Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Archive for the ‘About’ Category

I am absolutely thrilled that Greenbackd made The Reformed Broker’s superb Period Table of Finance Bloggers. I slept through most of my high school chemistry classes, but I think Greenbackd occupies the same esteemed place accorded to carbon on the periodic table of elements. Carbon’s got a bad rep at the moment, but that doesn’t bother me. Being a value investor, I know that “Many shall be restored that now are fallen and many shall fall that are now in honor.

Disclosure: Long Carbon (C).

Click to see a readable version (via The Reformed Broker):

Reformed Broker Periodic Table

Read Full Post »

Distressed Debt Investing has today launched the Distressed Debt Investors Club, a “community of investors dedicated to sharing ideas and helping each other navigate the sometimes mine-filled path of the distressed debt world.”

Members are admitted on the strength of their application and the thought process evident in the investment idea. Only 250 members will be admitted. Hunter is taking applications for next few weeks and will then admit those accepted to the site at the same time to “allow each member to see other admitted applicant’s ideas and thus begin the process of idea generation and sharing.”

If, like me, deep value, liquidations and activism are your thang, I would encourage you to join. The ability to analyze and trade in the debt side of the ledger will markedly expand your investment universe. Buy up all the bonds and get control like old “Net Quick” Evans or just agitate like Icahn.

Here is the Distressed Debt Investors Club FAQ.

Further questions should be directed to hunter[at]distressed-debt-investing[dot]com.

Read Full Post »

Aspen Exploration Corporation (OTC:ASPN) has announced that it will pay a cash dividend of $0.73 per share to stockholders of record on November 16, 2009 from the proceeds of the sale of its California oil and gas assets to Venoco, Inc. $0.73 per share represents $5.3M, which is just over the mid-point of the $5.0M to $5.5M range estimated by the company.

We’ve been following ASPN (see our ASPN post archive) because it’s trading at a discount to its $1.17 per share liquidation value and there are several potential catalysts in the stock, including a 13D filing from Tymothi O. Tombar, a plan to distribute substantially all of the net, after-tax proceeds from the completion of the Venoco sale to its stockholders ($5.3M), and the possibility that the company will dissolve. The stock is down 0.2% since we initiated the position to close yesterday at $0.983. This values the remaining stub of ASPN at $0.253 ($0.983 less $0.73) against a liquidating value I estimate at $0.44 ($1.17 less $0.73). I still think there’s obvious value here, and there might be another interesting play in the stub after the dividend. This is worth watching. It’s should also be noted, as reader bellamyj has pointed out, that, regardless of outcome of the upcoming shareholder vote, ASPN may not liquidate. This is not necessarily a bad thing if the controlling shareholder plans on monetizing the shell and its remaining cash. He owns 20% of the stock, so he’s got some incentive to do so, and he’s paying out a big cash dividend, which is a shareholder-friendly act. That said, it’s not clear whether that dividend was as a result of Timothy O. Tombar’s agitation or a spontaneous effort on behalf of the board. I’ve been wrong about managers before, but hope springs eternal.

Here’s the 8K filing:

On November 2, 2009 Aspen Exploration Corporation (“Aspen”) declared a cash dividend of $0.73 per share. The dividend will be paid to stockholders of record on November 16, 2009, with the dividend being paid on or about December 2, 2009. A copy of the news release describing the dividend is attached hereto as Exhibit 99.1. The distribution follows the final settlement of the sale of Aspen’s California oil and gas assets to Venoco, Inc., at which the parties made a number of immaterial adjustments to the purchase price paid at the June 30, 2009 closing, and made certain other payments that were not determined until after the closing. At the final settlement date Aspen received a net payment from Venoco, but was required to make various payments to third parties which ultimately resulted in a cash outflow from Aspen in an amount not considered to be material.

