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Archive for the ‘Activist Investors’ Category

Street Capitalist has a beautiful post on Gyrodyne Company of America Inc (NASDAQ:GYRO). It’s trading at its 52-week highs, but its settlement of a court case with the State of New York means that it’s at a greater than 60% discount to its liquidation value on a sum-of-the-parts basis. It’s also got some activists on the register.

Here’s the background:

Gyro just announced that they won a court settlement from the State of New York. Here’s what happened:

“ST. JAMES, N.Y., June 30, 2010 – Gyrodyne Company of America, Inc. (NASDAQ:GYRO), a Long Island-based real estate investment trust, announced today that the Court of Claims of the State of New York issued an opinion requiring the State to pay to Gyrodyne an additional $98,685,000 for land appropriated in 2005. Under New York’s eminent domain law (the “EDPL”), Gyrodyne is also entitled, subject to EDPL Section 514, to statutory simple interest on the additional amount at a rate not to exceed nine percent (9%) per annum from November 2, 2005, the date of the taking, to the date of payment.

The opinion was issued in connection with Gyrodyne’s claim brought in April 2006 for just compensation for the 245.5 acres of its Flowerfield property in St. James and Stony Brook, New York (the “Property”), taken by the State. The State had paid Gyrodyne $26,315,000 for the Property at the time of the taking, which Gyrodyne elected, under the eminent domain law, to treat as an advance payment while it pursued its claim.

In its opinion, the Court agreed that the State had improperly valued the Property and misapplied the eminent domain law’s requirement that just compensation be determined based upon the highest and best use and the probability that such use could have been achieved. Applying this standard, the Court determined that there was a reasonable probability that the Property would have been rezoned from light industrial use to a planned development district, thereby resulting in the aforementioned award to Gyrodyne.”

Gyrodyne Press Release

Here’s Tariq’s valuation:

I look at situations where a court verdict is announced, a drug trial passes, or a certain earnings target is met as milestones in my investment process. So if I think a stock is undervalued, I will look at whether or not the company meets the milestones that I put up to, check its progress against my thesis. The benefit is that when a company meets its milestones, part of the uncertainty or risk behind your thesis goes away. Gyrodyne is a good case of that.

So let’s look at this on a sum of the parts basis:

$99.0 (settlement)

+ 41.0 (interest payments)

+ 34.0 (book value of real estate)

+ 1.10 (cash & cash equivalents)

– 21.5 (total liabilities)

= 153.6 / 1.29 shares outstanding

= $119 per share.

With the shares currently trading around $73, you get a potential gain of 63%. To me, this is a conservative estimate of liquidation value because the real estate is booked at cost. My guess is that some of it may have appreciated since they acquired it, but would rather not speculate. The company also owns an interest of a bit less than 9% in a Florida orange grove. Again, I would rather not speculate as to what the value of that interest really is.

And the activists:

Typically, whenever a company has a large cash balance, they tend to be greeted with skepticism. One of the risks companies with high cash balances is the fact that they might squander the cash horde. I think there are two reasons for why I would handicap this as a low possibility:

1. Shareholder Activists

Phil Goldstein of Bulldog Investors owns 17.46% of the stock. Two other partnerships own a combined 15% of the stock (River Road Asset Management, Leap Tide Capital). Phil Goldstein is a notoriously tough activist, he has been pretty big on forcing close-ended funds to liquidate when trading at discounts to NAV. I think there is a good chance Goldstein and the other investors will make sure the money from the court case is used in an accretive manner.

See the rest of the post at Street Capitalist.

[Full Disclosure: I hold GYRO. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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Andrew Shapiro, President of Lawndale Capital Management, has provided an update on Reading International Inc (NASDAQ:RDI) (see the RDI post archive here. Andrew has also responded to commenters in the first post.):

Reading International: Index Fund Selling Presents Unique Liquidity Opportunity

As previously reported in mid-May, movie exhibitor and real estate developer Reading International (NASDAQ: RDI) announced what should be a major near-term catalyst for unlocking substantial embedded value in one of its most highly appreciated real estate development projects, Burwood Square, located in Melbourne, Australia. A unique major liquidity opportunity for buyers is being presented over the next week as substantial RDI shares (approx 1.3 million) are to be sold by Russell index funds. Such funds are completely indifferent to Reading’s value-unlocking activity, but are forced to sell at the end of this week when RDI is deleted from the Russell 2000 index, because it missed this year’s market capitalization cut-off.

Burwood Sale is a Catalyst
A May 16, 2010 article on SeekingAlpha.com, discusses the property and provides URL links to the parcel’s up-zoning and present development plans. A follow-up SeekingAlpha article on May 27, 2010 makes the argument that Burwood’s sale would convert difficult-to-value real estate and sizable hidden unrealized appreciation into easily valued cash, and that if Reading’s real estate value were removed from Reading’s present enterprise valuation, investors get a large geographically diverse movie exhibition business for “free”. (Note, alternatively, monetizing the movie theater business would create long-held and highly appreciated real estate for “free” as well.) That article concludes that, as Reading monetizes Burwood, investors ought to more easily price, via a higher stock price, the intrinsic value of both of Reading’s cinema and real estate segments.

Catalyst realization is in the Near term

A detailed Information Memorandum (a sales “teaser”) on the Burwood Square parcel posted on Reading’s website not only includes some some compelling photos and information illustrating the parcel’s substantial value, but it also sets a near term timeline for the sales process. Submissions of expression of interest and buyer qualifications are due next week on June 28th. Selection of short-listed candidates to participate in the next round of bidding will take place July 5th.

RDI being deleted from Russell 2000 Index on Friday June, 25

On Friday, June 25th, the Russell indices will be recomposed for the coming June 2010-June 2011 year with new members added and some old members deleted. The composition of the Russell 2000 index (a subset of the Russell 3000E) is purely based on market capitalization size on Russell’s cut-off date (May 28, 2010), not any fundamental business assessment of value or prospects. Reading’s closing market capitalization on May 28 placed the company about 40-60 slots below the 3000th ranking company, and thus, Reading has been listed by Russell as one of over 200 companies being deleted from the Russell 2000 index. Note, RDI will remain in the less followed Russell Micro Cap index.

Index fund selling presents unique liquidity opportunity for RDI buyers
It is important to note that RDI’s upcoming deletion from the Russell 2000 index was not qualitative based and index funds can’t consider whether Reading is monetizing its Burwood Square parcel or not. They MUST sell their shares on or around the Friday June 25, 2010 recomposition date. RDI’s average daily trading volume is about 50K shares, a modest and respectable number for a company that lacks any sell-side analyst coverage whatsoever. However, this amount is dwarfed by the estimated 1.3 million or more RDI shares held by index funds connected to the Russell 2000 index that must be sold.

Given the substantial surge over the last several months in RDI shares held short to approximately 780K shares on May 28, I feel some RDI shares to be sold by index funds are already spoken for. However, a substantial block of RDI stock liquidity remaining to be sold by index funds will enter the market in the coming week and, once sold, won’t be available to interested buyers under similar circumstances again. The next index participation in RDI likely won’t be till next year, after Burwood and possibly other real estate parcels are monetized or built out. That scenario would be index funds buying RDI shares, when the company likely gets added back into the Russell 2000 index.

Disclosure: At time of writing, funds author manages hold a long position in RDI. The funds may buy or sell shares at anytime.

[Full Disclosure:  I hold RDI. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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Whitney Tilson of T2 Partners has been making the rounds in the media talking up his position in BP Plc (LSE:BP). Here’s Tilson on Fast Money late last week:

Market Folly has a great summary of Tilson’s rationale here. In short, it’s a case of being greedy while others are fearful. Tilson compares BP to the Texaco v Pennzoil litigation in the 80s. Tilson makes the point that shareholders in Texaco “weren’t harmed” when Texaco filed for bankruptcy protection following Joe Jamail’s $12 billion judgement against the company. Here’s Icahn describing the negotiations to settle the litigation:

Icahn made out like a bandit on his holding in Texaco. One wrinkle to this comparison is that BP is a British stock, and so it’s not subject to the same bankruptcy regime as Texaco. The Texaco matter also wasn’t as politically sensitive as the BP spill.

