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Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square Capital Management has opened up an 11% stake in Fortune Brands, Inc. (NYSE:FO). The 13D filed 4 October doesn’t disclose much about the position, but the NYTimes has a great REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS article Fortune’s Links discussing the position:

After a round of golf with his Titleist clubs, a guy pops into the clubhouse for a Maker’s Mark neat before rinsing off under a Moen showerhead. That’s about the closest Fortune Brands comes to synergies. No wonder the conglomerate makes such a tempting target for an activist investor.

Shareholders won’t be alone rooting for Bill Ackman, whose Pershing Square Capital Management hedge fund revealed an 11 percent stake last week, to break Fortune up. Diageo, the big alcohol company, may one day toast him. The company has long wanted a major bourbon brand. Fortune has two: Maker’s Mark and Jim Beam.

Hypothetical examples aside, Fortune’s three main divisions — spirits, golf equipment and home products — don’t hang together naturally. And there are potentially better, more motivated owners for them. But drinks, accounting for some two-thirds of Fortune’s profit, deserves the primary focus.

The group — which also sells Hornitos tequila, Courvoisier Cognac and Canadian Club whisky — is expected to generate earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, a business measure known as Ebitda, of $635 million this year, according to Longbow Research. At 15 times — less than the 20 times Pernod Ricard paid for Sweden’s Absolut vodka — Diageo’s price tag could come to about $9.5 billion.

Subtract that from Fortune’s enterprise value of $12 billion (an $8.4 billion market cap plus $3.6 billion of debt) and the remaining two divisions would be trading at around four times Ebitda, as estimated by Longbow. Citigroup notes that the sporting goods maker Adidas and home products manufacturers like Masco fetch valuations of eight to nine times Ebitda.

Diageo would scramble to pay a top-shelf price for a portfolio that includes some less attractive brands, a few in categories it already dominates. But a handful of smaller players like Gruppo Campari have shown an interest in what insiders call “tail brands.” That would allow Diageo to finance part of a deal with divestitures.

It’s too soon to say for sure whether Mr. Ackman wants to carve up Fortune. But with a thirsty buyer waiting, and a corporate strategy best exemplified by a tipsy golfer in need of a shower, the odds are good.

No position.

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Travis Dirks has provided a guest post on the voting power of differently sized shareholdings, which has important implications for activist investors seeking to impose their influence on a management. Travis is an expert in Nanotechnology, and received his Ph.D. from the world’s leading institution for the study of condensed matter physics, University of Illinois at Urabana-Champaign. Travis has also taught informal workshops on sustainable competitive advantage, business valuation, and the wider applications of behavioral finance and prospect theory, in addition to running a concentrated deep value/special-situations equity portfolio, which has returned 69.53% since inception in June 2006 relative to the S&P 500’s -6.08%. An entrepreneur at heart, Travis has co-founded one successful local business and one technology startup. He is currently working on a book – Voting Power in Business. Travis can be reached at TravisDirks@gmail.com.

(I would greatly appreciate feedback on whether the information below is new and/or useful to you)

Process over outcome. The watch words of all great investors. By thinking probabilistically in terms of relevant long-term averages, such investors gain control over a field swayed by random events. Yet, it appears that this method of thought has not yet been thoroughly applied to shareholders’ only means of control: the shareholder vote. When probabilistic thinking is applied to the proxy battle the activist investor, and those of us who rely on him to catalyze our deep value investments, gain a counterintuitive and valuable edge! Here, I outline the strategic value of voting power – a measure of a shareholder’s true influence – via two examples: a simplified hypothetical and a real world company.

How does ownership differ from power?

Pop quiz: 1) Does 10% ownership of a company imply 10% influence on the vote? 2) Does buying 1% more of the company imply proportionally more power? 3) Is your influence on the vote impervious to other shareholder’s buying or selling?

Answers: No, no and NO!

Voting power is not related to ownership in a straightforward way – it is a function of the entire ownership structure of the company, i.e., how much everyone else owns. Voting power measures the percentage of all outcomes where a voter gets to decide the result of the vote. In fact, you can gain more or less power depending on who you buy from! The counterintuitive nature of these answers hints at an opportunity for the enterprising investor.

A simple example of voting power analysis

Alice and Bob each owned 50% of a successful rapidly growing small business. Like so many before them, they lost sight of cash flow and needed money fast. With no bank to turn to, they decided to sell 2% of their business to uncle Charlie. So the ownership structure looks like this: Alice –> 49%, Bob –> 49%, Charlie –> 2%. Does Charlie, with only 2% ownership, really have any influence on the company? The astounding fact is that Charlie now has just as much power over the business as Alice and Bob. When matters come to a vote, Alice, Bob, and Charlie are in exactly the same situation: to win the vote they each have to convince one of the other two to agree with them and it doesn’t matter which one.

Not everyone is as fortunate as Charlie – a voter can have drastically less control than his ownership would indicate. In fact, he may even have no control at all!

Let’s rejoin the story a few years later. Charlie now owns a third of the company, as do Alice and Bob. They’d like to raise more capital to buy out a weak competitor so, at Charlie’s suggestion, they do something clever: they sell Dan 20% of the business (new ownership structure: Alice –> 26.66%, Bob –> 26.66%, Charlie –> 26.66%, Dan –> 20%).  Interestingly, though Dan paid for 20% of the business, he received zero voting power! The reason is that there is no possible voting outcome in which Dan could change the result by changing his vote. All possible voting outcomes have a winning majority even without Dan’s vote! Effectively, Dan is wasted conference space. Thus:

Rule 1 of voting power analysis: a voter can have drastically more or less voting power than his ownership would indicate.

