake in the company.

BYD’s business has been on fire. It now has close to one-third of the global market for lithium-ion batteries, used in cell phones. Its bigger plans involve the electric and hybrid-vehicle business.

The test for BYD, one of the largest Chinese car makers, will be whether it can deliver on plans to develop the most effective lithium battery on the market that could become an even bigger source of power in the future. Even more promising is the potential to use the lithium battery to store power from other energy sources like solar and wind.

Says Mr. Munger: “The big lithium battery is a game-changer.”

BYD is a big roll of the dice for Mr. Li. He is an informal adviser to the company and owns about 2.5% of the company.

Mr. Li’s fund’s $40 million investment in BYD is now worth about $400 million. Berkshire’s $230 million investment in 2008 now is worth about $1.5 billion. Messrs. Buffett, Munger, Sokol, Li and Microsoft founder and Berkshire Director Bill Gates plan to visit China and BYD in September.

As impressive as that investment is, the WSJ says that Lu’s record is unremarkable without the investment in BYD:

But hiring Mr. Li could be risky. His big bet on BYD is his only large-scale investing home run. Without the BYD profits, his performance as a hedge-fund manager is unremarkable.

It’s unclear whether he could rack up such profits if managing a large portfolio of Berkshire’s.

What’s more, his strategy of “backing up the truck,” to make large investments and not wavering when the markets turn down could backfire in a prolonged bear market. Despite a 200% return in 2009, he was down 13% at the end of June this year, nearly double the 6.6% drop in the S&P-500 during the period.

Mr. Li declined to name his fund’s other holdings. Despite this year’s losses, the $600 million fund is up 338% since its late 2004 launch, an annualized return of around 30%, compared to less than 1% for the S&P 500 index.

Read the article.

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Barron’s has some interesting “sum-of-the-parts” analysis on the publicly traded limited partnership units of KKR & Co. L.P. (NYSE:KKR). Says Barron’s:

KKR ran $55 billion in assets across a variety of strategies as of March 31. Simply valuing the management fee stream from these assets at a 15 price-to-earnings multiple, in line with other money managers, and placing a lower multiple on its capital-markets unit, yields $3.25 or so per share in value, fully taxed. Adding the straight book value of its private and public direct investments produces another $6.25 per share, for a total implied value of $9.50, right at the present share price.

The next trick is valuing potential future performance fees on the $27 billion of deals housed in its private-equity funds, as well as those of deals not yet done and funds not yet raised.

One hedge-fund manager who has been buying the stock pencils in as plausible an 8% annual gain in the private funds, calculates the present value of the resulting performance fees (or the 60% of performance fees that flow to shareholders after employees get their taste) and gives this line item a 10 multiple to arrive at $3.70 a share in value. That produces a total sum-of-the-parts target above $13, more than 35% above the current price.

Analysts at Keefe Bruyette & Woods go even further, figuring KKR’s operating business to be worth $9 to $11 per share and the private-equity portfolio worth another $6.22 atop that, for a total value between $15.22 and $17.22.

Read the article.

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Market Folly has T2 Partners’ presentation to the 7th Annual Value Investing Seminar, in which they discuss three opportunities in BP, which I’ve discussed in the past, MSFT and BUD. Says Jay:

On Anheuser-Busch InBev, T2 Partners says, “you can currently buy BUD with an entry FCF yield of 10% for a business that can probably grow at GDP + inflation for a long time, giving you a long term IRR of at least 15% without any multiple expansion.” We’ve previously covered a separate and specific T2 Partners presentation on BUD worth checking out as well.

Secondly, Tilson and Tongue argue that Microsoft (MSFT) is undervalued. They write, “MSFT’s closing price on 7/12/10: $24.83, so assuming $2.40/share of FY 2011 earnings (midpoint of analysts’ estimates and our own), plus $4 share in cash, here are possible stock prices and returns (plus there’s a 2.1% dividend): 10x multiple = $28 stock = 13% return. 12x multiple = $33 stock = 33% return. 15x multiple = $40 stock = $61% return.” They highlight the company has $4.24 cash per share, shareholder friendly capital allocation (buybacks & dividend), as well as a new product cycle in tow (Microsoft Office, Windows 7, etc). T2 Partners says that the rumors of Microsoft’s demise are greatly exaggerated.