The Wall Street Journal has an interesting analysis discussing various scenarios for BP (subscription required).

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On Tuesday last week I ran a post on Lawndale Capital Management’s campaign to have P & F Industries Inc (NASDAQ:PFIN), among other corporate governance initiatives, rein in the compensation paid to PFIN’s Chairman and CEO, Richard Horowitz for poor performance.

Lawndale’s May 26 amended 13D exhibited its May 25 letter to PFIN board, which also annexed Proxy Governance’s Comparative Performance Analysis of PFIN. Both are worth reading for the background.

PFIN held its annual meeting on June 3, 2010. Lawndale voted its fund’s shares to “Withhold” on all of PFIN’s director nominees. Lawndale’s President, Andrew Shapiro, attended the meeting and met with PFIN’s board to discuss Lawndale’s many concerns, including but not limited to, excessive executive compensation, the need for greater independent composition and functioning of PFIN’s board and oversight of management’s unsuccessful acquisition strategy and operational execution.

PFIN reported the results of the annual meeting late afternoon on June 8:

Departure of Directors or Certain Officers; Election of Directors; Appointment of Certain Officers; Compensatory Arrangements of Certain Officers.

On June 3, 2010, the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of P&F Industries, Inc. (the “Registrant”) held a Meeting (the “Board Meeting”) immediately following the Registrant’s 2010 Annual Meeting of Stockholders. At the Board Meeting, the Board reconstituted the composition of the Board’s Compensation Committee and Stock Option Committee, so that, effective immediately, the members of such committees were Kenneth M. Scheriff (who was appointed as Chairman of each such committee) and Jeffrey D. Franklin, who also remained Chairman of the Audit Committee. All other committees of the Board remained unchanged.

At the Board Meeting, the Board also established the position of Lead Independent Director to preside at executive sessions of the non-employee directors and to serve as the principal liaison between the non-employee directors and the Chairman of the Board. The Board appointed Marc A. Utay to serve as the initial Lead Independent Director in addition to his continuing role as Chairman of the Nominating Committee of the Board.

Voting results from PFIN’s annual meeting were as follows: Robert Dubofsky, Alan Goldberg and Chairman/CEO Richard Horowitz had 31.9%, 29.9% and 29.5% of the votes cast as “Withheld”, respectively.

[Full Disclosure:  I do no hold PFIN. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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Mario Gabelli has long been criticized for his outsized remuneration at Gamco Investors Inc (NYSE:GBL). In 2005, a large investor in Gabelli Group Capital Partners, or G.G.C.P., Gabelli’s private company, sued him for, among other things, “looting the assets of the company.” According to this New York Times article, document disclosure in the case revealed that Gabelli “pays himself 20 percent of G.G.C.P.’s pretax revenue as a “management fee.” As recently as yesterday, the Wall Street Journal noted in its “Heard on the Street” column (subscription required):

… Mr. Gabelli’s compensation package has been a severe drag on earnings. In 2008, Gamco’s assets fell by a third and net income totaled $25 million. Even so, Mr. Gabelli received $46 million in cash compensation, 13 times as much as the second-highest-paid executive.

Gamco took an activist position in Biglari Holdings Inc (NYSE:BH) back when it was the humble Steak n Shake Company. Gamco’s most recent amendment to its 13D filing is an interesting change in direction. From Item 4 Purpose:

GAMCO has announced that, to the extent it has voting authority over its investment advisory accounts, GAMCO intends to vote AGAINST approval of the Incentive Bonus Agreement between the Issuer and Sardar Biglari, dated April 30, 2010 (the “Agreement”) at a special meeting of shareholders of the Issuer at which the Agreement will be submitted for approval by the shareholders of the Issuer. Consistent with applicable laws and regulations, GAMCO may discuss its plans to so vote with a limited number of institutional shareholders and others.

What’s in the Incentive Bonus Agreement? This:

Company shall pay to Executive, determined as of the last day of each fiscal year of Company (including any fiscal year in which any of the events set forth in Section 4(a) occur) (“Incentive Compensation Calculation Date”), incentive compensation equal to the Incentive Compensation Amount (as defined below) as of such Incentive Compensation Calculation Date; provided, however, that no duplicate Incentive Compensation Amount shall be paid to Executive in any fiscal year. The Incentive Compensation Amount shall be paid to Executive as promptly as practicable after each Incentive Compensation Calculation Date, and in no event later than 75 days thereafter (the “Payment Date”), subject to Section 6(c). The “Incentive Compensation Amount” means the amount computed (subject to proration with respect to any fiscal year during the term of this Agreement in which any of the events set forth in Section 4(a) occurs, determined based on the date of such event) using the following formula where “x” equals 1.05 (subject to proration for the 2010 fiscal year and any short fiscal year during the term of this Agreement) and “n” equals the number of years between the most recent Incentive Compensation Calculation Date and the Incentive Compensation Calculation Date on which the High Water Mark was achieved:

(0.25)(New Book Value – ((High Water Mark)(x)n))

In summary, Biglari gets 25% of the annual gain in book value over 5%. Gabelli gets 20% of pretax revenue. Mario thinks Sardar is going to be paid too much. Isn’t this a case of  the pot calling the kettle greedy? Or is this just gamesmanship on Gabelli’s part?

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Lawndale Capital Management, LLC filed an amended 13D on May 26 for its holding in P & F Industries Inc (NASDAQ:PFIN). Lawndale has been lobbying PFIN regarding “certain operational and corporate governance concerns that include, but are not limited to, what Lawndale believes to be excessive compensation paid to PFIN’s Chairman and CEO, Richard Horowitz, for poor performance. This further leads to serious concerns regarding the Board’s current composition and independence.”

Lawndale’s 13D exhibits its May 25 letter to PFIN board, which also annexes Proxy Governance’s Comparative Performance Analysis of PFIN. It is well worth reading.

Purpose of the Transaction

Extracted from the most recent 13D filing:

On May 25, 2010, Lawndale sent PFIN’s Board a letter (a copy of which is attached at Exhibit B hereto, and incorporated by reference to this filing) informing them of Lawndale’s intent to vote 272,812 shares, equal to 7.5% of eligible shares to “WITHOLD authority for ALL NOMINEES” on Proposal 1, Election of Directors, at PFIN’s annual meeting scheduled for June 3 2010 and noting independent proxy advisory services, Proxy Governance and RiskMetrics also recommended voting to “WITHHOLD ALL” and WITHHOLD Dubofsky”, respectively. (a copy of the Proxy Governance recommendation is attached as part of this exhibit)

As disclosed in greater detail in the letter, among the reasons for its vote, Lawndale cited the following:

· For P&F’s Small Size And Business Structure, Horowitz’ Compensation Is Wholly Inappropriate

· The Only Shareowner That Has Benefited From The Horowitz Era Has Been Horowitz

· P&F’s Board Requires Increased Independence Via New Directors From Outside “The Club”

At the invitation of the Nominating Committee Chairman, Marc Utay, in February 2010 Lawndale submitted the names and backgrounds of five highly qualified and independent individuals for possible addition to P&F’s Board. Although these nominations were made long before the deadline for setting PFIN’s slate and Proxy for the upcoming June 3 Annual Meeting, none of Lawndale’s suggested nominees appeared on PFIN’s final Proxy. Lawndale was recently informed that two of its nominees have been invited to meet with certain members of the Board in the week following PFIN’s Annual Meeting.

It is the view of Lawndale that a board comprised of qualified directors who are independent, and whose interests are better aligned with shareholders via meaningful purchased equity ownership, would more objectively and aggressively oversee the compensation and corporate acquisition decisions of PFIN.

Lawndale believes the public market value of PFIN is undervalued by not adequately reflecting the value of PFIN’s business segments and other assets, including certain long-held real estate.

While Lawndale acquired the Stock solely for investment purposes, Lawndale has been and may continue to be in contact with PFIN management, members of PFIN’s Board, other significant shareholders and others regarding alternatives that PFIN could employ to maximize shareholder value. Lawndale may from time to time take such actions, as it deems necessary or appropriate to maximize its investment in the Company’s shares. Such action(s) may include, but is not limited to, buying or selling the Company’s Stock at its discretion, communicating with the Company’s shareholders and/or others about actions which may be taken to improve the Company’s financial situation or governance policies or practices, as well as such other actions as Lawndale, in its sole discretion, may find appropriate.