Driving strategy via voting power analysis: Breitburn Energy Partners

What strategically valuable information can such statistical analysis reveal for a large public company?  Consider such a company from my (and Seth Klarman’s) portfolio: BreitBurn Energy Partners L.P. (NYSE: BBEP)

BBEP’s is a beautifully intricate story in which the oil crash, the market crash, an angry majority shareholder, a convenient bank loan covenant, 5 years of hedged production, and the fleeing of dividend-loving stock holders combined to create the easiest purchasing decision I’ve ever made! Voting power analysis sheds new light on one part of this story – a dispute between the majority shareholder and the company over voting rights.

In June 2008 the board decided to give the limited partners the right to vote on who would sit on the board of directors—with one caveat. No one share holder could vote more than 20% of the company’s shares. In the event that a shareholder owned more than 20% of the outstanding shares, the final vote would be counted as if the rest of the shareholder’s votes did not exist. This understandably upset Quicksilver Resources Inc., who held 40% of the outstanding shares. Strategically, how should Quicksilver and The Baupost Group (the other large shareholder) react to these unique voting rules?[i]


Figure 1: Percentage ownership (blue), and voting power under two schemes –  standard (red) and BBEP’s 20% cap (green) for Quicksilver Resources Inc. and The Baupost Group, the two largest stakeholders of Breitburn Energy Partners.

In Figure 1 the blue bars show Quicksilver’s and Baupost’s percentage ownership of BBEP as of March 2010. The red bars show each company’s voting power under a standard voting scheme. Notice that under a standard voting scheme  Quicksilver has drastically more voting power than their ownership indicates and Baupost has drastically less. This disparity, with some shareholders having more power and some less, is closer to the rule, than the exception. Under the 20% cap rule (green bars), however, Quicksilver’s voting power is cut in half and Baupost’s tripled, but both have influence that is more in proportion with their ownership – a powerful insight that could have been used in BBEP’s defense in the inevitable lawsuit that followed.

The lawsuit was settled and a voting system in which Quicksilver got to vote all its shares (but others who crossed the 20% threshold did not) was agreed on. The resulting power distribution is now exactly the same as under a standard voting scheme (red bars). Therefore, in the event of a disagreement between Quicksilver and Baupost, Baupost’s chances of success are much worse than their ownership percentage would suggest.

How to use voting power analysis to minimize influence loss?

The settlement also seemed to indicate that Quicksilver would be selling down its majority position. It has already sold nearly a quarter of its holdings, most of which went to a new share holder, M.R.Y. Oil Co. Now, assuming Quicksilver would like to retain some ownership, what strategic insight can voting power analysis lead to? Because voting power is a function of both individual ownership and the overall ownership structure, it is actually possible to minimize your lost voting power (on a per share basis) by strategically selecting low-impact buyers.[ii]

Consider two options open to Quicksilver to drop below the 20% ownership threshold: selling a third of its holdings (10% of the company) to the second largest stakeholder, Baupost, or selling it to small shareholders on the open market.[iii]

Figure 2: The current voting power structure at Breitburn Energy Partners (blue: ownership, red: voting power), as of July 2010, and two hypotheticals in which Quicksilver Resource Inc. sells another 10% of the company. In the first scenario, the shares are distributed among the smallest shareholders (orange bars). In the second, the shares are sold in a lump sum directly to The Baupost Group (pink bars). The inset shows the percentage change in power from the current situation for each hypothetical.

Figure 2 shows each company’s ownership stake (in blue), as of July 2010, along with the associated voting power (in red). First, note that Baupost’s voting power has improved significantly from March (see Figure 1) without buying any shares because the ownership structure has changed. Second, Quicksilver’s voting power changes depending on whether it sells its shares to the smallest shareholders (in orange) or to Baupost (in pink). When Quicksilver sells to the masses, Baupost’s power again increases substantially, even though they have not increased their holdings by a single share! (The same is true for M.R.Y. Oil Co.) Thus:

Rule 2 of voting power analysis:  voting power can be increased by influencing others to buy or sell!

In the inset in Figure 2 we can see that if Quicksilver sells its shares to Baupost, Quicksilver loses nearly 50% of their voting power. Whereas, if they sell to smaller shareholders they lose only 37% of their voting power. Thus, even a simple application of voting power analysis has profound implications – given the choice, Quicksilver can buffer its loss of influence by a whopping 13% by distributing its shares to smaller shareholders, rather than selling a lump sum to Baupost.

Voting power analysis: what else is it good for?

Stakeholders can use voting power (and related) analysis to help guide key strategic decisions like:

  • Who to buy from and who not to buy from to maximize their purchased control
  • Who to sell to and who not to sell to minimize any lost influence
  • When to be greedy by identifying situations where the purchase of a few more shares will result in a large increase in influence
  • When not to be greedy by identifying situations when the sale of just a few shares will result in a large decrease in influence
  • How to increase their influence without buying any more ownership
  • How much of a company can be sold, while giving up ZERO voting power

and more…

In conclusion, control isn’t worth much – until it is. When trying to change the course of a business in crisis, voting power analysis might prove essential. As voters form coalitions, the effective sizes of the voting blocs grow and so can the disparity between voting power and percentage ownership. It is here in the crucible where, I believe, voting power analysis plus intelligence about key voters’ stances can provide a real edge to investors trying to decide whether the proxy battle is worth the expense and, if so, how best to win it.

