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Reading the Markets’ Brenda Jubin reviewed my new book Deep Value: Why Activist Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of Losing Corporations (hardcover or Kindle, 240 pages, Wiley Finance) in her post Carlisle, Deep Value:

Tobias E. Carlisle, co-author of a book I put on investors’ “must read” list—Quantitative Value, is back with another compelling volume, Deep Value: Why Activist Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of “Losing” Corporations (Wiley, 2014).

The most public face of deep value investing is Carl Icahn, known for his “battering-ram personality,” who has had a long, storied career as a discount options broker, arbitrageur and liquidator of closed-end mutual funds, corporate raider, and activist investor. In 1976 he wrote a memorandum, which his biographer dubbed the “Icahn Manifesto,” in which he stated: “It is our contention that sizeable profits can be earned by taking large positions in ‘undervalued’ stocks and then attempting to control the destinies of the companies in question by: a) trying to convince management to liquidate or sell the company to a ‘white knight’; b) waging a proxy contest; c) making a tender offer and/or; d) selling back our position to the company.” (p. 4) By the way, the last option, known as greenmail, in which the company in effect pays a ransom by buying back the raider’s stock at a premium to the market price, is now illegal.

Few people have the qualities necessary to be the next Carl Icahn. But they can still profit from the well tested principles of deep value investing.

Carlisle traces out the evolution of deep value investing, beginning with Benjamin Graham’s notion of net nets, companies whose “market capitalization was net of the net current asset value.” That is, these companies had a surplus of current assets (cash, receivables, and inventory) over all liabilities (current and long term) and had market capitalizations no higher than two-thirds of their net current asset value.

Warren Buffett viewed the acquisition of net nets as foolish “unless you are a liquidator.” He essentially rejected deep value investing with its strictly quantitative metrics and its cigar butt investment philosophy. He incorporated qualitative considerations into his company analyses and famously said that “It’s far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price.”

Read the rest of Brenda’s review here.

Buy Deep Value: Why Activist Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of Losing Corporations (hardcover or Kindle, 240 pages, Wiley Finance) from Wiley Finance, Amazon, or Barnes and Noble.

Click here if you’d like to read more on Deep Value, or connect with me on Twitter, LinkedIn or Facebook.

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Have questions about my new book Deep Value: Why Activist Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of Losing Corporations (hardcover or Kindle, 240 pages, Wiley Finance) or almost anything else? I’m answering questions on reddit/r/investing from 10:30 EDT today.

Click here to go to the Q&A.

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Earlier today I was on Bloomberg Radio’s Taking Stock with Pimm Fox and Carol Massar talking about my new book Deep Value: Why Activist Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of Losing Corporations (hardcover or Kindle, 240 pages, Wiley Finance).

Here’s the .mp3 of Taking Stock (my interview starts at about 13:45):

Taking Stock

Buy Deep Value: Why Activist Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of Losing Corporations (hardcover or Kindle, 240 pages, Wiley Finance) from Wiley Finance, Amazon, or Barnes and Noble.

Click here if you’d like to read more on Deep Value, or connect with me on Twitter, LinkedIn or Facebook.

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The Aleph Blog’s David Merkel reviewed my new book Deep Value: Why Activist Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of Losing Corporations (hardcover or Kindle, 240 pages, Wiley Finance). Here is the first half of his Book Review: Deep Value:

This is a book that starts with a simple premise: buy stocks at a fraction of the per share intrinsic value of the company, conservatively calculated.  Neat idea, huh, and it is called value investing.

The author starts by giving a preview of where he will end — with Carl Icahn when he was much younger, where he was buying closed-end funds at large discounts, and pressuring managers to liquidate the fund.  Eventually he started doing the same with overcapitalized companies trading a discount to the net worth of the company.

Then the author takes us on a trip through history, starting with Ben Graham buying the shares of companies at prices lower than the net liquid assets of the company, net of the debt.  It was easy money while it lasted, but eventually many of those companies were bought up and liquidated, and many of the rest had the stock price bid up until the value was no longer compelling.

Then we get to travel along with Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger, who note that the easy pickings are gone, and begin investing in companies that are inexpensive relative to their growth prospects.  This is more complicated, because these companies must have an advantage that will sustain their effort versus their competition.

Then we visit Joel Greenblatt, where he analyzes buying good companies at cheap prices, analyzing them the way an acquirer might do, but also looking for high returns on invested capital.  Lo, but it works, and furthers the efforts of those trying to obtain excess returns.

Then the book gets gritty, and looks at mean reversion of companies that have done poorly over the last four years.  Surprise! The worst tend to do quite well on average.  Also, raw application of simple valuation ratios tend to work on average in stock selection.  People undervalue the boring crud of the market, and overvalue the glamorous stocks, leaving an investment opportunity.

Then it tells a story that is personal to me, that of Litton Industries.  Litton Industries was one of two stocks I owned as a boy — gifts from relatives.  Litton Industries was a company that in the ’50s and ’60s used its highly valued stock to buy up companies that were not highly valued, and made Litton look like its earnings were growing rapidly, which propelled the value of Litton stock still higher.  So long as Litton could keep acquiring cheap-ish companies, the idea kept working, but eventually that ended, and the stock price crashed.  When did my relatives buy me shares of Litton?  Near the end, natch, when everyone know how wonderful it was.

Quite a lesson for an eight year old to see the stock price down by 80% in a year.  The other stock, Magnavox, did that also, so it is a testimony to my mother’s own clever investing that I ended up in this business… my story aside, the point of the Litton chapter was to point out that not all earnings growth is real, and that it is far better to focus on boring companies than what seems glamorous and successful.  Untempered optimism tends not to be rewarded.

Read the rest of David’s review of Deep Value here.

Buy Deep Value: Why Activist Investors and Other Contrarians Battle for Control of Losing Corporations (hardcover or Kindle, 240 pages, Wiley Finance) from Wiley Finance, Amazon, or Barnes and Noble.

Click here if you’d like to read more on Deep Value, or connect with me on Twitter, LinkedIn or Facebook.

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