About PFIN

PFIN operates in two primary lines of business, or segments: tools and other products (Tools) and hardware and accessories (Hardware). The Company conduct its Tools business through a wholly owned subsidiary, Continental Tool Group, Inc. (Continental), which in turn operates through its wholly owned subsidiaries, Florida Pneumatic Manufacturing Corporation (Florida Pneumatic) and Hy-Tech Machine, Inc. (Hy-Tech). The Company conducts its Hardware business through a wholly owned subsidiary, Countrywide Hardware Inc. (Countrywide), which in turn operates through its wholly owned subsidiaries, Nationwide Industries, Inc. (Nationwide), Woodmark International, L.P. (Woodmark) and Pacific Stair Products, Inc. (Pacific Stair).

[Full Disclosure:  I do no hold PFIN. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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Andrew Shapiro, President of Lawndale Capital Management, has provided today’s guest post on Reading International Inc (NASDAQ:RDI):

Exhibitor Reading Int’l – Cashing in on Aussie Land Boom – getting the movies for free.

Movie box office isn’t the only business that’s popping for theater exhibitor Reading International (NASDAQ: RDI) these days. In fact, a resurging property boom in Australia, particularly in Melbourne, is likely to have a greater effect on Reading’s near term market value than Avatar, Alice, Shrek or anything else on the silver screen.

That’s because Reading isn’t just a 466-screen exhibitor that has the 3rd, 4th, and 12th largest share in Australia, New Zealand, and the US, respectively.  Reading also owns valuable real estate parcels that have appreciated, in some instances, for over more than a decade, from surrounding population growth, substantial up-zoning, construction, lease-up and, of course, inflation.

It important to note that, at $4/share, the entire company’s market cap is $91MM.  Book value, at almost $5/share, is understated for all the appreciation on Reading’s real estate.  Extracting the value of Reading’s real estate from its enterprise value imputes a very low—possibly even negative—multiple on Reading’s cinema business.  In essence, you buy the land and get the movie business “for free”.

At its recent annual meeting, Reading made a slide presentation filed as an 8-K with the SEC. This presentation besides highlighted 2009’s record growth and an outstanding Q1 2010, illustrated, among other things, how Reading’s EV/EBITDA valuations were already equal to or somewhat less than comparable companies in both industry segments (see pages 7 and 9).

Per Reading’s 2009 10-K, its Real Estate segment is 49% or $197.MM of the company’s assets.  These assets include fee ownership of approximately 16.5mm sq. ft. of real estate comprised of 1.2 million sq ft. of cash flow generating commercial real estate, and approximately 15.3 million sq. ft. of land to be developed and built upon in the future. So almost 93% (15.3 sq. ft./16.5 sq ft) of Reading’s real estate assets presently do not yet contribute to Reading’s present $36MM adj EBITDA (LTM March 31, 2010).

The substantial amount of assets carried in Reading’s enterprise value that don’t contribute EBITDA is why the Reading’s recent decision to list for sale its large and unencumbered 51-acre Burwood Square development parcel in Melbourne is a major near-term catalyst that should shed light on Reading’s deep stock market undervaluation.

Purchased by Reading in 1996, the Burwood land has enjoyed almost 15 years’ worth of appreciation due to inflation, surrounding population growth, and substantial up-zoning.  Burwood is on Reading’s balance sheet for only $47MM, and represents the largest unrealized gain of any of Reading’s eight major undeveloped parcels, which together comprise 130 acres, have a gross book value of $70MM and don’t presently contribute to EBITDA.

Acquired when it was nothing more than a rock quarry and zoned industrial, Burwood Square is now one of the last prime developable sites fairly close to Melbourne’s central business district. Indeed, the parcel was, until recently, part of a mixed-use development plan that was to include commercial, retail, and entertainment space, and 700-1000 residences.

However, there now appears to be good reason for the parcel to have an increased residential component – perhaps more than 2000 residences.  According to an article in a leading Melbourne paper, Burwood-area homeowners are seeing enormous growth from the steady rise in demand caused by housing requirements of nearby Deakin University and an influx of Chinese residents/students. It should be noted that student housing demand is less cyclical than most.

A detailed Information Memorandum (.pdf) (a sales “teaser”) on the Burwood parcel has recently been posted on Reading’s website. The teaser includes some amazing aerial photos clearly showing how Melbourne’s burgeoning population has migrated over the years to completely surround this crown jewel of Reading’s real estate holdings.  In addition, the memo sets forth that indications of interest, including buyer’s offer price, conditions and credentials and plans, are to be provided by end of day, June 28 and that Reading will short list its candidates by July 5th.

The sale of Burwood would convert a parcel, which comprises almost ¼ of Reading’s real estate asset book value, and unlock substantial embedded unrealized gain, into cash.  Investors ought to more easily reflect the intrinsic value of both of Reading’s business segments after monetizing Burwood and selling or developing other Reading non-EBITDA-generating parcels with a higher stock price.

Andrew also provided a link to the detailed Information Memorandum on the Burwood parcel (.pdf), which includes photos “making it clear how valuable this parcel is and what kind of embedded gain it represents.” Here is a sample photo:

[Full Disclosure:  I hold RDI. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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The incredible Zero Hedge has an article on Seth Klarman’s address to the CFA Institute:

Seth Klarman was speaking at the CFA Institute earlier, and in typical fashion cut to the chase: in summarizing the current market, the Baupost founder said he “sees few bargains in the current environment and predicted on Tuesday that the stock market could suffer another lost decade without any gains.” And the punchline: his description of market conditions which he compared to “a Hostess Twinkie snack cake because everything is being manipulated by the government and appears artificial.” Such facility with words, there is a reason the man runs a $22 billion fund and his book “Margin of Safety” has been out of print for years, and sells for a $1000 on ebay.

Sayeth Seth (via Reuters):

“Given the recent run-up, I’d be worried that we’ll have another 10 years of zero returns,” Klarman, who rarely speaks in public, said at the CFA Institute’s annual conference in Boston.

“I’m more worried about the world broadly than I’ve ever been in my whole career,” Klarman said.

Inflation is a risk that Klarman said he is particularly concerned with given the government’s high rate of borrowing to bail out the financial system. Baupost has purchased far out-of-the-money puts on bonds to hedge the risk, he said.

The puts, which Klarman said he viewed as “cheap insurance,” will expire worthless even if long-term interest rates rise to 6 or 7 percent. But if rates rise to 10 percent, Baupost would make large gains, and if rates exceed 20 percent the firm could make 50 or 100 times its outlay.

Typically, Baupost focuses on out-of-favor stocks and bonds. Klarman cleaned up in 2007 and 2008 buying distressed debt and mortgage securities that later recovered.

One area Klarman said he is currently scouring for potential investments is private commercial real estate below the top quality. Publicly traded real estate investment trusts, however, have “rallied enormously” and are “quite unattractive,” he said.

“We’d rather underperform a huge bull market than get clobbered in a bear market,” he said.

For those of you who don’t want to shell out $1,000 on eBay for Seth’s out-of-print Margin of Safety and have only recently become aware that the Internet is available on computers, the Zero Hedge article includes a link to a scanned copy of the book, available at a price even an anarcho-capitalist could embrace.

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Mario Cibelli’s recent 13D amendment for Dover Motorsports Inc (NYSE:DVD) is interesting reading. Cibelli controls around 17.5% of DVD through Marathon Partners and Cibelli Capital Management. His most recent 13D amendment filed Wednesday annexes a letter setting out a (huge) case study of DVD “partly as a contribution to public education but also to obtain a clearly objective review of the Dover Motorsports situation for our own investment purposes:”

Via Fed-Ex

April 26, 2010

Trustees of RMT Trust
Michele M. Rollins
R. Randall Rollins
Henry B. Tippie
Board of Directors, Dover Motorsports, Inc.
Henry B. Tippie, Chairman
Denis McGlynn, Chief Executive Officer
Patrick J. Bagley
Kenneth K. Chalmers
Jeffrey W. Rollins
John W. Rollins, Jr.
R. Randall Rollins
Eugene W. Weaver
Dover Motorsports, Inc.
1311 N. DuPont Highway
Dover, Delaware 19903

RE: Dover Motorsports, Inc. Case Study

Dear Trustees of RMT Trust and Board Members:

Please find enclosed a study that we sponsored, partly as a contribution to public education but also to obtain a clearly objective review of the Dover Motorsports situation for our own investment purposes.