Again, I would really appreciate feedback – especially on whether such voting power analyses are commonly applied either in the boardroom or by activist investors.

Travis Dirks, Ph.D. (TravisDirks@gmail.com)

I’d like to thank my co-authors, Radhika Rangarajan and Guy Tal for their insightful conversations that both inspired and fleshed out these ideas as well as for their heroic efforts in helping me to (hopefully) make this tricky subject understandable!


[i] I have made two main assumptions for ease of calculation. The first is that all shareholders vote their shares. The second is that the shares held by groups and individuals with small enough position to not file a 13d are held in equally sized small pieces. While a more realistic assumption, such as a power law distribution in shareholder size, will change the values of voting power, it will not change the main results: percentage ownership alone does not equal voting power, allowing for full optimization of voting power. Also, a Shapley-Shubik index is used to measure voting power.

[ii] It is also possible to optimize in other ways. For instance we can  buy shares to maximize our voting power gain or even our voting power gain plus competitors’ voting power loss.

[iii] Here I’ve assumed that Baupost would get to vote all 25% of its shares, as it would in most other companies, after its own lawsuit. Interestingly, if Baupost were to suffer the 20% cap, selling to Baupost or the masses becomes nearly equivalent options for Quicksilver (Q = 28% , B = 22% , M = 7% ).

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Top posts for the quarter

Folks, I’m traveling this week to the Value Investing Congress in New York (it’s nearly sold out, but tickets are still available. Come and say, “Hello.”) I won’t be maintaining my usual posting schedule while I’m here. In the mean time, here are the top posts for the quarter:

  1. The long and short of Berkshire Hathaway
  2. Mr. Market refuses to do what he’s supposed to, apparently
  3. Graham / Shiller PE10 calculated using ShadowStats CPI
  4. Greenbackd Contrarian Value Portfolio Update
  5. Guest post: Seahawk Drilling Inc (NASDAQ:HAWK) and the Hacienda
  6. Quant funds don’t perform like a good quant fund should
  7. East Coast Asset Management on Becton, Dickinson and Co. (NYSE:BDX)
  8. Handy automatic Graham / Shiller PE10 chart
  9. Darwin’s darlings in practice
  10. The long and short of The St. Joe Company (NYSE:JOE)

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LCV Capital Management and Raging Capital Management are running an activist campaign against ModusLink Global Solutions(TM) Inc (NASDAQ:MLNK) calling on MLNK to immediately implement a $50 to $75M share repurchase program and align executive compensation with performance. The two fund managers, calling themselves “The ModusLink Full Value Committee,” say that the full potential of MLNK is not being realized due to shortcomings in MLNK’s “operational and capital market strategies” and has “concerns regarding the Company’s corporate governance practices.”  The committee has nominated a slate of three independent director nominees for election to the board at MLNK’s upcoming annual meeting of shareholders.

The full text of the letter follows:

THE MODUSLINK FULL VALUE COMMITTEE
Raging Capital Management, LLC254 Witherspoon Street

Princeton, New Jersey 08542

LCV Capital Management, LLCFifteen Churchill Road, Suite 1000

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15235

October 7, 2010

The Board of Directors

ModusLink Global Solutions, Inc.

1100 Winter Street

Waltham, MA 02451

To the Board of Directors of ModusLink:

The ModusLink Full Value Committee (“The Committee”) owns approximately 5.5% of the outstanding shares of ModusLink Global Solutions, Inc. (“ModusLink” or the “Company”).  We are well informed, long-term investors who have met with senior management and several board members on numerous occasions since representatives of The Committee began investing in ModusLink in 2008.

As we have communicated to you, we believe that the full potential of the Company is not being realized due to shortcomings in the Company’s operational and capital markets strategies.  We are concerned about the Company’s strategic direction, approach to capital allocation, and weak governance oversight.  In our opinion, these factors are key contributors to ModusLink’s lackluster stock price performance over the past several years.

Our view is that ModusLink has a tremendous opportunity to unlock and drive substantial shareholder value.  The Company’s $174 million in cash and investments are equal to approximately $4.00 per share, and working capital on hand exceeds $220 million, or 80% of the Company’s current market capitalization.  Yet the Company’s enterprise value totals just $120 million, or less than three times its Fiscal 2010 EBITDA of $46 million.  Unfortunately, the Company will likely continue as a chronic underperformer in the marketplace until change is implemented.

IMPROVE CAPITAL ALLOCATION AND OPERATING FOCUS; DIVEST NON-CORE ASSETS

Shareholder value has been destroyed via a series of poorly timed and poorly executed business acquisitions by ModusLink.  Since 2004, ModusLink has spent more than $315 million on acquisitions, including $87 million on three separate businesses acquired since 2008.  The Company has since taken material goodwill impairment charges on the bulk of these acquisitions in the last two years.  With a current enterprise value of $120 million, it’s fair to say that the return on deployed acquisition capital over the past six years has been abysmal.

Instead of making additional acquisitions, we believe the Company should focus on optimizing and streamlining existing operations, while divesting underperforming and non-core assets.  We believe a simpler, more transparent business would be easier for management to operate and for investors to comprehend and support, thus leading to improved operating results and shareholder returns.

Furthermore, given the relative stability of the cash flows of the Company’s core business, the significant discount to intrinsic/replacement value that the stock currently trades at, and the strength of the balance sheet, we believe ModusLink should immediately implement a $50 to $75 million share repurchase program.  This would be highly accretive to shareholders and magnify the potential upside of any improvement in the Company’s operating results.

