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Archive for the ‘Warren Buffett’ Category

Yesterday I ran a guest post on the short case for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (NYSE:BRK.A, BRK.B) by S. Raj Rajagopal, an MBA student at Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University. The post generated several requests for the valuation supporting Raj’s short thesis, which Raj has provided and I’ve reproduced below.

Here is the valuation underpinning Raj’s short case for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (NYSE:BRK.A,BRK.B):

(Click to enlarge)

Click here to download the full presentation including the updated valuation for the Berkshire Hathaway short case (.pdf).

Please contact Raj if you would like to discuss his valuation or his short case.

[Full Disclosure: I do not hold a position in BRK.A or BRK.B. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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S. Raj Rajagopal has provided a guest post outlining his argument for a short position in Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (NYSE:BRK.A, BRK.B). Raj is an MBA student at Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University graduating in May this year. He has worked as a portfolio manager at the Cayuga Fund, LLC, the Johnson Graduate School’s $12M hedge fund, and is currently seeking full-time employment in the investment management area. Here is his resume and his website, Gordian Knots. Please contact Raj if you would like to see his valuation on BRK.A / BRK.B.

Raj’s short case for Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (NYSE:BRK.A,BRK.B) is set out below:

(Click to enlarge)

Click here to download the Short Case for Berkshire Hathaway in full (.pdf)

[Full Disclosure: I do not hold BRK.A or BRK.B. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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When I started out investing I summarized Warren Buffett’s letters to shareholders into a document I jokingly called the “Tractatus Logico-Valere.” The title, Latin errors aside, was intended to be an homage to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (which, according to Wikipedia, may in turn have been an homage to the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus by Baruch Spinoza). The idea was to create a comprehensive summary of Buffett’s investment process set out in a succinct, logical fashion. I kept Wittgenstein’s seventh and final proposition – “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent” – as my own and interpreted it to mean “where you can’t value something, don’t invest” or “stay in your circle of competence.” My Tractatus wasn’t very good, and I’m not Warren Buffett’s shoelace. Consequently, I didn’t do very well with it. (Wittgenstein was not similarly burdened with self-doubt. Wikipedia says that he concluded that with his Tractatus he had resolved all philosophical problems, and upon its publication retired to become a schoolteacher in Austria.) My abortive experience attempting to create a comprehensive guide to earnings and growth-based investing has given me a great appreciation for those who are able to successfully create such a document and live by it. One investor who has done so is setting out his process for the world to see at The Fallible Investor.

The author of The Fallible Investor is a private investor who has “previously worked for a private hedge fund in Bermuda and Bankers Trust in Sydney, Australia.” He calls himself The Fallible Investor because he “often makes errors when he invests, and says, “Recognising such a weakness is also useful. As Taleb says:

Soros… knew how to handle randomness, by keeping a critical open mind and changing his opinions with minimal shame… he walked around calling himself fallible, but was so potent because he knew it while others had loftier ideas about themselves. He understood Popper. He lived the Popperian life.

I have found particularly useful his elucidation of the linkage between return-on-invested-capital, market value, replacement value, and sustainable competitive advantage:

I define the replacement value of a business as what the business’s assets would be worth if it’s ROIC was equal to its cost of capital.

The market value of a business with a high ROIC and no sustainable competitive advantage should (assuming the market eventually prices a business at its intrinsic value[1]) fall to its replacement value. This should happen because if an incumbent business has a high ROIC, and no sustainable competitive advantage, other businesses will enter this industry, or expand within the industry, to seek these higher returns. These competitors will drive down the incumbent business’s profits until its ROIC declines to the average return of a commodity business. Once this occurs, the incumbent business can only be worth the cost of replacing the business’s assets.

Professor Greenwald has another way of describing this process. He points out that if an incumbent business, with no competitive advantage, has a replacement value of $100 million and its market value is $200 million[2], competitors will drive its market value down to $100 million. Competitors will calculate that by spending $100 million to reproduce the assets of that business they can also create an enterprise with a market value higher than $100 million. These competitors will think, correctly, there is no reason for why they should have a different economic experience from the incumbent because there is nothing it can do that they cannot. Remember the incumbent business has no sustainable competitive advantage. Competitors, by reproducing the assets of the incumbent business, will increase the supply of products or services in the industry. There will now be more competition for the same business. Either prices will fall or, for differentiated products, each producer will sell fewer units. In both cases, the incumbent’s profits will decline and the market value of its business will decline with them. This process, capacity continuing to expand, and the profits and the market value of the incumbent’s business falling, will continue until the incumbent’s market value falls to the replacement value of its assets ($100 million). Its competitors will suffer the same fate.