We believe this objective and thorough review confirms our position that Mr. Tippie has not been performing his duties satisfactorily, and cannot be relied upon to do so in the future. We recognize that Mr. Tippie’s past accomplishments are significant and worthy of admiration, but whatever tribute is due cannot be imposed on the company’s long-suffering shareholders. Under these circumstances, it is the fiduciary responsibility of the company’s directors as well as of the trustees of its controlling shareholder to act in the interest of those who rely upon them to assure the competent management of Dover Motorsports.

If you are reluctant to take the necessary actions yourselves, you should at least allow me to do so. As you know from our reports, I have made sound preparations to assume this responsibility.

Sincerely,

Mario D. Cibelli
Managing Member

Enclosure

Cibelli’s DVD case study:

Isaac C. Flanagan

April 26, 2010

Dancing on the Deck of the Titanic:
Henry B. Tippie and Dover Motorsports, Inc.

As the first decade of the 21st century rapidly drew to a close, the motorsports industry in the United States faced shifting internal dynamics, and was buffeted by the macroeconomic environment. The third-largest public player in a sector whose decades-long cycle of consolidation was largely complete, Dover Motorsports, Inc. (NYSE: DVD) (“Dover Motorsports,” “Dover” or the “Company”) was not immune.

By the time Henry B. Tippie was elected Chairman of Dover’s Board of Directors in 2000 following the death of Company founder and Chairman John W. Rollins, he had distinguished himself through nearly fifty years of service to the Rollins family and their group of companies. In his career, Mr. Tippie had developed a reputation for consistently organizing and growing companies in a diverse group of industries, frequently taking them public. Mr. Tippie was known not only as a successful manager and a nimble rescuer of companies, but also as a leader with unimpeachable integrity. The University of Iowa described Henry Tippie in the following manner on the biographical web page entitled Who is Henry Tippie?:

“Integrity. Innovation. Impact.

Those words not only apply to the Tippie College and its offerings, they also apply to its benefactor, Henry B. Tippie. A native of Belle Plaine, Iowa, Henry Tippie is a man of integrity, who has built his personal and professional life on the principles of hard work and doing the right thing. He is a living and breathing illustration of the word ‘integrity.'”1

1 http://tippie.uiowa.edu/about/henry.cfm

It is in this context that the circumstances surrounding Dover Motorsports could have been confusing to those familiar with the situation starting in 2007. The management decisions made over a long period of time at Dover seemed contradictory to the legacy of both Mr. Tippie and the Rollins group of companies and left Dover at a major crossroads in 2009.

Company Description

Dover Motorsports, Inc., headquartered in Dover, Delaware, marketed and promoted motorsports entertainment in the United States via the following four raceways:

1. Dover International Speedway in Dover, Delaware

2. Gateway International Raceway near St. Louis, Missouri

3. Memphis Motorsports Park in Memphis, Tennessee

4. Nashville Superspeedway in Lebanon, Tennessee

The Sprint Cup Series was NASCAR’s premier racing series, with 36 races scheduled in 2009 and 36 more scheduled in 2010. Dover International Speedway hosted two Sprint Cup Series race weekends each year, and was the only one of the Company’s four tracks to host a Sprint Cup Series event. All four facilities hosted NASCAR Nationwide Series and Camping World Truck Series events, although these events drew much smaller crowds and generated significantly lower sponsorship, event-related, and broadcast television revenues compared to Sprint Cup events.

Dover Motorsports was one of three publicly traded racetrack operators, along with International Speedway Corporation (NASDAQ: ISCA) (“ISCA”) and Speedway Motorsports, Inc. (NYSE: TRK) (“SMI”). ISCA was controlled by members of the France family and SMI was controlled by O. Bruton Smith.

Motorsports Industry Overview

NASCAR

Founded by Bill France, Sr. in 1948, the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. (NASCAR) was the premier motorsports sanctioning body. NASCAR consisted of three national series (the NASCAR Sprint Cup Series, NASCAR Nationwide Series, and NASCAR Camping World Truck Series), a road racing series, and a variety of regional, local, and international racing series. The France family controlled the sanctioning body, and Brian Z. France served as CEO and Chairman of the Board of NASCAR.

By the fall of 2009, racetrack operations in the United States had begun to display many of the classic signs of sector maturity. Most significantly, nearly all of the country’s major media markets and population centers boasted an established NASCAR-affiliated track by this point, with the notable exception of New York City. Given the lack of de novo growth prospects and NASCAR’s outspoken reluctance to expand the current race schedule, profit-expansion opportunities were largely driven by more efficient marketing and management of tracks, offering enhanced experiences to race attendees, and successful acquisition and integration of competitors.

Pocono Raceway was owned by the Mattioli family with the asset held in a generation- skipping trust2, and the historic Indianapolis Motor Speedway, known for its open-wheeled racing, was owned by the George/Hulman family.

2 Speed Channel (6/13/04), reported by http://www.jayski.com

Corporate History

The Company was founded in 1969 as racetrack operator Dover Downs, and launched with a NASCAR Sprint Cup Series race won by Richard Petty. Dover Downs Entertainment, Inc., which included both the motorsports and gaming businesses, went public on the New York Stock Exchange in 1996 under the ticker symbol DVD. In 2002, the gaming portion of the Company’s operation was separated and went public on the New York Stock Exchange as Dover Downs Gaming & Entertainment, Inc. under the ticker symbol DDE. The Company’s motorsports operations were renamed Dover Motorsports, Inc. following the divestiture and retained the DVD ticker symbol. Despite the separation into two distinct businesses, the management teams of each company remained nearly identical.

Share Classes and Voting Structure

Dover Motorsports maintained a dual class share structure, which included common stock and Class A common stock. The Class A shares, owned by a small group of Rollins family members and management, carried ten votes per share. Common shares carried a single vote per share. Dividends on Class A shares could not exceed those of common shares, but under certain circumstances common dividends could exceed those of the Class A shares. In addition, the common and Class A common shares were part of a shareholder rights plan, also known as a “poison pill.” In the event that an outside investor accumulated over 10 percent of the company’s total shares, or tendered a takeover offer without prior approval, existing shareholders had the right to purchase additional shares in order to prevent a takeover.

RMT Trust

Following the death of John W. Rollins, Senior on April 4, 2000, Henry Tippie (at the time, Vice Chairman of Dover) was named executor of Mr. Rollins’ vast estate, and thereafter, Mr. Tippie possessed more than 50% voting control of the Company. The Last Will and Testament of John W. Rollins, Senior, established the RMT Trust as the primary vehicle to transfer assets to his wife, Michele M. Rollins. Among many of its stakes in property and operating assets, the RMT Trust held 8 million shares of Class A Common Stock in 2009, which represented approximately 39.4% of the voting control of Dover Motorsports. The Last Will and Testament stipulated that the RMT Trust would be administered by three trustees, presently Michele M. Rollins, R. Randall Rollins, and Henry B. Tippie. Through an agreement which renews annually, Michele Rollins and Randall Rollins yielded sole discretion over the voting power of shares held by RMT Trust to Henry Tippie. Therefore, at the behest of the Rollins, Henry Tippie maintained the dual role of Chairman of the Company and voting trustee of RMT Trust and was able to single-handedly determine the outcome of any and all shareholder votes. As the Company disclosed in its Annual Report:

“We are a controlled corporation because a single person…controls in excess of fifty percent of our voting power. This means he has the ability to determine the outcome of the election of directors at our annual meetings and to determine the outcome of many significant corporate transactions….Such a concentration of voting power could have the affect of delaying or preventing a third party from acquiring us at a premium.”

Business Overview

Key Executives

Henry B. Tippie, Chairman of the Board

Henry Tippie serves as Chairman of the Board of Dover Motorsports, as well as controlling Trustee of RMT Trust (Dover’s largest shareholder), and in these capacities exercises control over 54.4% of the combined voting power of the two classes of the Company’s common stock.