INSUFFICIENT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INSIDER OWNERSHIP

We have also communicated to you our serious suggestions to improve ModusLink’s corporate governance shortcomings. While many publicly traded companies have prudently separated the respective roles of Chairman and CEO, ModusLink continues to operate under an archaic structure where the Chairman also holds the position of CEO and President.  This structure fails to provide the appropriate checks and balances needed between the Board and management and engenders a harmful and value-destroying perception by the market of a general lack of accountability.

We are also deeply concerned that this Board has failed to align executive compensation with performance.  According to the Company’s 2009 proxy statement, ModusLink paid out more than $13.8 million to its top three senior executives over a period of three years while Company’s market value declined by hundreds of millions of dollars. This is not acceptable to us as active and concerned shareholders.  It is noteworthy that we are not alone in our opinion on this matter: At last year’s annual meeting, one of the leading corporate governance and proxy advisory firms recommended that shareholders withhold their vote against the election of the chairman of the compensation committee because of the Company’s propensity to overcompensate management for an underperforming stock.  We firmly believe that, in accordance with its fiduciary obligation to shareholders, it is imperative that the Board aligns compensation with the enhancement of shareholder value, since shareholders are the true owners of the Company.

We propose that part of the failure to align compensation with performance can be traced to the low level of stock ownership held by senior management and the Board.  In fact, excluding ModusLink’s Chairman & CEO, the other six members of the board own approximately 35,000 shares in total, or less than one tenth of one percent of the Company.

NEW SHAREHOLDER REPRESENTATIVES ARE NEEDED TO UNLOCK VALUE

As significant shareholders, our objective is to see the full value of our shares and the shares of all other owners of this Company be recognized in the marketplace.  We are committed to working on behalf of all shareholders to ensure that shareholders’ interests are represented in the boardroom.

As you know, we have nominated three individuals to fill the director positions up for election at the Company’s next annual meeting.  All three of our nominees have the appropriate skills and fortitude to implement the significant changes necessary to benefit all ModusLink shareholders and we believe they will be valuable additions to the Board.

We continue to welcome an open dialogue with you but to date we have been unable to reach an understanding with the Company that will result in the Company immediately taking the necessary steps to unlock shareholder value.  Our sincere hope is that this Board will take a fresh look at the opinions we have outlined above and take immediate action to embrace change rather than engage in a protracted and costly proxy contest in an effort to preserve the status quo.

We remain open to speaking with you at any time.

Sincerely,

/s/ Lodovico C. de Visconti

_____________________________

Lodovico de Visconti

Managing Member, LCV Capital Management, LLC

/s/ William C. Martin

_____________________________

William C. Martin

Managing Member, Raging Capital Management, LLC

The company responded in a press release yesterday:

WALTHAM, Mass.–(BUSINESS WIRE)– ModusLink Global Solutions(TM), Inc. (NASDAQ:MLNK), today issued the following statement in response to the public letter from dissident hedge funds, LCV Capital Management, LLC, Raging Capital Management, LLC and certain of their affiliates:

ModusLink values the opinions of all stockholders and strives to maintain an open dialogue with them. To that end, members of ModusLink’s senior management have met with LCV and Raging Capital representatives on numerous occasions, and throughout the discussions the Company gave these dissidents every indication that their concerns could be resolved in a manner that would be beneficial to all stockholders.

ModusLink’s directors, six of seven of whom are independent, are all highly qualified and committed to represent the best interests of all ModusLink stockholders. Consistent with their fiduciary duties, members of the Board’s Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee have interviewed each one of the dissident nominees and are in the process of evaluating their qualifications.

ModusLink recommends that stockholders defer making any determination with respect to the letter from LCV and Raging Capital, which distorts the Company’s record on a number of matters, until they have been advised of the Board’s evaluation of the dissident’s nominees and proposals.

ModusLink remains firmly committed to creating value for all its stockholders through the successful execution of the Company’s strategy. The Company’s Board and management have taken actions to improve the financial and operational performance of the Company and create value for stockholders, including:

  • Investing $55.3 million to repurchase shares since early fiscal 2008. In total the Company has purchased 5.6 million shares, which represents 12% of the fully diluted outstanding share count at the time the program was first announced.
  • Effectively managing through a very difficult economic environment, taking decisive actions to reduce expenses and maintain a strong balance sheet.
  • Focusing on maximizing profitability, resulting in record free cash flow from operations in fiscal 2010.

It’s an interesting situation worth watching. The record date is next Friday, so stock buying will have to be complete by Tuesday for trades to clear in time for votes to count at the annual meeting.

No position yet.

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Fortune has an article asking whether VCs can be value investors:

After all, the philosophy of value investing, in theory, should cut across all asset classes and managers. The precepts and principals therefore should apply to the venture capital business as well.

Sadly, they don’t.

Jeffrey Bussgang, the author, identifies the problem as an inability to invest with a margin of safety:

Klarman writes: “Investing in bargain-priced securities provides a “margin of safety” — room for error, imprecision, bad luck, or the vicissitudes of the economy and stock market.”

Unfortunately, VCs don’t operate with a margin of safety, even if they are able to find and negotiate good deals. Later stage investors may have downside protection if they buy smart, but early-stage VCs do not. If a portfolio company goes bad, there is typically barely any salvage value.

I don’t know that venture capital investing necessarily means investing without a margin of safety, but I agree that many early stage investments lack a margin of safety.

An estimate of intrinsic value is key to determining a margin of safety. Early stage businesses by definition lack a track record, and – BYD aside – not even Buffett can value a business without a track record. It is more difficult when the business has promise, but is burning cash, if only because the blue sky makes it easier to ignore the ugly financial statements.