Aspen expects that after the payment of the dividend, and its anticipated operations through the end of the current calendar year, on December 31, 2009 it will have more than $3 million of working capital remaining. Aspen currently intends to utilize its remaining funds to maintain its corporate status as a reporting issuer under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and to explore other business opportunities. Pending developments with respect to any business opportunities Aspen identifies, Aspen may later reevaluate its status and plans and consider alternatives to wind up its affairs. Aspen’s projections and future plans described in this report are “forward-looking statements” (as such term is defined in Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended) which are dependent upon a number of factors. There can be no assurance that Aspen’s projections will prove to be accurate or that Aspen will be able to successfully execute or implement its operations as described herein.

Hat tip Joe G.

[Full Disclosure:  I do not have a holding in ASPN. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

Read Full Post »

Nyer Medical Group Inc (NASDAQ:NYER) is to liquidate subject to the approval of its shareholders and the closing of two transactions. The board estimates that shareholders will receive a liquidating distribution of between $1.84 to $2.00 per share. At its $1.75 close yesterday, the low end of the range represents a 5% return and the high end represents a 15% return. This is the filing disclosing summaries of the two transaction agreements (the underlining is mine):

Asset Purchase Agreement

On October 22, 2009, D.A.W., Inc. (“DAW”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Nyer Medical Group, Inc. (“Nyer”), and Nyer entered into an Asset Purchase Agreement (the “WAG Agreement”) with Walgreen Eastern Co., Inc., a New York corporation (“WAG”), for the sale of a substantial portion of DAW’s operating assets, including prescription files and inventory of a total of 12 neighborhood pharmacies which includes the assignment of eight leases (the “Acquired Assets”), for a purchase price, subject to certain adjustments, of $12.0 million plus up to $5.75 million of qualifying inventory and $1.1 million of operating equipment (the “WAG Transaction”).

DAW, Nyer and WAG made customary representations, warranties and covenants in the WAG Agreement. In addition, DAW and Nyer agreed that, for a period of three years, they would refrain (and cause their current controlled affiliates to refrain) from competing within a certain area of the pharmacies whose assets were included in the Acquired Assets, with certain exceptions set forth in the WAG Agreement.

The parties have agreed to indemnify each other against certain losses, including losses for breaches of representations, warranties and covenants. Each of DAW’s and Nyer’s indemnification obligations begin at an aggregate of $50,000 and are limited to a total of $1,200,000 or, with respect to the inaccuracy of certain fundamental representations, $4,000,000. Further, DAW’s and Nyer’s indemnification obligations terminate 90 days following the closing date, with certain exceptions, including an extension of the indemnification period for up to 12 months for claims related to certain representations and 3 years for claims related to noncompetition covenants. WAG agrees to indemnify DAW and Nyer for its breach of the WAG Agreement for a period of 12 months, except in certain circumstances set forth in the WAG Agreement, and its indemnification obligations are for an unlimited amount.

DAW, Nyer and WAG can terminate the WAG Agreement in certain specified instances, as provided in the WAG Agreement. If the closing does not occur and Nyer or DAW enters into an alternative transaction under certain conditions specified in the WAG Agreement, DAW would owe to WAG a breakup fee in the amount of $300,000 and reimbursement of actual out-of-pocket expenses in an amount up to $200,000.

The completion of the WAG Transaction is subject to certain closing conditions set forth in the WAG Agreement, including the approval of the WAG Transaction at a special meeting of Nyer’s shareholders which is expected to be held on or about December 15, 2009 (the “Special Meeting”).

Nyer’s Board of Directors engaged Newbury Piret Companies, Inc. (“Newbury Piret”) as financial advisor to evaluate the WAG Transaction. The Board of Directors of Nyer and DAW (the “Boards”) unanimously approved the WAG Transaction. In approving the WAG Transaction, the Boards considered the depressed market price of the stock, the historically low trading volume and volatility of bid prices; market pressures on margins and operating costs that would have an adverse effect on the operating results of the pharmacies, a fairness opinion from Newbury Piret and other considerations.

The foregoing description of the WAG Agreement is qualified in its entirety by reference to the full text of the WAG Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.1 to this Current Report on Form 8-K and incorporated herein.

Stock Purchase Agreement

On October 23, 2009, Nyer and DAW entered into a Transaction Agreement (the “DAW Stock Agreement”) with certain management investors named therein (the “Investors”) for the sale of the stock of DAW, under which Nyer will receive a benefit of $1,500,000 after giving effect to liabilities to be retained by DAW (the “DAW Stock Transaction”).