A Belle Plaine, Iowa farm boy, Henry B. Tippie enlisted in the United States Army Air Force at the age of 17, and enrolled at the University of Iowa upon completion of his military service. After earning his degree in Accounting in two years in 1949, Mr. Tippie pursued work as an accountant in Des Moines and Omaha, eventually earning his CPA in 1951. Shortly thereafter, he was hired by Delaware-based John W. Rollins, Associates as a controller. In his decades with the Rollins family and the diverse group of companies they control, Mr. Tippie has been instrumental in the growth and management of a number of firms across many unrelated industries.

For his many achievements in business, Mr. Tippie has been recognized with induction into the Horatio Alger Association of Distinguished Americans and has been the recipient of several distinguished alumni awards from the University of Iowa. In 1999, the University of Iowa renamed its College of Business Administration the Henry B. Tippie College of Business. The Henry B. Tippie College of Business was the first academic division of the University of Iowa to be named after an alumnus.

Mr. Tippie also serves as Chairman of the Board of Dover Downs Gaming & Entertainment and is a Director of three other public companies controlled by the Rollins family.

R. Randall Rollins, Director

In addition to his role as Trustee of RMT Trust and Director of Dover Motorsports and Dover Downs Gaming & Entertainment, Mr. Rollins was the Chairman of the Board of Rollins, Inc. (NYSE: ROL), Marine Products Corp. (NYSE: MPX), and RPC, Inc. (NYSE: RES) and maintained shared voting control of each of these public companies with his younger brother, Gary Rollins. As the eldest son of the late O. Wayne Rollins (brother of John W. Rollins, Senior) and as the sole Rollins family member involved with each of the five public companies controlled by the Rollins family, Mr. Rollins appeared to be the de-facto patriarch of the Rollins family.

Denis McGlynn, President, CEO and Director

Jeffrey W. Rollins, Director, son of John W. Rollins, Sr.

Kenneth K. Chalmers, Director

Patrick J. Bagley, Former CFO; Director

John W. Rollins, Jr., Director, son of John W. Rollins, Sr.

Eugene W. Weaver, Former SVP, Administration; Director

With the exception of Eugene Weaver, seven of the eight Directors of Dover Motorsports also served on the board of Dover Downs Entertainment. Mr. Tippie and Mr. McGlynn, maintained their respective directorships and/or management positions at Dover Downs Gaming & Entertainment as well, and received separate compensation from that entity.

DVD Directors – Overlap with Companies Controlled by the Rollins Family

Shareholder Concerns

Scale

Driving the consolidation wave of the late 1990’s through late 2000’s was Dover Motorsports’ largest competitor, International Speedway Corporation, or ISCA. Owning 13 active tracks, ISCA hosted 19 of the 36 NASCAR Sprint Cup Series races by 2009. By comparison, competitor Speedway Motorsports occupied a distant second place with eight racetracks, while Dover rounded out the third position with its four tracks and two Sprint Cup races. Consolidating a sizable portfolio of tracks and race dates under a single umbrella provided the leading players with sustainable competitive advantages in the form of superior ability to negotiate with NASCAR, lobby municipal and state governments and regulators, maintain pricing power for sponsorships and ticketing, and spread marketing and corporate expenses across a broader revenue base.

While the benefits of scale accrued to each of the top three market participants to some extent, International Speedway’s position as the industry leader had become increasingly difficult to challenge.

Dover Motorsports’ efforts to increase its size and competitive position, via both acquisitions and de novo expansion, were met with significant challenges. The 1998 acquisition of the Grand Prix Association of Long Beach for a pro-forma price of approximately $91 million included the Grand Prix of Long Beach, Gateway International Raceway and Memphis Motorsports Park. The Company later acquired the Grand Prix of Denver and Grand Prix of St. Petersburg and folded them into this business unit. These acquisitions resulted in a steady stream of asset impairments and goodwill writedowns of over $106 million between 2002 and mid-2009, and by 2005, only the Gateway and Memphis tracks remained part of Dover Motorsports.

In April 2001, Dover Motorsports inaugurated the Nashville Superspeedway, a 1.33 mile racetrack with a permanent seating capacity of 50,000, built at a cost of approximately $100 million (net of subsidies from the state of Tennessee). The facility was built for the purpose of attracting a NASCAR Sprint Cup Series race, which had yet to occur. In the 2009 NASCAR racing season, the Nashville Superspeedway played host to two NASCAR Nationwide Series races, the Pepsi 300 and Nationwide Auto Parts 300, and bore the unique distinction of being the only track to host two NASCAR Nationwide Series events without also hosting a Sprint Cup Series race.

By 2006, it was evident that Nashville would not attract a Sprint Cup series race, which resulted in nearly $20 million of asset impairments between 2006 and 2008.

In addition to the multitude of goodwill writedowns and asset impairments which occurred over the decade, it was believed that the Gateway, Memphis, and Nashville tracks collectively operated at a $5-$6 million annual loss and had never been profitable. An exact figure has never been available given the Company had never publicly provided any track level operating data or classified the Midwest assets as a separate operating unit.

Chairman Tippie’s business philosophy on cutting losses was highlighted in a 1999 interview from the Tippie School of Management at the University of Iowa.

“Being detail-oriented has always been important to me. I believe in getting all the facts, looking at different points of view, from different angles. It makes me a 24-hour “sleep on it” type of a decision-maker. I think it out, then go forward. If it doesn’t work, fine. I’m not one to stay with it if it doesn’t work– I cut my losses and try something else. I don’t let decisions keep me awake at night.”

“I’m probably at my best when things are toughest. When things get tough, I feel the need to organize and straighten things out. I’m strong on planning wherever I’m going. I’m also known as an ‘attack dog.’ I’m for attacking a problem, not running from it.”3

Declining Fundamentals

NASCAR experienced tremendous growth in popularity over a 15 year period, peaking at an estimated 75 million NASCAR fans in 2005. In the 2006 racing season, however, NASCAR began to experience declines in both television ratings and race attendance. Television ratings declined in 32 of 36 races, with declines of more than 10% for 16 of those races. In addition, NASCAR reports estimated that attendance decreased at a third of Sprint Cup races. At that time, it was estimated that fewer than half of the Sprint Cup races were sold out.45

The macro-economic fallout arising from the bursting of the United States’ housing bubble in 2007 continued to plague the consumer discretionary sector well into 2009. As a result, ticket demand for race events, corporate spending and sponsorship budgets, concession sales and other revenue streams generally remained soft across the motorsports industry, and Dover was no exception. Revenue and operating profit declines, which began in Fiscal 2006, had yet to reverse course. While the broad economic malaise affected Dover’s competitors as well, the Company’s lack of scale, its unprofitable tracks, and its reliance on a single facility (Dover) for its operating profit left the Company more vulnerable to undesirable economic conditions and underperformance. The reliance on a single track for its profits also subjected the Company to variability in results due to potential adverse weather conditions on its two Sprint Cup weekends per year.

Ticket sales presented a unique barometer for changing market conditions in the motorsports industry. Attendance at Dover International Speedway, never again sold out its 140,000 seated capacity, yet management continued to resist cutting ticket prices in 2009, opting instead to focus on package deals combining race admission, food and lodging.6 With 53% of NASCAR fans earning less than $50,000 annually, and 32% earning less than $30,000, many operators began to pay attention to what was becoming an increasingly elastic demand base.7 Competing racetracks aggressively cut prices in an attempt to revive volumes, with noteworthy examples such as Daytona International Speedway cutting grandstand prices to $40, the lowest level since 1996.8

The first wave of sponsorship terminations by corporate advertisers began in late summer and early fall 2008 with the abrupt exit of long-time supporters such as Chevron, General Motors and Chrysler. By July 2009, all four automobile manufacturers affiliated with the sport had reduced their support or announced plans to do so. Many of the sponsors who continued their involvement with NASCAR cut their commitments, forcing teams and track operators to seek multiple parties to split sponsorship deals.

While the early wave of sponsorship cancellations was weighted heavily towards the most beleaguered industries and marginal teams, by May 2009, speculation had begun that even brand-name players such as Jeff Gordon might be affected. Media sources were reporting that even DuPont chemical may not renew its NASCAR deal upon expiration, following other advertisers such as GM Goodwrench, Tide, Kodak, Jack Daniel’s and Jim Beam, among others.