Confronted with this state of affairs – no track record, no ability to see the future – most value investors would do as Buffett suggests and simply refuse to swing. This is one of the nice things about value investing. You don’t have to know everything about everything, or even much about anything. All you have to know is what you do know, and what you don’t know, and the location of the line separating the two.

Venture capitalists, however, must know stuff about the future, and must be able to “see around corners” (seriously?). To the extent that venture capitalists undertake any sort of valuation that a value investor might recognize, they must extrapolate revenue growth from non-existent revenue, hope that some of it eventually falls to the bottom line, and then into the hands of shareholders, and plug it into a model with the Gordon Growth Model (GGM) at its heart. (As an aside, I could barely type with a straight face that part about venture capitalists waiting for the dividends. I know they “exit” in a trade sale or IPO, which I guess is a euphemism for “sell to a greater fool.”)

Every value investor knows that big growth assumptions in the GGM – even those based on a historical track record – are a recipe for disaster. Why? Simply because the growth is always going to be so astronomical as to overwhelm the discount rate portion of the model, leading to a “Choose your own value” output. To wit:

Value = D / R – G

Where D is next year’s dividend, R is your discount rate and  G is the perpetuity growth rate

If R is say 10-12%, any G over 9-11% gives a value that is more than 100x dividends, which is pricey. I doubt there are any VCs getting out of bed for 10% growth assumptions, so I assume they crank up their discount rates, but the result is the same. As G approaches R, value approaches infinity, and, in some instances, beyond. The solution to this problem is obviously to assume a short period of supernormal growth and then a perpetuity of GDP (or some other, lower) growth figure. This just creates another problem, which, for mine, is too many assumptions, and too many moving parts to get a meaningful valuation.

In this vein, I had a chat with a friend who is a value guy about Facebook’s “valuation”. He says:

Originally thought that the $33b Facebook valuation was ridiculous but am beginning to breathe the fumes. It is taking over the world. Set me straight please!

I responded:

Sounds pretty crazy to me. Might be based on a Gordon Growth Model-type valuation which #Refs out once the assumed growth exceeds the discount rate (which it almost assuredly would for Facebook). That said, these crazies don’t seem to think it’s so crazy.

Says he:

One of the commenters on that site has set me straight:

“Google provides a relevant service. FB is a spam hole. No one is going to pay for spam unless it’s from the guy at the other end of the ad stealing your credit card #. FB is worthless. And of that 1 billion (doubt it), they still owe around 150 million for financing servers and other things. If they had the funds, don;t you think they’d be smart enough to pay CASH, instead of paying interest on a LOAN?”

Insightful stuff. Shame on me.

So the answer for VCs is simple. The valuation is too hard so ignore it, but buy a portfolio of interesting businesses and hope that you get a few home runs. Oh, also sell some of your early shares in Facebook at that $33B valuation because you never know what lurks around the corner.

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FT.com’s Lex has an article (Sara Lee in play) on a possible bid for the food conglomerate Sara Lee (NYSE:SLE) by the old barbarians at the gates, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts:

Of course, a bid now might be opportunistic. Sara Lee has been without the architect of its restructuring since chief executive Brenda Barnes retired due to illness in August. Asset sales have brought debt down to moderate levels. And there is always a good price for a bad business. Sara Lee trades on about seven times prospective earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation – well below the double-digit multiples typical for attractive consumer goods acquisitions.

However, it is hard to see what might better be done with a collection of commoditised food businesses (bakery, meat processing and food service) and a low-growth coffee arm. Overall profitability has barely varied from a steady 8 per cent operating margin in two decades. Disposing of the North American bakery business, as management plans, should cause that to jump to 12 per cent, calculates CreditSights. But any sale also involves handing care of part of the Sara Lee brand to a third party, and buyers have not rushed to snap up an operation with expensive unionised labour. There seems little reason to linger at the gate.

I don’t think Lex will be buying the stock, but it’s still interesting. A portfolio of good brands with some commodity businesses thrown into the mix at ~7 times EBITDA. KKR could buy it, sell off the commodity businesses and do something with the brands (I don’t know, what am I, a PE guy?). It might be worth doing some work. Anybody got a buyout analysis they’d care to share?

No position.

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The inimitable Distressed Debt Investing has another great analysis of Visteon (see my post archive here). Hunter says:

In my 8 years on the buy side, in distressed and high yield land, I have never seen a more consensus long than Visteon’s when issued equity. Simply put, Visteon’s equity to distressed funds is like Apple to Long/Short funds. Many people I know are long it (including myself) – The only thing I can’t figure out: who is selling?

Here’s Hunter’s analysis:

  1. Visteon owns 70% of Halla: At the USD equivalent market cap of ~$2B, gives us $1.4B of value
  2. Visteon owns 50% of Yanfeng: We will use a 10x multiple, ~$900M of value [note I am seeing analysts put a 12-15x multiple on this business]
  3. Cash at Exit: $785M
  4. Added Cash from Warrents: ~$100M

That gets us to $3.2B before adding any value to the US operations. From this we subtract:

  1. Term Loan: $500m
  2. Cash at Halla ~$150M (as to not double count)

Which nets us to $2.55B of equity value. Still before US operations. 54M shares outstanding translates to $47/share. Given the $56/share price today, there is a $9/delta or $500M. This is where the market is currently valuing Visteon’s US operations.

And that’s where we say: “You’ve got to be kidding me?”