DAW and Nyer made customary representations, warranties and covenants in the DAW Stock Agreement. In addition, DAW and Nyer agreed, on the terms set forth in the DAW Stock Agreement, not to solicit or encourage any alternative sale transactions.

DAW, Nyer and the Investors can terminate the DAW Stock Agreement in certain specified instances, as provided in the DAW Stock Agreement. If the closing does not occur and Nyer and DAW enter into an alternative transaction under certain conditions specified in the DAW Stock Agreement, DAW and Nyer would owe to the Investors a breakup fee in the amount equal to the actual out-of-pocket expenses, including attorneys’ fees, incurred by the Investors in connection with the DAW Stock Transaction.

The completion of the DAW Stock Transaction is subject to certain closing conditions set forth in the DAW Stock Agreement, including the approval of the DAW Stock Transaction at the Special Meeting and the approval and closing of the WAG Transaction.

The DAW Stock Transaction was reviewed by a special committee of the Board of Directors of Nyer comprised of independent directors (the “Special Committee”). The Special Committee engaged Newbury Piret to evaluate the DAW Stock Transaction. The DAW Stock Transaction was unanimously approved by the Special Committee and recommended to the Boards by the Special Committee. The Boards also unanimously approved the DAW Stock Transaction. In approving the DAW Stock Transaction, the Special Committee and the Boards considered the fact that substantially all of the assets of DAW would be sold to WAG under the WAG Agreement, the lack of interest by WAG in the assets subject to the DAW Stock Agreement, a fairness opinion from Newbury Piret and other considerations.

The foregoing description of the DAW Stock Agreement is qualified in its entirety by reference to the full text of the DAW Stock Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 2.2 to this Current Report on Form 8-K and incorporated herein.

The WAG Agreement and DAW Stock Agreement (the “Agreements”) have been included to provide investors with information regarding their terms. It is not intended to provide any other factual information about Nyer or DAW. The representations, warranties and covenants contained in the Agreements were made only for purposes of such agreements and as of the specific dates therein, were solely for the benefit of the parties to such agreements, and may be subject to limitations agreed upon by the contracting parties, including being qualified by confidential disclosures exchanged between the parties in connection with the execution of the Agreements. The representations and warranties may have been made for the purposes of allocating contractual risk between the parties to the agreements instead of establishing those matters as facts, and may be subject to standards of materiality applicable to the contracting parties that differ from those applicable to investors. Investors are not third party beneficiaries under the Agreements and should not rely on the representations, warranties and covenants or any descriptions thereof as characterizations of the actual state of facts or condition of the Nyer, DAW or any other party to the Agreements. Moreover, information concerning the subject matter of the representations and warranties may change after the dates of the Agreements, which subsequent information may or may not be fully reflected in Nyer’s public disclosures.

Here is the announcement of the board approval of the liquidation:

As previously disclosed on October 23, 2009, in conjunction with the sale of a substantial portion of the assets of D.A.W., Inc. (“DAW”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Nyer Medical Group, Inc. (“Nyer”), to Walgreen Easter Co. (the “WAG Transaction) and the sale of the stock of DAW to certain management investors (the “DAW Stock Transaction”), the Board of Directors of Nyer approved the liquidation and dissolution of Nyer pursuant to a Plan of Dissolution (the “Plan of Dissolution”), subject to obtaining shareholder approval of the WAG Transaction, the DAW Stock Transaction, and the Plan of Dissolution (the “Transactions”). Upon shareholder approval and the closing of the WAG Transaction and the DAW Stock Transaction, Nyer intends to proceed with the orderly wind down and dissolution of Nyer pursuant to the Plan of Dissolution. Nyer currently expects that upon dissolution of Nyer, shareholders of Nyer will receive a liquidating distribution in the range of $1.84 to $2.00 a share, depending on the ultimate amount of assets and liabilities to be realized upon liquidation.