See the T2 presentation.

No positions.

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The WSJ has an article on Standard & Poor’s Valuation & Risk Strategies list of 10 publicly traded companies that could be LBO targets:

Analysts at S&P Valuation & Risk Strategies chose companies in the consumer discretionary and industrial sectors, because these sectors, along with financials, have been especially active for buyouts. Also, they picked companies that have market values of $1 billion to $4 billion, in keeping with the size of recent top LBOs. And finally, they picked companies trading at less than their respective industry’s coming year-end price-to-earnings ratio, which would indicate that the market currently undervalues them.

S&P’s top pick for an LBO is Eastman Kodak, with a market capitalization of roughly $1.2 billion. Private-equity firm KKR already owns a stake in Eastman Kodak. Here is the rest of the list:

  • Eastman Kodak ($1.2 billion)
  • Oshkosh ($2.8 billion)
  • GameStop ($2.9 billion)
  • EMCOR Group ($1.6 billion)
  • Cooper Tire & Rubber Co ($1.3 billion)
  • DSW ($1 billion)
  • TRW Automotive ($3.6 billion)
  • Dillard’s ($1.4 billion)
  • Alaska Air Group ($1.7 billion)
  • Gymboree ($1.2 billion)

Read the article.

No positions.

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Interesting commentary out of Minyanville (Today’s Market Is Missing Valuation, Fundamental Metrics) from a self-described “old valuation guy” lamenting the disappearance of value and value investors from the market. I usually enjoy these articles. I like sitting on Uncle Warren’s knee while he talks about the time he swapped a bag of cocoa beans for a controlling interest in Berkshire Hathaway:

For several weeks I busily bought shares, sold beans, and made periodic stops at Schroeder Trust to exchange stock certificates for warehouse receipts. The profits were good and my only expense was subway tokens.

Great story, Uncle Warren. I’m right now trying to buy Pfizer with a paper clip and some pocket lint, but I digress. I was just getting settled onto Old Valuation Guy’s lap when he springs this one on me:

One of the most frustrating aspects of the current market to an old valuation guy is the complete absence of a focus on fundamental valuation metrics and apparent lack of understanding of the relationship among leverage, growth, and value. Old Mr. Market is just not doing what he’s supposed to.

“Old Mr. Market is just not doing what he’s supposed to.” Say what? Isn’t the whole point of Ben Graham’s Mr. Market analogy that Mr. Market is a manic depressive who does silly things? What Mr. Market is supposed to do is act irrationally. You say he’s acting irrationally? He’s doing what he’s supposed to! I don’t think Old Mr. Market is the problem here. I think Old Valuation Guy is the one who’s not doing what he’s supposed to, which is to say, valuing things and taking advantage of Old Mr. Market. Reading between the lines, I think what Old Valuation Guy is saying is that the market refuses to go up. In my book, that’s not conclusive evidence that you’re not a value investor, but it’s strike one.

So-called Old Valuation Guy continues:

For those of us who grew up with a nod to Graham and Dodd, efficient market theory, or even discounted cash flow, this is one tough time, as increased volatility, whipsaw-like moves, and technical “tells” seem to be in ascension. Perhaps this is the inevitable volatility reflecting the combined uncertainty about the upcoming elections, the outlook for global recovery, and general economic uncertainty, and Mr. Market is merely going through the inevitable digestion required after the gluttony of the last decade; but I’d posit that there’s a bigger risk sitting in the wings.

Placing the words “efficient market theory” right after the words “Graham and Dodd” is vanishingly close to blasphemy. Wash your mouth out, and strike two. I’d give you a third strike for that line about “increased volatility” and “whipsaw-like moves”, but then you’d be out of strikes, and I want to send you to the showers for this gem:

Should investors and professional money managers come to believe that metrics like P/E ratios, TEV to EBITDA, book values, hurdle rates, or WACC are meaningless and antiquated tools in the current post-Armageddon financial meltdown, it may be a long time before folks come back to the market and provide the necessary liquidity to break us out of the doldrums.