Greenwald points out that while this process does not happen smoothly or automatically it will eventually turn out this way. It happens because the incentives for businesspeople to take advantage of the market’s excessive valuation of the incumbent’s business are too powerful.[3]

The market value of a business with a sustainable competitive advantage can, by contrast, stay much higher than its replacement value simply because it can sustain a high ROIC.

[1] The intrinsic value of a business is what I think the business is worth to a rational businessperson.

[2] Assuming the business has a high market value because it has a high ROIC.

[3] P38, ‘Value Investing: From Graham To Buffett And Beyond’, Bruce Greenwald et al, 2001.

The Fallible Investor has provided me with a full copy of his notes. I highly recommend following his posts as he sets out his investment process on the site.

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The Manual of Ideas has a copy of Empirical Finance Research’s paper “Fundamental Value Investors: Characteristics and Performance” (.pdf). The paper examines the investment methods of professional value investors (defined as the members of the valueinvestorsclub.com) and concludes that value investing is a broad church encompassing many different styles, but predominantly consists of “Warren Buffett-style growth investors:”

We find that investors are overwhelmingly concerned with assessing intrinsic value. Discounted cash flow models, earnings multiples, GARP, and other similar valuation techniques are overwhelmingly used (87.50% include this analysis in their recommendation). Based on these results, professional value investors tend to be Warren Buffett-style growth investors…

The paper seems to quantitatively confirm our qualitative (read, baseless) assertion in the About Greenbackd page that “assets are a contrarian measure of value.” Less than a quarter of professional value investors incorporate the value of tangible assets in their investment decisions:

[A]pproximately 24% of value investors do incorporate the classic value technique of focusing on tangible asset undervaluation. The other favorite tools of value investors are open market repurchases (12.12%), the presence of net operating loss assets (5.29%), restructuring and spin-off situations (5.12%), and insider trading activity (4.70%).

The paper also indirectly tackles the question oft posed by commenters on this site which, incidentally, questions the very raison d’etre of Greenbackd: why opportunities to invest below liquidation value and alongside activist investors persist even after the filing of the 13D notice:

According to efficient market logic (Fama (1970)), the rational arbitrager should act alone, drive the price to the fundamental level, and reap all the rewards of the arbitrage he has found. Unfortunately, arbitragers find this difficult in practice. Two primary reasons for this are capital constraints and the limits to arbitrage arising from the realities in the investment management business (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)).

The paper is typical of Empirical Finance Research’s rigorous approach and well worth the effort.

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Walter Schloss might be one of Benjamin Graham’s lesser-known disciples, but to Warren Buffett, perhaps Graham’s most famous disciple, Schloss is a “superinvestor.” In The Superinvestors of Graham-and-Doddsville, an article based on a speech Buffett gave at Columbia Business School on May 17, 1984 and appearing in Hermes, the Columbia Business School magazine, Buffett said of Schloss:

Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years.

Here is what ‘Adam Smith’ – after I told him about Walter – wrote about him in Supermoney (1972):

He has now connections or access to useful information. Practically no on in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and that’s about it.

Walter has diversified enormously, owning well over 100 stocks currently. He knows how to identify securities that sell at considerably less than their value to a private owner. And that’s all he does. He doesn’t worry about whether it’s January, he doesn’t worry about whether it’s Monday, he doesn’t worry about whether it’s an election year. He simply says, if a business is worth a dollar and I can buy it for 40 cents, something good may happen to me. And he does it over and over and over again. He owns many more stocks than I do – and is far less interested in the underlying nature of the business; I don’t seem to have very much influence on Walter. That’s one of his strengths; no one has much influence on him.

This is Schloss’ record, extracted from Buffett’s article (click to go the article for the full-size table on page 7):

walter-schloss-record1

Over 28 1/4 years between 1955 and the first quarter of 1984 (when Buffett wrote the article), WJS Limited Partners returned 5,678.8% and in the WJS Partnership returned an astonishing 23,104.7%. Annualised, that’s 16.1% in WJS Limited Partners and 21.3% in the WJS Partnership. Both dwarf the S&P’s gain of 887.2% or 8.4% annually over the same period.