Management tend to underestimate liquidation distributions (for obvious reasons), so this is probably worth playing. With a market capitalization of just $7M, it’s a small company, but that’s nothing new around here. I’m adding it to the Greenbackd Portfolio at $1.75.

The S&P500 closed yesterday at $1042.88

Hat tip William Wang.

[Full Disclosure:  We have a holding in NYER. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

Read Full Post »

The WSJ has an article Profiting from the crash excerpting parts of the Gregory Zuckerman book The Greatest Trade Ever about John Paulson’s infamous bet against the housing market:

By early 2006 the 49-year-old Mr. Paulson had reached his twilight years in accelerated Wall Street-career time. He had been eclipsed by a group of investors who had amassed huge fortunes in a few years. It was the fourth year of a spectacular surge in housing prices, the likes of which the nation never had seen. Everyone seemed to be making money hand over fist. Everyone but John Paulson.

“This is crazy,” Mr. Paulson said to Paolo Pellegrini, one of his analysts.

Paulson’s response was to have Pellegrini look at the long term returns on house prices:

The answer was in front of him: Housing prices had climbed a puny 1.4% annually between 1975 and 2000, after inflation. But they had soared over 7% in the following five years, until 2005. The upshot: U.S. home prices would have to drop by almost 40% to return to their historic trend line. Not only had prices climbed like never before, but Mr. Pellegrini’s figures showed that each time housing had dropped in the past, it fell through the trend line, suggesting that an eventual drop likely would be brutal.

Paulson decided he wanted to bet that house prices would regress to the mean, but how to find the right instrument to allow him to do that:

By the spring, Mr. Paulson was convinced he had discovered the perfect trade. Insurance on risky home mortgages was trading at dirt-cheap prices. He would buy boatloads of credit-default swaps—or investments that served as insurance on risky mortgage debt. When housing hit the skids and homeowners defaulted on their mortgages, this insurance would rise in value—and Mr. Paulson would make a killing. If he could convince enough investors to back him, he could start a fund dedicated to this trade.

And then he stuck to his trade:

By the summer of 2006, Mr. Paulson had managed to raise $147 million, mostly from friends and family, to launch a fund. Soon, Josh Birnbaum, a top Goldman Sachs trader, began calling and asked to come by his office. Sitting across from Mr. Paulson, Mr. Pellegrini, and his top trader, Brad Rosenberg, Mr. Birnbaum got to the point.

Not only were Mr. Birnbaum’s clients eager to buy some of the mortgages that Paulson & Co. was betting against, but Mr. Birnbaum was, too. Mr. Birnbaum and his clients expected the mortgages, packaged as securities, to hold their value. “We’ve done the work and we don’t see them taking losses,” Mr. Birnbaum said.

After Mr. Birnbaum left, Mr. Rosenberg walked into Mr. Paulson’s office, a bit shaken. Mr. Paulson seemed unmoved. “Keep buying, Brad,” Mr. Paulson told Mr. Rosenberg.

What’s Paulson’s new big idea? Hint: It’s got distinctly Austrian tones:

By the middle of 2009, a record one in 10 Americans was delinquent or in foreclosure on their mortgages. U.S. housing prices had fallen more than 30% from their 2006 peak. In cities such as Miami, Phoenix, and Las Vegas, real-estate values dropped more than 40%. Several million people lost their homes. And more than 30% of U.S. home owners held mortgages that were underwater, or greater than the value of their houses, the highest level in 75 years.

As Mr. Paulson and others at his office discussed how much was being spent by the United States and other nations to rescue areas of the economy crippled by the financial collapse, he discovered his next targets, certain they were as doomed to collapse as subprime mortgages once had been: the U.S. dollar and other major currencies.

Mr. Paulson made a calculation: The supply of dollars had expanded by 120% over several months. That surely would lead to a drop in its value, and an eventual surge in inflation. “What’s the only asset that will hold value? It’s got to be gold,” Mr. Paulson argued.

Paulson & Co. had never dabbled in gold, and had no currency experts. He was also one of many warming to gold investments, worrying some investors. Some investors withdrew money from the fund, pushing his assets down to $28 billion or so.