Everyone in the market knows Visteon sandbagged their numbers. Why? Because management is getting a good deal of equity post emergence. But let’s say they are right – the 2011 plan calls for $550M of EBITDA. You have to deduct Halla from this which nets you do approximately $300M.

Therefore the market is valuing the US operations at 1.7x. For a company with a net cash position…Here are some 2011E EV/EBITDA comps for your reference: TRW: 4.1x, LEA: 3.9x, Fed Mo: 5.0x, Dana: 3.9x, Tenneco: 4.9x. Let’s be conservative and use 4.0x and see where the value gets us to: Add $1.2B to our sum of parts above, gets us to a $70/stock. And I will tell you, I am probably one of the more conservative estimates out there.

I want to know who is selling this stock? Is this side as one-sided as I believe it to be (at $55/share)?

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Longterm Investing has a series of posts examining several scenarios in Seahawk (HAWK) following the recent conference call (see my post archive for the background). In particular, Neil has examined the effect of CEO Randy Stilley’s proposal to take on debt to buy rigs, rather than buyback stock. Here’s the analysis:

It’s important to understand how the risk-reward profile of HAWK is modified as they take on debt. In their quarterly call they indicated a strong preference for adding debt and adding rigs.

I’ve considered three scenarios.

1. HAWK retains their current leverage and uses asset sales to pay for operations. These asset sales will be at scrap values, around $7M per rig.

2. HAWK takes on 110M of debt and 50M of new assets. These new assets are 3M cash flow positive each quarter after interest. All of HAWKs rigs, new and old are security for this debt. It replaces the existing credit line. This amount of debt is below the scrap value of existing rigs + new asset value.

3. Hawk takes on $150M of debt and 50M of new assets. Similarly,  these new assets are 3M cash flow positive each quarter after interest. All of HAWKs rigs, new and old are security for this debt. It replaces the existing credit line. This amount of debt is about the liquidation value of current rigs and new rigs, net of liabilities.

The “good case” is where HAWK continues their current cash burn, as modified in the scenarios above, until a point in time when rig market values return to December 2008 levels.

The company values under each scenario are shown below assuming a return to December 2008 values in that period. The value added and subtracted by debt are shown along with the 40M residual value under case 2.

image

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Long HAWK.

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Andrew Shapiro has talked to Seeking Alpha’s Jason Aycock about his single highest-conviction position, Reading International (RDI) (See the RDI post archive):

If you could only hold one stock position in your portfolio (long or short), what would it be?

Our best risk/reward idea is Reading International (RDI), an internationally diversified movie exhibitor, with a related business segment that owns, develops and operates substantial real estate assets, many of which are entertainment-themed retail centers (“ETRCs”) anchored by Reading’s cinema multiplexes. Reading’s cinemas generate growing, recession-resilient and recurring box office and concession cash flows. The cinema business builds value by paying down acquisition debt, as well as funding the front-end cash demands of developing Reading’s valuable real estate assets. The development process includes purchasing raw land, up-zoning, development and construction, eventually generating cash through leasing or outright sale.

In addition to its upside from present prices triggered by impending catalysts and growing cash flow, Reading has an enormous “margin of safety” both from the value of its huge landholdings in Australia, New Zealand and the United States, as well as a reasonable valuation of its cinema segment.

Tell us a little more about the company behind the stock.

Over the past few years, Reading has strategically expanded its many cinema circuits in Australia, New Zealand and the U.S. through organic growth and acquisitions, building the fourth-largest exhibitor in Australia, third-largest in New Zealand and the 12th-largest here in the United States. Its approximately 462 screens in 56 cinemas and four live (“Off-Broadway”) theaters are primarily situated on owned or long-term leased land.

Reading’s cinema segment cash flows have continued to show resiliency in recessionary times, producing approximately $35 million of adjusted EBITDA for the 12 months ended June 30. In addition to selective new theater openings and culling of underperforming theaters, Reading has begun equipping a majority of its theaters with digital 3-D capabilities that will provide incremental cash flow into this cinema segment.

As for the real estate segment: Unlike other cinema exhibitors, Reading owns over 16.5 million square feet of real estate, of which only 1.2 million square feet is already developed and generating approximately $13.5 million of adjusted EBITDA for the 12 months ended June 30. In many instances, Reading benefits by having its own multiplex as an anchor tenant and by having itself as landlord. Developed real estate includes the Courtenay Central shopping center in downtown Wellington, New Zealand; the Red Yard Centre in the Auburn suburb of Sydney; and the Reading Newmarket Centre near Brisbane, Australia.

A substantial portion of the more than 15.3 million square feet of additional land owned by Reading holds great cash flow growth potential as it is developable in desirable urbanized locations throughout Australia, New Zealand and the United States, but not yet generating a dime of cash flow. These undeveloped parcels are in various stages as stand-alone developments or “phase two” expansions of existing ETRCs. In addition, Reading owns the land underneath its New York City and Chicago live theaters, including the Union Square Theater, and also midtown Manhattan real estate underneath its Cinema 123 on Third Avenue, across from Bloomingdales – all prime land.

Reading’s 51-acre Burwood Square project in Melbourne, Australia, is by far Reading’s most valuable undeveloped parcel, on its balance sheet for around $45 million. Purchased in 1996 when it was a former brickworks and rock quarry, this giant parcel has now been upzoned to be a “major activity center,” zoned for residential, commercial, entertainment and retail use, and is one of the last prime developable sites fairly close to Melbourne’s central business district.

It should be noted that Reading owns its Burwood parcel (as well as its recently completed and leased Indooroopilly Brisbane office building) debt-free, unencumbered by any mortgages.