WACC? WACC?? WACC is meaningless. And useless. And meaningless (Did I mention that?). Strike three. You’re outta here. I’ve got news for you, Old Valuation Guy: You’re not a value guy.

Value guys like volatility. Crazy, gyrating market? Giddyup. Whipsawing prices? Yee hah. “Uncertainty about the upcoming elections?” Beautiful. Follow that red herring. No liquidity? Along with raindrops on roses and whiskers on kittens, these are a few of my favorite things. Why? It is axiomatic to value investing that volatility is not risk, but the generator of opportunity. We want Mr. Market manic depressive for the rest of our lives. We want him bucking like a bronco. We want him scaring people away.

These articles pop up occasionally. Remember the article What Would Warren Do? where Megan McArdle interviewed a fund manager under the Omaha twilight who suddenly said, “The only way to make money these days is leverage”?  This sort of fuzzy thinking needs to be beaten back with a stick. If you’re going to go around calling yourself a value guy, at least have the common decency to find out what a value guy believes. A good place to start would be that Graham and Dodd book you nodded at as you were coming up.

Read the rest of it here. It improves slightly until he asks if “Edwards and Magee [have] finally beaten Graham and Dodd? Have momentum investing, computers, and flash trading killed the value investor?” Ugh. No.

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Greenbackd readers, get your exclusive $1,800 discount for the 6th Annual Value Investing Congress on October 12 & 13, 2010 in New York City. This offer expires in 8 days, so get your ticket now using dicount code: N10GB4.

The Value Investing Congress is the place for value investors from around the world to network with other value investors. I went to the May event earlier this year in Pasadena, and it was well worth it. The speakers seem to mingle freely and are generally available for a chat. Weather permitting, I’ll be in New York for this event.

Speakers include:

  • David Einhorn, Greenlight Capital Management
  • Lee Ainslie, Maverick Capital
  • John Burbank, Passport Capital
  • J Kyle Bass, Hayman Capital
  • Mohnish Pabrai, Pabrai Investment Funds
  • Amitabh Singhi, Surefin Investments
  • J. Carlo Cannell, Cannell Capital
  • Zeke Ashton, Centaur Capital Partners
  • Whitney Tilson & Glenn Tongue, T2 Partners

This offer expires midnight on July 30. Use using dicount code: N10GB4 and get your ticket now .

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Andrew Shapiro, President of Lawndale Capital Management, has provided a further update on Reading International Inc (NASDAQ:RDI) (see the RDI post archive here):

In Reading’s 2008 Consolidated Entertainment/Pacific Theaters acquisition of 181 movie screens in California and Hawaii, there were three contingent purchase price reduction tests, each forgiving a portion of the acquisition’s seller note PLUS interest RETROACTIVE back to the Feb 2008 acquisition date. Two of those tests have already taken place and have reduced the seller note (“US Nationwide Loan 1” on Reading’s 3/31/10 schedule of Notes Payable) to $15.3 million.

This article notes the first anniversary of a competitive theater in Bakersfield California, within the competitive radius of Reading’s Valley Plaza 16, triggering the last contingent purchase price reduction test.

A multiple of the cash flow reduction experienced by Reading’s theater over this PAST year (that is lower EBITDA which RDI shareholders have already “suffered” from) is to be returned to Reading in the form of forgiveness on the seller note. The measurement will take place this current quarter.  Reading’s lowered debt from forgiveness of a portion or all of the US Nationwide Loan 1 and recovery of accrued interest expense on the forgiven principal RETROACTIVE to the Feb 2008 acquisition date is likely to occur during Q4, after Pacific Theater’s audit of Reading’s claim.