Mr. Paulson acknowledged that his was a straightforward argument, but he paid the critics little heed.

“Three or four years from now, people will ask why they didn’t buy gold earlier,” Mr. Paulson said.

He purchased billions of dollars of gold investments. Betting against the dollar would be his new trade.

It is interesting to see a few well-respected investors on the same side of this trade. Einhorn made his views on gold known in his speech to the Value Investing Congress.

Read Full Post »

Following my Simoleon Sense interview with Miguel Barbosa, I’ve had a few requests for a post on Tom Evans. Here it is, hacked together like Frankenstein’s monster from all the public information I could track down:

Thomas Mellon Evans was a one of the first modern corporate raiders, taking Graham’s net current asset analysis and using it to wreak havoc on the gray flannel suits of the 40s and 50s. He’s not particularly well-known today, but he waged numerous takeover battles using tactics that are forerunners of those employed by many of the takeover artists of the 1980s and the activists of the 1990s and 2000s. Proxy battles? Check. Greenmail? Check. Liquidations? Check.

Born September 8, 1920 in Pittsburgh, and orphaned at the age of 11, Evans grew up poor. Despite his famous middle name (his grandmother’s first cousin was Andrew Mellon), he began his financial career at the bottom. After graduating from Yale University in 1931 in the teeth of the Great Depression, he landed a $100-a-month clerk’s job at Gulf Oil.

While his friends headed out in the evening, Evans would stay home reading balance sheets and looking for promising companies: those he could he could buy for less than the assets were worth in liquidation. Evans found such companies by calculating their “net quick assets,” the long forgotten name for “net current assets.” His friends teased him about his obsession and gave him a nickname: “Net Quick” Evans. From the 1944 Time Magazine article, Young Tom Evans:

With only some fatherly advice from Gulf’s Board Chairman, W. L. Mellon, Tom Evans made his way alone. For six years he saved money, like an Alger hero; and played the stockmarket, unlike an Alger hero. Thus he collected $10,000. He wanted to find and buy a family-owned business that had gone to pot. In the down-at-the-heels H. K. Porter Co., in Pittsburgh’s slummy Lawrenceville section, he found it. Once a No. 1 builder of industrial locomotives, Porter Co. was down to 40 workers.

Tom Evans bought up Porter bonds at 10 to 15 cents on the dollar, reorganized the company under 77B, and became president at 28.

From then on, Evan was the chief terror of the sleepy boardrooms of the era, much like Icahn would be 30 years later. As a connoisseur of deep value on the balance sheet, one has to admire his methods (From the New York Times obituary, Thomas Evans, 86, a Takeover Expert, Dies):

‘He was never really an operator; he was a financial guy — a balance sheet buyer,” one of his sons, Robert Sheldon Evans, told Forbes magazine in 1995. ”He would buy something for less than book value and figure the worst that could happen was he would liquidate it and come out O.K. What he didn’t want to do was lose money on the deal. If he knew his downside was covered, then he figured the upside would probably take care of itself.

”It was a very shrewd policy in the 50’s and 60’s, when there were highly inefficient markets: buying undervalued assets, running them for cash and selling off pieces. The 80’s leveraged buyout guys were just taking a lot of his deals to their logical extension.”

The book The White Sharks of Wall Street: Thomas Mellon Evans and the Original Corporate Raiders by Diana B. Henriques is an excellent biography on Evans. More than that, it describes many of the battles for corporate control in the 40s, 50s and 60s. In contradistinction to the takeover battles of the 80s, the dogfights in the 40s, 50s, and 60s were largely proxy fights, and in as much, should be familiar to today’s “activist investors.” James B. Stewart’s Let’s make a deal, his review of Henriques’ book, does it justice:

There are surely few phenomena more remarkable in American business than the periodic ability of cash-poor but swashbuckling newcomers, using little or none of their own money, to seize control of some of the country’s most valuable corporations. In its most recent, frenzied incarnation, dot-com entrepreneurs have exchanged stock in companies with few tangible assets and even fewer profits for control of established, profitable companies. Fifteen years ago, the currency was junk bonds rather than inflated stock. And before that, it was bank loans using a target’s assets as collateral.