Most of Reading’s real estate that has been held or developed over a long period of time (some, like Burwood, since the mid-90s) is on the company’s balance sheet at values which we believe greatly understate current market value. These parcels have enjoyed – to varied degrees – substantial unrealized appreciation from up-zoning, surrounding population growth, property improvements, construction and lease-out, and, in some instances, more than a decade of market inflation.

As more of Reading’s real estate assets are converted to either current cash flow generation or outright sale, Reading ought to be viewed more and more as an undervalued growing operating company attracting a multiple, rather than simply an asset play.

How does your choice reflect your firm’s investment approach?

My firm, Lawndale Capital Management, and the funds it manages have for over 17 years targeted capital appreciation in securities where our research-intensive and active style can add value by identifying and capitalizing on market mispricing. We invest as very active owners, preferring to have strong friendly relationships with the portfolio company managements and boards, but never afraid to take any and all measures that are in the best interests of protecting and creating value, including proxy fights or other legal steps. We regularly take 13D filing-size positions and communicate our views.

We seek large returns through concentration in a few core companies that are analytically out-of-favor (contrarian), analytically complex (special situation), or analytically uneconomic (illiquid). We find small and micro-cap company stocks, and small issues of more senior securities such as preferred stock, and corporate debt of even larger companies, are often priced inefficiently due to illiquidity and investor neglect or incomplete fundamental analysis.

We balance our quest for substantial returns with a fundamental tangible asset-based and deep value-style approach, seeking a “margin of safety” that cushions the biggest risk to our returns: the extensive time and effort to unlock value in our portfolio companies.

Our Reading investment fits right in with our strategy. It started even more analytically illiquid and complex when initially invested in Reading’s three micro-cap predecessor companies, Craig Corp., Reading Entertainment and Citadel Holdings. These companies had much smaller public stock floats and an interrelated ownership structure confusing to most investors. We encouraged and supported a year-end 2001 merger of the three companies to become the single, simpler and larger small-cap Reading International. Even today, tracking progress milestones and estimating the value of Reading’s multiple undeveloped foreign parcels turns off most investors and every sell-side analyst. The fact that Reading’s current stock price basically provides its sizable undeveloped landholdings for free more than adequately provides us our required margin of safety.

How much is your selection based on the Reading’s industry, as opposed to a pure bottom-up pick?

The concentrated private-equity-like portfolio approach Lawndale takes creates inherently larger event risk, so we seek to invest as generalists in several different industries. That being said, as deep value balance sheet-focused investors, we have a predilection for companies with hard assets where investors aren’t pricing those hard assets. For example, with Reading, we own a sizable cinema player that owns a lot more land than investors give it credit for.

In general, our selections are bottom-up where we identify assets undervalued by the market due to perceptions or misperceptions of perpetual deterioration or perpetual stagnation at best. We look for operations that can be turned around, credit quality that can be improved, or dysfunctional boardroom and management situations that are fixable with a catalyst such as ourselves.

How is Reading positioned with regard to competitors?

Initially, the entrenched real estate moguls in Australia severely stalled Reading’s development plans in the late ’90s and early part of this decade, but that logjam has been overcome and almost all of Reading’s parcels have now received their up-zoning.

While Reading’s small theater footprint in the U.S., relative to Regal (RGC) and Cinemark (CNK), had hurt availability and terms on first-run films several years ago, an antitrust lawsuit against the largest movie studios and exhibitors (long since favorably settled) and growth of Reading’s market share in certain markets (70% Hawaii, 12% San Diego) has alleviated this issue.

How does Reading’s valuation compare to its competitors?

Extracting the value of all of Reading’s real estate from its enterprise value imputes a compelling, very low or even negative multiple on Reading’s geographically diverse cinema business. Alternatively, Reading’s cinema business, using multiples below those of comparables, plus its understated book value on its developed real estate, exceeds Reading’s present enterprise value. Thus, the value of all of Reading’s substantial to-be-developed real estate is “free,” serving as a substantial “margin of safety.”

Without individual cash flow figures available on Reading’s land, our valuation model becomes a three-pronged matrix. On the cinema segment, we use an EBITDA multiple as well as a multiple on-screen count. For developed parcels, we are compelled to use a multiple on net book value, based on building age and occupancy and/or appraisals the company previously disclosed. On the to-be-developed parcels we use very conservative assumptions in an NPV approach. Finally, while cinema segment G&A is accounted for in its EBITDA, including a deduction for the value of real estate segment and normalized corporate G&A expenses results in a total value range for RDI of at least $8-12/share. [Reading closed Wednesday at $4.32.]

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Harry Long of Contrarian Industries has a great guest post on SureWest Communications (SURW). Harry is the Managing Partner of Contrarian Industries, LLC and can be reached at info@contrarianindustries.com (mailto:info@contrarianindustries.com):

SureWest Communications (SURW) is a fascinating study in capital allocation, which is the most important strategic imperative in an industry with stagnant growth. For the past 3 years, SureWest has averaged a little over $60 million in cash flow from operations, yet amazingly, trades at a $91 million market cap, giving it a Price to Cash flow ratio of less than 1.50X.

Why is the stock so cheap? The answer is simple. The company does not pay a dividend, and cash flow has been pretty steady for many years. In addition, SureWest has plowed back much of its cash flow into capital expenditures, upgrading its network to compete in the broadband space, as traditional phone service revenue has declined.