RDI has also announced that it has settled its tax dispute with the IRS. Here’s the release:

Reading International Settles Tax Case with IRS

Los Angeles, California, – (BUSINESS WIRE) – July 16, 2010 – Reading International, Inc. (Reading) (NASDAQ:RDI) announced today that its wholly owned subsidiary, Craig Corporation (Craig), has reached an agreement in principle to settle its tax dispute with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) related to Craig’s tax year ended June 30, 1997. Craig and the IRS are currently in the process of documenting this settlement. The settlement resulted in a 70% concession by the government and will lead to the previously issued IRS Notice of Deficiency, dated June 29, 2006, in the amount of $20.9 million, $47.2 million inclusive of interest, being set aside by agreement of the parties. Reading estimates that, as of the date of this release, Craig’s liability under this settlement is approximately $15.0 million inclusive of interest, although final calculations have yet to be agreed. As of March 31, 2010, Craig had reserved $4.5 million against this liability.

The impact of this settlement with the IRS on Reading is approximately $14.0 million, resulting in a charge against earnings of $9.5 million for the second quarter.

[Full Disclosure:  I hold RDI. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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Hervé Jacques has provided a guest post on the accuracy of guru prognostications. Here’s Hervé’s bio:

Hervé is a veteran of 30-year of market activity on the official sector side (central banks, International Financial Organizations) with first hand experience of FX and fixed income markets. He is now consulting for official and private institutions, targeting International financial organizations, sovereign wealth funds, central banks, commercial and investment banks, hedge funds.

In parallel to his professional career, he has a successful track record as a personal investor in stocks, bonds and commodities over several decades.

His market experience from an unusual perspective (the nexus between policy making and investors/traders) gives him unparalleled insight into the post-crisis world of capital markets.

Hervé Jacques on Guru Calls: Better lucky than smart?:

I came across this today, by accident. Check the date. Yes, it’s 2009.

Makes you modest, doesn’t it? That was back in May 2009. So David got it almost exactly right, month-wise. He was just a year early, as the market didn’t peak until April 23rd, 2010, so about 12 months later. The S&P500 went all the way from 920 to 1217 during those 12 months.

And this was coming from one of the (rightfully) most respected Wall Street voices, at the top of his career, crowning many years of leading presence at Merrill on his valedictorian interview.

Not picking on him here: there are dozens of examples of such calls ending way out of the ballpark, starting with quite a few of mine…

In 2001, the IMF did a 63 country-study on how well economists predicted recessions. The punch line of the result?

“The record of failure to predict recessions is virtually unblemished.”

Goes to show that both the economy as well as Mr. Market do as they please, no matter how intricate the research, how strong the gut feeling and how extensive the experience of whoever places calls, especially as regards the future of stock prices.

David’s point was right, mind you. I would subscribe even today to everything he said, on the fundamentals.

Nevertheless, the “animal spirits”, “market sentiment”, “investor psychology” or whatever you call it meant that Mr. Market would keep going strong for another year, despite all the appropriately highlighted issues.

So where does that leave us? Taking cheap shots at highly respected gurus? Nope.

The lesson is that no matter how authorized the voices, whatever they come up with is one of the potential “states of the world” that will materialize. There is this somewhat sarcastic saying that “promises only commit those that receive them”. I think it applies to forecasting as well.

Any forecast, no matter how carefully crafted, is a probability. Nothing more than that. Which explains, by the way, why we get so many different forecasts, based on so many different expectations, which make the market that superior voting and weighing machine described by Ben Graham.

So next time we read some intricately motivated forecast from a star Wall Street authority, let’s keep in mind that this is just as much as the human mind-at its best? -can conceive, but that reality will result of the competing expectations of millions of other “votes”.

Not necessarily better-informed “votes”, by the way. Which means that the outcome might be less “efficient” than the most carefully forecasted one. Being smart does not always lead to riches, as “the market can stay inefficient longer than you can stay solvent”, as we know.

So, away from philosophy, what does that mean in real trading life?

The practical consequence is that, no matter how strong the gut feeling, how grounded the analytics and how big the firepower backing it, any market position is a bet that needs to be backed by a stop-loss (“risk management”).

Any such position is only based on the existing information (public or private).

Therefore two things can derail the plans: new information (potentially “black swans”, but even more mundane events); and an unexpected reaction of other players (“Mr. Market”) to the existing information. That’s more than enough to mess up the best plans.