Wall Street greets each wave of takeovers as the dawning of a new era. But the proposition that nothing has fundamentally changed is convincingly set forth in ”The White Sharks of Wall Street,” an engaging and thorough history of early corporate takeovers by Diana B. Henriques, a financial reporter for The New York Times. Her central character is Thomas Mellon Evans, who surfaces in what seems like nearly every trendsetting corporate battle from 1945 until his retirement in 1984, and whose tactics remain essential to practitioners of corporate warfare. Junk bonds? Greenmail? Scorched earth? Evans had been there long before investment bankers coined a catchy vocabulary to describe the maneuvers of people like T. Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn and Saul Steinberg.

Though Evans seems to have escaped the widespread public resentment and envy the others generated, and Henriques’s portrait is carefully nonjudgmental, it is difficult for a reader to work up much sympathy for him. He was ruthless, bad-tempered, usually indifferent to workers and communities. He repeatedly displayed what appears to be a criminal disregard for the antitrust laws (though he was never prosecuted). He divorced two wives (the second later committed suicide), and both times a replacement was conspicuously at hand long before any legal proceedings had begun. He betrayed two of his own sons in his quest for corporate dominance and wealth.

Yet as a deal maker Evans displayed a natural audacity and genius. In 1935, 24 years old and lacking any money to speak of, he decided he wanted to gain control of Pittsburgh’s struggling H. K. Porter Company, a manufacturer of steam locomotives. Inspired by a Fortune magazine account of Floyd Odlum, who became rich by using borrowed securities as collateral for loans to buy undervalued stock, Evans borrowed shares from a Mellon mentor, took out a loan and invested in Gulf Oil stock, then a Mellon enterprise. When Gulf’s stock rose handsomely as the nation emerged from the Depression, Evans used his profits to buy Porter bonds, then selling for a small fraction of their face value. When Porter finally had to declare bankruptcy and was reorganized, Evans, as the largest creditor, traded his bonds for equity and became the largest shareholder. Porter, essentially acquired for junk bonds, would be Evans’s vehicle for most of his life.

I highly recommend The White Sharks of Wall Street: Thomas Mellon Evans and the Original Corporate Raiders by Diana B. Henriques for fans of deep value and activist investment.

Read Full Post »

We’ve just completed an interview with Miguel Barbosa of the wonderful Simoleon Sense. Go there now, and get trapped in an endless loop as you are recirculated back here and so on.

Read Full Post »

Yesterday was the record date for the first dividend in the liquidation of Leadis Technology Inc (NASDAQ:LDIS). The dividend is likely to be approximately $0.93 per share. The board estimates that “if we are able to dispose of substantially all of our non-cash assets, the aggregate amount of all liquidating distributions that will be paid to stockholders will be in the range of approximately $0.93 to $1.20 per share of Leadis common stock.” After the initial $0.93 dividend, the remaining dividends will be in the range of nil to $0.27 ($1.20 less $0.93). LDIS closed yesterday at $0.99. If the stub starts trading tomorrow at $0.06 ($0.99 less $0.93), it becomes an interesting security offering the potential for some substantial upside.

The definitive proxy filings have the detail:

How much can stockholders expect to receive if the Plan of Dissolution is approved at the special meeting?

At this time, we cannot predict with certainty the amount of any liquidating distributions to our stockholders. However, based on information currently available to us, assuming, among other things, no unanticipated actual or contingent liabilities, we estimate that over time stockholders will receive one or more distributions that in the aggregate range from approximately $0.93 to $1.20 per share. This range of estimated distributions represents our estimate of the amount to be distributed to stockholders during the liquidation, but does not represent the minimum or maximum distribution amount. Actual distributions could be higher or lower.