I would argue that even though broadband revenue growth has kept overall revenue and cash flows stable, that now is the time to reward stockholders. At the beginning of 2000, SureWest’s stock sold at $32.88 a share. On September 27th, the stock closed at $6.54 a share. Over a decade, shareholders have been clobbered. They deserve the very best form of shareholder value after such punishment and such a long wait—a dividend check in the mail every quarter!

On September 27th, I spoke to SureWest CEO Steven Oldham. He was clear that maintenance capex, calculated conservatively, was $15 million per year. In my opinion, that means SureWest could comfortably dividend out almost $45 million a share per year, which would equate to a dividend of $3.20 per share annually.

Dividend yields on telecommunications companies top out at around 10%. If SureWest instituted a $0.80 per share dividend paid quarterly, I believe its stock would quickly shoot to $32.00, giving it a 10% yield, which would be comparable to the upper end of the dividend yield range for other Telcos.

On September 23rd, SureWest announced that the board increased its share repurchase authorization, “which increases the total amount previously available for repurchase under the program from approximately 253,000 shares to approximately 1,253,000 shares.”

Since then, the stock has jumped. This is a fair start to build on. However, it is not nearly enough. The best increase in shareholder value comes from a dividend check in the mail. A repurchase authorization is just that—an authorization. It does not force the company to buy back stock. The type of dramatic increase in shareholder value, which shareholders deserve after suffering heavily for over a decade, is a fat dividend of $3.20 per share annually.

The reality is that fiber-based telcos have not grown quickly for years. Competition in the telecommunications industry is intense. Pricing competition is intense. You can be a brilliant operator, but competitors are likely to match any move to either lower pricing, or offer more services. Hence, the customer benefits, but shareholders rarely earn substantial returns without scale. The Comcasts of the world have scale, and some moderate advantages. They can squeeze a smaller competitor. They can afford to spend more. SureWest cannot, in my opinion, outspend a large competitor. Therefore, they need to dividend out their cash flow, improve shareholder value, and/or negotiate a sale to a larger competitor.

Executives, as fiduciaries, are stewards of capital. It is very tempting to have the mentality that the job of a Telco executive is to grow the company, even if vast amounts of capital have to be sunk into it at very low returns on capital. However, growth at low returns on capital can be destructive to shareholder value, because the capital could best be deployed elsewhere. The real test of character is whether executives love the business of buying vast amounts of equipment which earn low returns on capital, or whether they love their shareholders. If SureWest executives truly want to behave as first-class fiduciaries, I would argue that their duty is to shovel money back to shareholders, who can find better returns in other industries on their own.

As Warren Buffett said, “When a management team with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact.” Recognizing that truth is imperative for SureWest’s executives, even if they have brilliant plans that they believe will allow the company to grow. For a reality check, revenue at SureWest last quarter decreased by almost 1% from a year ago. When it comes to growth, “show” means much more than “tell.”

CEOs are intensely competitive and do not lack in confidence. As such, they systematically over-estimate their ability to extract shareholder value from intensely competitive industries. They often truly delude themselves in to thinking that they will be special, that they will not suffer the fate of the other small players in the industry. But they are almost invariably wrong.

We do not need to be prophets to reasonably predict what will happen if all cash flows are continually sunk back into the company. We need to look at the past. In 2000, SureWest’s stock sold at $32.88 a share. Since then, hundreds of millions have been sunk into capex. On September 27th, SureWest’s stock sold at $6.54 per share. Most Telco mangers are human. They love running and growing Telcos. It is more an engineer’s perspective than a business perspective. SureWest shareholders, however, have suffered from this perspective, in my opinion, with a very cheap stock price and decimated shareholder value. Shareholders deserve a radical change in strategy.

Charlie Munger and Warren Buffett have often pointed out that the best managers are excellent capital allocators. SureWest is at a classic capital allocation fork in the road. I predict that if SureWest does not change their capital allocation strategy, that shrewd acquirers and activists will become involved. They will either see the company as a great potential vehicle, like the original Berkshire Hathaway (BRK.A), or will turn the company into a dividend machine themselves, if management refuses to.

Even if activists or financial acquirers do not make a run at the company, SureWest would be in a far better negotiating position with a potential strategic acquirer, such as Comcast, with a higher stock price. A stock price of $32 per share would be a great touchstone for negotiations. In every mature industry, management often says a version of “Trust us. Next year will be better. If we just plow a little more money into it, we’ll see a return.”

As Charlie Munger has pointed out, people are easy to fool, and the easiest people to fool are ourselves. Confirmation bias rules the day. Any dis-confirming evidence is likely to be ignored. For years, the auto industry said the same thing to shareholders. We all know how that ended. As Buffett has often pointed out, “A girl in a convertible is worth five in the phonebook.” Shareholders can have dividends today which will increase shareholder value if they are declared by the board now. Dividends today are far more valuable than promises of rosier days ahead for Telcos.

In 2009, CEO Steven Oldham received $1,361,140 in total compensation. I do not begrudge him such compensation, so long as he does not begrudge stockholders a large dividend. Everyone deserves to be treated fairly—especially shareholders. Shareholders need to be put first—capex should be at the back of the line.

SureWest would make a fantastic vehicle. Cash flow could be redeployed to many other industries, to great advantage. Buffett and Munger have seen this playbook before. After all, they wrote it!

If CEO Steven Oldham sees the light and starts supporting huge dividends, he will become a hero to shareholders in this industry. However, if he does not, the board should replace him with someone who wants to reward shareholders now. After all, shareholders have waited for the rewards of ownership for 10 years. They should not have to wait any longer.

Disclosure: Author is long SURW

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