As my mom used to say: “Better lucky than smart”.

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In September last year I picked up a small position in Cadus Corporation (OTC:KDUS). The idea was as follows:

Cadus Corporation (OTC:KDUS) is an interesting play, but not without hairs on it. First, the good news: It’s trading at a discount to net cash with Carl Icahn disclosing an activist holding in 2002, and Moab Capital Partners disclosing an activist holding more recently. At its $1.51 close yesterday, the company has a market capitalization of $19.9M. The valuation is straight-forward. We estimate the net cash value to be around $20.6M or $1.57 per share and the liquidation value to be around $23.2M or $1.77 per share. The liquidation value excludes the potential value of federal and New York State and City net operating loss carry-forwards. It’s not a huge upside but it’s reasonably certain, and we think that’s a good thing in this market. The problem with the position is the catalyst. It’s a relatively tiny position for Icahn, so he’s got no real incentive to do anything with it. He’s been in the position since 2002, so he’s clearly in no hurry. That said, he’s not ignoring the position. He last updated his 13D filing in March this year, disclosing an increased 40% stake. He’s also got Moab Capital Partners to contend with. Moab holds 9.8% of the stock and says that it “has had good interaction with the CEO of Cadus, David Blitz, and feels comfortable that he will structure a transaction with an operating business that will generate significant long-term value for Cadus holders.” KDUS could end up being a classic value trap, but we think it’s worth a look at a discount to net cash, and two interested shareholders.

Fast forward to Friday’s close, and the stock is at $1.44. I got out a little while ago as I was liquidating holdings outside of my fund, breaking even on the position. In For Investors, Shaking Up Is Hard to Do (subscription required) Jason Zweig of the WSJ’s The Intelligent Investor column has some background on the goings on in KDUS:

Just ask Matthew Crouse of Salt Lake City. Starting in 2002, he sank roughly $190,000 into Cadus Corp., a classic “value” stock. The tiny company was selling for less than the amount of its cash minus debt.

In February 2009, Mr. Crouse wrote to Cadus, requesting that the board sell the company and return the cash proceeds to investors. He drafted a resolution to that effect, which he asked the board to include in Cadus’ proxy statement when shareholders were next asked to vote.

Yet Cadus didn’t hold an annual meeting last year. One large shareholder says that “time and again, we have brought opportunities [for mergers or acquisitions] to the attention of the board.” Each time, he says, the suggestion was rebuffed or ignored. “It’s been a decade of complete nonaction,” he says.

A little over a week ago—17 months after Mr. Crouse’s letter—Cadus informed him that it will hold its annual meeting on Oct. 6, that his resolution will be included and that the board will recommend that shareholders reject it.

“My goal is to get it on Icahn’s radar screen so that he’ll need to deal with us, not just ignore us,” Mr. Crouse says. “If you push for shareholder activism in other companies, I’d think you’d want to take care of your own.”

It isn’t that simple, Mr. Icahn counters. “We’ve been looking assiduously for three years for opportunities,” he told me this week. “But I don’t want to make a bad acquisition and lose the cash.” He added, “I strongly believe that in today’s type of market we will find a company [to buy] fairly soon.”

Furthermore, Mr. Icahn says, if Cadus distributed its cash to shareholders, it would have no money for an acquisition, losing the opportunity to use its tax benefits directly. “I don’t want to waste $25 million,” he says. Of course, Cadus could still be acquired by another firm that could make use of the tax break.

Cadus is less a company than a publicly traded checking account with a tax perk attached. The insiders are the only ones who can write checks. The minority shareholders can always vote with their feet by selling the stock—although they would have little to show for it.

For the proposal to pass, nearly 90% of all the minority shareholders would have to vote for it, since Mr. Icahn controls 40% of the stock.

I still think KDUS is good value, but the stock doesn’t trade, so good luck getting any. I don’t see Icahn just wasting the tax shelter, some of which starts rolling off in the next few years, but it’s all academic to me.

[Full Disclosure:  No position. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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