This estimated range is based upon, among other things, the fact that as of August 31, 2009, we had approximately $28.6 million in cash, cash equivalents, restricted cash equivalents and short-term and non-current investments. In addition, subsequent to August 31, 2009, we received approximately $3.2 million in connection with the sale of certain assets to IXYS Corporation. We expect to use cash of approximately $2.3 million to satisfy liabilities on our unaudited balance sheet after August 31, 2009. In addition to converting our remaining non-cash assets to cash and satisfying the liabilities currently on our balance sheet, we have used and anticipate using cash for a number of items, including but not limited to: satisfying capital leases and other contractual commitments. In addition to the satisfaction of our liabilities, we have used and anticipate continuing to use cash in the next several months for a number of items, including, but not limited to, the following:

• ongoing operating expenses;

• expenses incurred in connection with extending our directors’ and officers’ insurance coverage;

• expenses incurred in connection with the liquidation and dissolution process;

• severance and related costs;

• resolution of pending and potential claims, assessments and obligations; and

• professional, legal, consulting and accounting fees.

We are unable at this time to predict the ultimate amount of our liabilities because the settlement of our existing liabilities could cost more than we anticipate and we may incur additional liabilities arising out of contingent claims that have not been quantified, are not yet reflected as liabilities on our balance sheet and have not been included in the estimated range of potential distributions, such as liabilities relating to claims that have not been resolved and claims or lawsuits that could be brought against us in the future. If any payments are made with respect to the foregoing, the estimated range of distributions to stockholders will be negatively impacted and less than estimated. If the ultimate amount of our liabilities is greater than what we anticipate, the distribution to our stockholders may be substantially lower than anticipated. Therefore, we are unable at this time to predict the precise nature, amount and timing of any distributions due in part to our inability to predict the ultimate amount of our liabilities. Accordingly, you will not know the exact amount of any liquidating distributions you may receive as a result of the Plan of Dissolution when you vote on the proposal to approve the Plan of Dissolution. You may receive substantially less than the low end of the current estimate.

For some further background, see Shake&Bake’s take on LDIS.

Hat tip Joseph.

[Full Disclosure:  We have a holding in LDIS. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

Read Full Post »

The FT Alphaville blog has a post, The US stock market is overvalued by 40%, based on a recent research report, The US Stock Market: Value and Nonsense About It, from Andrew Smithers of London-based research house Smithers & Co.

According to the FT Alphaville blog, Smithers says there are only two ‘valid’ ways to value the market. One is by using a cyclically adjusted PE ratio and the other by using the Q ratio, which compares the market capitalisation of companies with their net worth, adjusted to current prices. Both techniques yield the same answer: the stockmarket is overvalued by around 40%.

Smithers explains:

As the valid measures of the US market show that it is currently around 40% overvalued, some ingenuity is needed to claim otherwise. The EPS for the past 12 months on the S&P 500 is $7.51 so, with the index at 1071, it is selling at a trailing PE of 142. This is far higher than it has ever been before, as the previous end month record is a PE of 47. But current multiples are no guide to value; when depressed, or elevated, they need to be adjusted to their cyclical norm.

This is how the cyclically adjusted PE (”CAPE”) is calculated and when its current value is compared with long-term average, using the geometric means of EPS and cyclically adjusted PEs,6 it shows that the market is 37.7% overpriced using 10 years of earnings’ data and 45% if 20 years are used. This method is therefore of no use to those who sell shares, or have made faulty claims about value in the past. The following are among the most common approaches to circumventing the problem this presents. Some produce relatively small distortions, but these can amount to a substantial degree of misinformation when combined.

Go to the The FT Alphaville blog post, The US stock market is overvalued by 40%.

Read Full Post »

In a new paper Value vs Glamour: A Global Phenomenon (via SSRN)  The Brandes Institute updates the landmark 1994 study by Josef Lakonishok, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny investigating the performance of value stocks relative to that of glamour securities in the United States over a 26-year period. Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny found that value stocks tended to outperform glamour stocks by wide margins, but their earlier research did not include the glamour-driven markets of the late 1990s and early 2000s. The paper asks, “What effect might this period have on their conclusions?” To answer that question, The Brandes Institute updated the research through to June 2008, examining the comparative performance of value and glamour over a 40-year period, and extending the scope of the initial study to include non-U.S. markets, to determine whether the value premium is evident worldwide.