Beyond the challenges faced by the prestigious Sprint Cup Series, the lower-tier events, such as the NASCAR Nationwide Series and Camping World Truck Series were hit even harder. With widespread sponsor exits and a number of teams sitting idle, industry observers are not convinced these lower tier series will survive in their current form over the intermediate term.

3 Business at Iowa, Henry Tippie Interview, Spring 1999

4 http://www.jayski.com/pages/tvratings2006.htm

5 USA Today, “NASCAR’s Growth Slows After 15 Years in the Fast Lane

6 Delaware News Journal, January 16, 2009

7 USA Today, “Tracks Go Extra Mile to Keep Fans Coming Back,” April 28, 2008

8 Revenues From Sports Venues, “Prices Drop for NASCAR Tickets in Daytona,” July 9, 2009

The slashing of corporate budget allocations to NASCAR, its raceways, races and teams led to multiplicative effects. As sponsor budgets fell, race teams were forced to cut their number of cars, number of races entered, merge with competitors, or cease operations altogether.

Many NASCAR track, event and team sponsors were in hard-hit sectors of the economy, such as automotive and construction. While some sponsorships were replaced by upstarts such as GoDaddy.com and Cash4Gold, serious questions remained about the ability of the industry to permanently replace lost revenue.

Transparency or Lack Thereof

The Company reported its financial results under a single operating segment, and did not disclose track-level information to any finer degree of granularity, making third-party analysis of the relative performance of various tracks a daunting task. The Company did not host an analyst day nor did its management participate in investor conferences. Dover Motorsports eliminated the Q&A portion of its quarterly earnings conference calls after the Q2 2008 event, eliminating the only public forum for shareholders to communicate with management. With no earnings guidance provided by the Company and minimal coverage provided by the equity research community, shareholders were seriously challenged to forecast future performance.

Failed Shift in Strategy

On January 28, 2009, Dover publicly announced it had entered into an agreement to sell Memphis Motorsports Park to Gulf Coast Entertainment, L.L.C. (“Gulf Coast”) for $10 million in cash, subject to financing conditions, with an expected closing date of April 30, 2009. Gulf Coast had announced its intention in September 2006 to build a major motorsports and entertainment facility in southern Alabama, with an initial expected completion date of fall 2009. By spring 2009, however, it became apparent that the financing for the Memphis acquisition might be at risk when Dover announced on April 24, 2009 that their agreement with Gulf Coast had been amended to provide for a closing on or before June 29, 2009. On July 8, 2009, Dover announced that Gulf Coast did not finalize its project financing in time for the scheduled June 29, 2009 closing date and further extended the closing date until September 29, 2009.

On September 30, 2009, the Company announced that its agreement to sell Memphis Motorsports Park to Gulf Coast had been terminated due to Gulf Coast’s inability to secure financing.

Public Market Valuation

From October 1, 2008 to October 1, 2009, Dover experienced a precipitous share price decline, falling nearly 72 percent, from $5.20 to $1.48 per share. This was more than double the percentage decline in the share prices of its two nearest competitors, International Speedway and Speedway Motorsports, whose share prices lost 30 percent and 26 percent, respectively.

While the $340 million price SMI paid for the New Hampshire International Speedway (a close comparable to Dover International Speedway) in 2008 may not be easily replicated in the environment of late 2009, even a fraction thereof would have eclipsed Dover’s total enterprise value, at that time, of roughly $91 million.

Investor Sentiment

By 2007, Dover’s outside shareholders had become increasingly concerned with the Company’s performance and strategy, voicing concerns about the Company’s prospects as a stand-alone entity. One of the most vocal shareholders was Marathon Partners, L.P., a New York City-based investment partnership founded by Mario Cibelli, the largest outside shareholder of the Company. In a series of letters addressed to Dover’s board of directors beginning in May 2007, Marathon articulated the concerns of Dover’s shareholders: namely, the Company’s weakened financial and operating position relative to its competitors and the resulting need to divest assets up to and potentially including the Company as a whole.

Marathon sent several letters to Dover’s board of directors during the period from 2007 to 2009. When Dover ultimately responded via letter on September 9, 2009, the Company’s General Counsel indicated that Dover had participated in merger talks with a consortium consisting of Speedway Motorsports and International Speedway, Dover’s primary competitors, on May 2, 2007. According to Dover Motorsports, the consortium offered to acquire Dover Motorsports for a five-cent per share premium to market value. Based on the May 1, 2007 adjusted closing price of $5.57, the stock went on to lose approximately seventy percent of its market value by late October 2009.

Voting Results of 2009 Annual Meeting

At the Company’s annual meeting which took place on April 29, 2009, shareholders voted on the re-election of three directors (including Mr. Tippie) and a stockholder proposal submitted by Marathon Partners to eliminate the Company’s poison pill.

Regarding Mr. Tippie’s re-election, 95.7 percent of the voting shares were cast in favor of Mr. Tippie’s re-election, with 4.3 percent of the votes being withheld. However, adjusting for the voting impact of the Class A shares, a very different result was apparent. Assuming all insiders had voted for the re-election of Mr. Tippie, the remaining non-insider votes would have totaled 65.2 percent withheld against Mr. Tippie’s re-election.

The number of “Withheld” votes related to the re-election of Chairman Tippie to the Board of Directors over his past three re-elections seemed to reflect a deterioration of support by outside shareholders.

Regarding the Stockholder Proposal, Marathon Partners argued in its supporting statement that the Rights Agreement served no other purpose than to arbitrarily limit the number of shares a current or prospective shareholder could own at 10% of the combined classes of stock.  Similar to the results of Mr. Tippie’s re-election, the vote of the non-insiders was drastically different than those of the insiders, with 90.7% of outside shareholders in favor of eliminating the poison pill.

Increasing Level of Shareholder Concern

Exchange Listing Warnings

On February 20, 2009, Dover Motorsports received a notice from the New York Stock Exchange indicating that it failed to meet the NYSE’s $75 million minimum market capitalization requirement and was in danger of being de-listed. On June 2, 2009, Dover received notice that it had regained compliance due to a reduction in minimum thresholds to $50 million. In early October of 2009, with a market capitalization of roughly $54 million, a mere 7.5 percent decline in the share price would once again put the Company in danger of being de-listed by the NYSE.

Suspension of Dividend

On July 29, 2009, Dover Motorsports announced that its Board of Directors voted to suspend the Company’s quarterly dividend on all classes of its common stock. As a result, Dover became the second Rollins-controlled public company in 2009 to suspend its regular dividend. The suspension of the dividend triggered the following salient provision in the Last Will and Testament of John W. Rollins, Senior.

“My wife shall have the power at any time and from time to time to require Trustee to convert any non income-producing property held at any time by the RMT to income producing property by delivering to Trustee a written direction to that effect.”9

Therefore, despite the Voting Agreement in force, the suspension of dividend enabled Ms. Rollins to compel Mr. Tippie to convert RMT Trust’s Dover shares from ‘non-income producing’ to ‘income producing’ at any time if so desired.

Debt Covenants

On August 21, 2009 the Company amended its revolving credit agreement with PNC Bank in order to avoid violating covenants attached to the revolver. As of the Company’s June 30, 2009 financial statements, $34.8 million was outstanding. The revised agreement increased interest rates on this facility to roughly LIBOR + 350 basis points, depending on certain external factors such as the current prime rate. In addition, the revised agreement granted the lender a lien on the Company’s assets and prohibited it from resuming its dividend.

Management Reticence to Discuss Sale

Setting itself apart from many companies which have wrestled with failed acquisitions and divestitures, concerns over debt repayment and de-listing notifications, Dover chose not to entertain any formal, public discussion of a potential sale process, nor did it publicly discuss the possibility of retaining an outside advisor to evaluate its options with respect to maximizing shareholder value. With the exception of CEO Denis McGlynn’s passing comment that “the Board has to look at [every potential offer]” during the Company’s July 24, 2008 earnings call (the Company’s final Q&A session), management had yet to publicly address the notion of a sale.