Fast forward 24 years to a February 2008 Forbes article titled, Experience:

Although he stopped running others’ money in 2003–by his account, he averaged a 16% total return after fees during five decades as a stand-alone investment manager, versus 10% for the S&P 500–Schloss today oversees his own multimillion-dollar portfolio with the zeal of a guy a third his age.

The Experience article highlights a few things about Schloss that we really like (mostly because they coincide with Greenbackd’s views on investing). First, he’s an asset investor:

“Most people say, ‘What is it going to earn next year?’ I focus on assets. If you don’t have a lot of debt, it’s worth something.”

Schloss had earlier discussed his preference for assets over earnings at the New York Society of Security Analysts (NYSSA) dedication of the Value Investing Archives in November 2007 (from the article NYSAA Value Investing Archive Dedication: Walter Schloss by Peter Lindmark):

“We try to buy stocks cheap.” His investment philosophy is based on equities which are quantitatively cheap and he often holds over 100 securities. Although he expounds that, “Each one is different. I don’t think you can generalize……But I think you just have to look at each situation on its own merits and decide whether it’s worth more than its asking price.” He prefers to buy assets rather than earnings. “Assets seem to change less than earnings.”

Second, as Buffett pointed out in his article, he’s not particularly interested in the nature of the business:

Schloss doesn’t profess to understand a company’s operations intimately and almost never talks to management. He doesn’t think much about timing–am I buying at the low? selling at the high?–or momentum.

Lindmark’s article also notes Schloss’ disinterest in the underlying business:

Mr. Graham simply did not care, and tried to purchase securities strictly on a quantitative basis. Mr. Schloss advocated buying decent companies with temporary problems. He stated, ” Warren understands businesses – I don’t. We’re buying in a way that we don’t have to be too smart about the business….”

Finally, we have to admit that we admire Schloss’ gentlemanly approach to running his business:

Typical work hours when he was running his fund: 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., only a half hour after the New York Stock Exchange’s closing bell.

You can see Schloss speaking here at the Ben Graham Center For Value Investing, Richard Ivey School of Business. Our favorite line:

If this doesn’t work, we can always liquidate it and get our money back.

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Warren Buffett took the opportunity Friday to lend his considerable intellectual weight to the debate about buy backs, saying, “I think if your stock is undervalued, significantly undervalued, management should look at that as an alternative to every other activity.”

We’ve been banging the drum for buy backs quite a bit recently. We wrote on Friday that they represent the lowest risk investment for any company with undervalued stock and we’ve written on a number of other occasions about their positive effect on per share value in companies with undervalued stock.

In a Nightly Business Report interview with Susie Gharib, Buffett discussed his view on stock buy backs:

Susie Gharib: What about Berkshire Hathaway stock? Were you surprised that it took such a hit last year, given that Berkshire shareholders are such buy and hold investors?

Warren Buffett: Well most of them are. But in the end our price is figured relative to everything else so the whole stock market goes down 50 percent we ought to go down a lot because you can buy other things cheaper. I’ve had three times in my lifetime since I took over Berkshire when Berkshire stock’s gone down 50 percent. In 1974 it went from $90 to $40. Did I feel badly? No, I loved it! I bought more stock. So I don’t judge how Berkshire is doing by its market price, I judge it by how our businesses are doing.

SG: Is there a price at which you would buy back shares of Berkshire? $85,000? $80,000?

WB: I wouldn’t name a number. If I ever name a number I’ll name it publicly. I mean if we ever get to the point where we’re contemplating doing it, I would make a public announcement.

SG: But would you ever be interested in buying back shares?

WB: I think if your stock is undervalued, significantly undervalued, management should look at that as an alternative to every other activity. That used to be the way people bought back stocks, but in recent years, companies have bought back stocks at high prices. They’ve done it because they like supporting the stock…

SG: What are your feelings with Berkshire. The stock is down a lot. It was up to $147,000 last year. Would you ever be opposed to buying back stock?

WB: I’m not opposed to buying back stock.

You can see the interview with Buffett here (via New York Times’ Dealbook article Buffett Hints at Buyback of Berkshire Shares)

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