The research focuses on our favorite indicator, price-to-book value, but also includes price-to-cash flow, price-to-earnings, sales growth over the preceding five years and combinations of the foregoing. Here is The Brandes Institute’s discussion on price-to-book:

Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny on price-to-book

The Brandes Institute  hewed closely to Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s methods, described on page 3 of the paper:

First, the sample of companies as of April 30, 1968 was divided into deciles based on one of the criteria above. Second, the aggregate performance of each decile was tracked for each of the next five years on each April 30. Finally, the first and second steps were repeated for each April 30 from 1969 to 1989.

We start with the price-to-book criterion as an example. First, all stocks traded on the NYSE and AMEX as of April 30, 1968 were sorted into deciles based on their price-to-book ratios on that date. Stocks with the highers P/B ratios were grouped in decile 1. For each consecutive decile, P/B ratios decreased; this cuilminated in stocks with the lowest P/B values forming decile 10.

In essence, this process created 10 separate portfolios, each with an inception date of April 30, 1968. The lower deciles, which consisted of higher-P/B stocks, represented glamour portfolios. In contrast, the higher deciles – those filled with lower-P/B stocks – represented value portfolios.

From there, annual performance of deciles 1 through 10 was tracked over the subsequent five years. Additionally, new 10-decile sets were constructed based on the combined NYSE/AMEX sample as of April 30, 1969, and every subsequent April 30 through 1989. For each of these new sets, decile-by-decile performance was recorded for the five yeras after the inception date. After completing this process, the researchers had created 22 sets of P/B deciles, and tracked five years of decile-by-decile performance for each one. Next, [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny] averaged the performance data across these 22 decile-sets to compare value and glamour.

As the chart below indicates, [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny] found that performance for glamour stocks was outpaced by performance for their value counterparts. For instance, 5-year returns for decile 1 – those stocks with the highest P/B ratios – averaged an annualized 9.3%, while returns for the low-P/B decile 10 averaged 19.8%. These annualized figures are equivalent to cumulative rates of return of 56.0% and 146.2%, respectively.

Value Glamour 1

[Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny] repeated this analysis for deciles based on price-to-cash flow, price-to-earnings, and sales growth. The trio found that, for each of these value/glamour criteria, value stocks outperformed glamour stocks by wide margins. Additionally, value bested glamour in experiments with groups sorted by select pairings of P/B, P/CF, P/E, and sales growth.

The Brandes Institute update

The Brandes Institute sought to extend and update Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s findings. They replicated the results of the Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny study to validate their methodology. When they were satisfied that there was sufficient parity between their results and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s findings “to validate our methodology as a functional approximation of the [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny] framework,” they adjusted the sample in three ways: First, they included stocks listed on the NASDAQ domiciled in the US. Second, they excluded the smalles 50% of all companies in the sample. Finally, they divided the remaining companies into small capitalization (70% of the group by number) and large capitalization (30% of the group by number):

To expand upon [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s] findings we begin with our adjusted sample, which now includes data through 2008. Specifically, we added decile-sets formed on April 30, 1990 through April 30, 2003 and incorporated their performance into our analysis. This increased our sample size from 22 sets of deciles to 36. In addition, the end of the period covered by our performance calculations extended from April 30, 1994 to April 30, 2008.

Exhibit 3 compares average annualized performance for U.S. stocks from the 1968 to 2008 period for deciles based on price-to-book. Returns for deciles across the spectrum changed only slightly in the extended time frame from our replicated [Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny’s] results. Most notably, the overall pattern of substantial value stock outperformance persisted. During the 1968 to 2008 period, performance for decile 1 glamour stocks averaged an annualized 6.9% vs. an average of 16.2% for the value stocks in decile 10. Respective cumulative performance equaled 39.6% and 111.9%.

Value Glamour 2

Set out below is the comparison of large cap and small cap performance:

Value Glamour 3The paper concludes that the value premium persists for the world’s developed markets in aggregate, and on an individual coutry basis. We believe it is more compelling evidence for value based investment, and, in particular, asset based value investment.

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts - Older Posts »