Management Non-Compete & Change in Control Provisions

As of the close of Fiscal Year 2008, the Company had $7.6 million to $9.2 million in contingent liabilities related to non-compete and change in control provisions relating to Dover’s senior management. Given the struggles endured by the Company, and subsequent evaporation of shareholder value, these agreements had appeared to become increasingly questionable. Independent observers may have wondered if a truly arms-length board would have continued to approve such agreements in the face of the Company’s ongoing challenges.

9 Last Will and Testament of John W. Rollins, Sr., paragraph 10(A)(1)

Strategic Alternatives

By October 2009, Dover Motorsports was at a crossroads with three simple options: it could maintain the status quo, continuing its present course of action and attempting to pay down debt out of cash flow; it could attempt to become a scale player through an acquisition or acquisitions, or it could retain a financial advisor and conduct a sales process.

Status Quo

Returning to profit growth via a “stay the course” strategy would first and foremost depend on a favorable macroeconomic environment. In the fall of 2009, industry observers expected headwinds to persist at least through 2010. Furthermore, the Company would need to sell its loss-generating business units in order to make more rapid progress on debt reduction and an eventual resumption of dividend payment. The failed sale of Memphis Motorsports Park to Gulf Coast Entertainment after nearly one year of public, and as much as three years of behind-the-scenes effort by the Company cast doubts on Dover’s ability to raise funds by selling any tracks except for its marquee asset, Dover International Speedway. With a strong likelihood of a continuing weak economic environment, incremental revenue and profitability expansion resulting from uplift in attendance, increased ticket prices and/or more favorable corporate sponsorship deals were becoming increasingly unlikely. In the event that NASCAR decided to reduce the number of races in future years, Dover Motorsports would potentially find itself at a disadvantage in its efforts to retain onto its Sprint Cup Series race weekends given its status as a small, independent operator.

During fiscal 2009, the Company was faced with a de-listing warning from the New York Stock Exchange which was only overcome due to a favorable change in requirements, and was forced to renegotiate its revolving credit agreement at less favorable terms when it appeared the Company would likely violate its debt covenants. Between these ongoing pain points, consolidation trends in the industry, and the Company’s position of weakness relative to its competitors, it was difficult to envision a scenario in which Dover Motorsports was capable of thriving as a stand-alone entity. By failing to articulate a forward-looking plan for a stand-alone Dover, management had done nothing to shed light on the viability of maintaining the status quo.

Acquisitions

Dover Motorsports had an extremely limited ability to pursue acquisitions due to a minimal cash position and diminished ability to fund acquisitions using debt. The Company’s experience with the Grand Prix Association of Long Beach cast doubts about its ability to successfully integrate an acquisition regardless of financing considerations.

Sale of Company

As the third largest public racetrack operator in the US, Dover Motorsports’ most credible potential acquirers were International Speedway Corporation and Speedway Motorsports. Each company had the financial and organizational capabilities to acquire and successfully integrate Dover Motorsports into a larger platform.

Potential Acquirers

International Speedway Corporation (“ISC”):

International Speedway Corporation was far and away the dominant racetrack operator in the US from the late-1990’s onward. In addition to its 13 racetracks, ISC was unique among track owners in the fact that its controlling shareholder, the France family, also owns the NASCAR organization. International Speedway had been a key partner of NASCAR in its attempt to expand and modernize the sport of automobile racing, and the two organizations have worked in tandem for over a decade to increase the number of high profile races and penetrate new media markets. NASCAR’s France family controlled more than two-thirds of the voting stock of International Speedway, and the two companies shared many of the same individuals among their executive ranks. While some of ISC’s competitors have alleged that this situation violated antitrust statutes, the courts had thus far shown little willingness to sever the relationship between these companies.

In early 2007, ISC acquired the remaining 62.5 percent of Raceway Associates it did not already own, giving it 100 percent of the Chicagoland Speedway and its Sprint Cup race weekend, for approximately $102 million. By acquiring nine tracks from 1999 to 2009, International Speedway demonstrated its competence at successfully valuing, purchasing, integrating and operating a nationwide portfolio of racetracks.

Speedway Motorsports Incorporated (“SMI”):

Speedway Motorsports Incorporated became the first publicly traded racetrack operator in the United States following its Initial Public Offering on the New York Stock Exchange in 1995. After pursuing a multi-year strategy of growth through the acquisition and closure of tracks in order to obtain NASCAR race dates, SMI operated eight racetracks by the fall of 2009. Speedway Motorsports boasts one of the largest permanent seat totals in the motorsports industry, and the highest average number of seats per raceway. In addition to its primary business of selling tickets to racing events, sponsorship and advertising placement and concessions sales, Speedway was also involved in the marketing and distribution of licensed and unlicensed souvenir and apparel merchandise and also operated a racing broadcast network through its Performance Racing Network subsidiary.

In January 2008, Speedway Motorsports closed on the $340 million acquisition of New Hampshire International Speedway, a racetrack with striking similarities to Dover International Speedway. Both facilities were home to two Sprint Cup race weekends, although New Hampshire International Speedway seats roughly 40,000 fewer attendees. Furthermore, New Hampshire International Speedway occupied a lower tier of TV revenue participation than the Dover racetrack for one of its two Sprint Cup races.

In December 2008, SMI closed on its acquisition of Kentucky Speedway for $78 million. Although it was designed with Sprint Cup Series events in similar fashion to Dover’s Nashville track, the facility did not host a Sprint Cup race weekend at the time it was purchased. Given Speedway’s objective of hosting one or two Sprint Cup race weekends at each of its qualified facilities, this transaction gave SMI a powerful incentive to obtain additional Sprint Cup races through an acquisition.

Transaction Rationale

A buyout offer could potentially arrive in the form of an all-stock offer at a premium to the Company’s current trading price, with a potential share repurchase designed to neutralize the dilutive effects of an all-stock transaction. Given recent retrenchments in the share prices of Dover’s two publicly-traded competitors, shareholders would derive additional upside in a subsequent recovery. Given the events of the first decade of the 21st century, it would be hard for any observer to conceive of a scenario in which Dover shareholders would be more successful as a standalone entity. Swapping Dover’s shares for those of a competitor who possessed a lower likelihood of underperforming the overall motorsports industry would mitigate any potential argument questioning the wisdom of what could be viewed as “selling at the bottom.”

Potential Obstacles

External obstacles to a transaction would be minimal. NASCAR demonstrated a willingness to endorse these roll-up acquisitions by transferring the race event sanction agreements to the acquirer. Both International Speedway and Speedway Motorsports have made no secret of their desire to acquire additional racetracks which host Sprint Cup Series events.

Internal obstacles to a transaction would be more formidable. The poison pill and non-compete agreements would need to be overcome before any possible transaction. Ultimately, the one and only relevant barrier to a Company-saving transaction appeared to be Mr. Tippie. His acquiescence would facilitate the board’s clear-headed assessment of the Company’s situation and realistic future progress, potentially forming an independent special committee and retaining an advisor.

Which Way Forward?

By all measures, the trajectory of Dover Motorsports under Mr. Tippie’s control left much to be desired. The remaining question for board members in 2009 was “What now?” Would the Company be best served by putting its future in the hands of a larger, stronger competitor, or by hoping to prevail in a battle of David versus two Goliaths?

If a board member felt a merger was the best course of action, how would he or she go about convincing Mr. Tippie that the history of Dover Motorsports and the jobs of its employees would be best secured through a merger, and that this transaction would be a fitting coda to an illustrious career spanning over six decades?

If, on the other hand, you elected to stay the course, how would you respond to concerns that you had neglected the concerns of the shareholders?

Given R. Randal Rollins role as a Director of Dover, a Trustee of RMT Trust (the largest shareholder), and apparent patriarch of the Rollins family, how might non-family board members attempt to convince Mr. Rollins to effect change at Dover?

How might Mr. Rollins best alter the current path of Dover given the long-standing relationship between Mr. Tippie and the Rollins family?

Subsequent Events

On October 30, 2009, the Company announced that it was ceasing all operations at Memphis Motorsports Park and that it would not promote any events in Memphis in 2010. Concurrently with the announcement, the Company announced it secured approval from NASCAR to realign the Memphis Nationwide Series race to Gateway International Raceway and the Camping World Truck Series race to Nashville Superspeedway.

On November 2, 2009, the Company reported its quarterly earnings for the period ended September 30, 2009. At that time, the Company disclosed that it made a further asset impairment charge of $7.5 million related to Memphis Motorsports Park.

On November 9, 2009, Marathon Partners sent a letter to the Trustees of RMT Trust, offering to acquire RMT Trust’s 8,000,000 shares of Class A common stock for $2.35 per share, a 35% premium to the day’s closing price of $1.75. While a sale of RMT Trust shares would not have resulted in Marathon Partners controlling the Company, it would have resulted in a shift of control from Mr. Tippie to other Rollins family members and management.

On November 17th, 2009, Mr. Tippie responded via letter to Marathon Partners indicating that the three Trustees of RMT Trust had no interest in pursuing Marathon Partners’ offer.

On November 25, 2009, Marathon Partners submitted a shareholder proposal to Dover Motorsports, seeking to amend the Bylaws of Dover to eliminate the transferability restrictions of Dover’s Class A Common Stock.

On December 1, 2009 Kansas Entertainment, LLC, a 50/50 joint venture between International Speedway and Penn National Gaming, was selected by the Kansas Lottery Gaming Facility Review Board to develop and operate a Hollywood-themed entertainment destination overlooking Turn 2 at ISCA’s Kansas Speedway, with a planned opening of 2012. Included within the joint venture’s winning proposal was ISCA’s commitment to add a second Sprint Cup race to Kansas Speedway in 2011.

On December 11, 2009, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling in which it dismissed, in its entirety, the civil antitrust action brought by Kentucky Speedway, LLC against ISC and NASCAR. Jerry Carroll announced on behalf of the plaintiffs that the founding track ownership group will not exercise remaining legal options in the case of Kentucky Speedway, which largely cleared the way for SMI to move a Sprint Cup date to Kentucky Speedway as early as 2011.

Mr. Tippie was awarded an honorary doctorate from the University of Iowa at their December 19, 2009 commencement ceremonies. In the official University of Iowa press release dated December 3, 2009, Dean Curt Hunter describes Mr. Tippie as follows:

“Henry Tippie is a man of humble demeanor but extraordinary achievement, and he is a role model for University of Iowa students,” said Hunter. “He has built his businesses the right away [sic], with hard work and ethical considerations always foremost. His generosity with the University ensures that he will continue to inspire our students for generations to come.”10

10 http://tippie.uiowa.edu/news/story.cfm?id=2248

Although the information contained in this case study has been obtained from public sources that the author believes to be reliable, the author cannot guarantee its accuracy. The case study is for academic purposes only, and does not constitute an offer or solicitation to buy or sell any securities discussed herein. Marathon Partners, LP supported the costs of completing this study and had an investment interest in Dover Motorsports, Inc. as of the time of this writing.

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Michael B. Rapps of Geosam Capital Inc has provided a guest post on WGI Heavy Minerals Inc (TSE:WG).

Michael recently joined Geosam Capital Inc., a Toronto-based private equity firm that focuses on small-capitalization activist investments and distressed debt investments. Prior to joining Geosam Capital Inc., he practiced law for 3 1/2 years at Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP where he focused on M&A and securities law. He is a graduate of McGill University with a BCL and L.LB (Bachelors of Civil and Common Laws).

Here’s his take on WGI Heavy Minerals Inc (TSE:WG):

WGI Heavy Minerals (“WGI”) operates two businesses: (i) the mining and sale of abrasive minerals; and (ii) the sale of aftermarket replacement parts for ultrahigh pressure waterjet machine cutting systems. WGI trades at $0.40/share on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “WG”. There are 23,617,610 shares outstanding for a market cap of approximately $9.4 million. I believe the upside in WGI’s share price is at least +65% and the downside is at least +22%.

Abrasive Minerals

WGI’s principal mineral product is garnet, which is used as an abrasive in sandblast cleaning and waterjet cutting of metals, stone, concrete, ceramics, and other materials. The majority of the company’s garnet is supplied pursuant to a distribution agreement with an Indian supplier that was formerly owned by WGI (WGI sold this company in 2008 and distributed the proceeds of the sale, together with a portion of its cash on hand, to shareholders). The distribution agreement guarantees WGI a supply of a minimum amount of garnet annually, with additional amounts to be supplied as mining capacity expands. This distribution agreement expires at the end of 2016. WGI also obtains garnet from its own mining operations in Idaho. Abrasive minerals represent 80-85% of WGI’s sales.

Waterjet Parts

WGI manufactures and distributes aftermarket replacement parts for ultrahigh pressure waterjet cutting machines under the “International Waterjet Parts” brand. Waterjet machines are used to cut a variety of materials using a thin, high pressure stream of fluid, often in very intricate and complex shapes. Waterjet technology continues to improve and take market share from older technologies, such as saws. According to WGI, the company competes in this market with OEMs, such as Flow International, Omax, Jet Edge, KMT and Accustream. Waterjet parts represent 15-20% of WGI’s sales.

Book and Liquidation Value

Below is an estimate of WGI’s book value and liquidation value:


Assuming additional liquidation costs of $500,000, the liquidation value would be reduced to $0.54/share (or $0.49/share on a diluted basis). As you can see, WGI trades at a meaningful discount to both its estimated liquidation value and its book value.

Profitability

I generally prefer to rely on tangible asset values than estimates of future profitability when looking at an investment opportunity. In this case, WGI trades substantially below its book and liquidation values. However, it is also profitable. In 2009, WGI generated EBITDA of $1,896,449 as follows:


This implies an EV/EBITDA multiple of 1.8. Investors can argue about what an appropriate multiple is, but we would likely all agree that this multiple is too low. Applying an EV/EBITDA multiple of 5.0 (for the sake of conservatism), WGI’s equity value per share is $0.66/share (65% upside).


Catalyst

WGI has two large shareholders. Jaguar Financial Corporation owns 3,777,100 shares representing 16% of the outstanding shares (acquired at $0.35/share). Cinnamon Investments Limited owns 3,098,500 shares, representing 13.1% of the outstanding shares (a portion of these shares was acquired as recently as January 2010 at $0.41/share).

Jaguar is known in Canada as an activist investor and has launched a number of proxy contests and take-over bids to unlock value at Canadian companies. Jaguar recently successfully challenged the acquisition of Lundin Mining by Hudbay Minerals. In Q4 2009, Jaguar obtained a seat on WGI’s board and pushed for WGI to use a portion of it cash to repurchase shares, which it did in December 2009 (at a price of $0.395/share).

At WGI’s upcoming annual meeting, I would expect Jaguar and Cinnamon to vote against the confirmation of WGI’s shareholder rights plan. The plan was adopted after Jaguar announced its acquisition of shares but prior to the time Jaguar received a board seat. With 29.1% of WGI’s shares voting against the rights plan, there is a decent chance the rights plan will be defeated, allowing Jaguar to launch a take-over bid for WGI in order to put them in play (a tactic they use routinely). I would also expect Jaguar to push WGI to take additional value-enhancing actions, such as additional share buybacks, and for its patience to run out if such actions are not undertaken in the near term.

Risk

The principal risk I see in WGI relates to its Idaho mining operations. WGI’s disclosure indicates that the mineral resource at WGI’s operating mine in Idaho has been declining in recent years. Accordingly, WGI is undertaking exploration (and eventual development) of the lands contiguous to its current mine, which it believes contain additional garnet. A complete depletion of the existing garnet would negatively affect WGI as its Idaho mine currently contributes approximately 17% of revenues (although WGI increased the amount of garnet it receives annually from India last year, so this percentage should be lower now). Additionally, significant expenditures on exploration and development would reduce WGI’s cash on hand.

Conclusion

Given that WGI is a profitable and growing company, I would argue that WGI should trade at least at its book value (67-85% upside on a diluted/non-diluted basis) and we should look at its liquidation value to determine our downside protection (22-35% upside). On an EV/EBITDA basis, WGI should also trade at a minimum of $0.66/share, providing upside of at least 65%. In the case of an acquisition of each of WGI’s divisions, the upside could be even greater.

[Full Disclosure: I do not hold a position in WGI. This is neither a recommendation to buy or sell any securities. All information provided believed to be reliable and presented for information purposes only. Do your own research before investing in any security.]

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